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1 Does Labor Protection Increase Support for Im-
migration? Evidence from Switzerland
with Mirjam Bächli
1.1 Introduction
The number of international migrants has risen by nearly seventy percent since
1990, reaching 272 million people globally (UNPD, 2019). A small number of
countries, mostly high-income, have received a disproportionate share of immi-
grants. Among OECD members the foreign population makes up approximately
nine percent of the population (OECD, 2020). At the same time, immigration
has come to the center of political debates in a number of these countries. Anti-
immigrant rhetoric dominated recent elections in the United States and several
European countries, and the debates leading up to the Brexit referendum. The
wide voter support such campaigns receive is evidence of a rising concern about
how foreigners are integrated into society and the labor market of the receiving
country.
We investigate the role of labor market concerns in shaping preferences over
migration policies. Our main contribution is to test whether protecting native
working conditions affects support for immigration. We focus on Collective Bar-
gaining Agreements (CBAs) which set wage and working conditions for the con-
tracting parties. Our results show that collective bargaining coverage determines
how native support for immigration and native labor market outcomes respond
to the local presence of migrants.
Switzerland offers a favorable setting to study our research question. With 24
percent foreigners in the population, the country ranks second among the OECD
member states (OECD, 2020). Swiss direct democracy gives voters a say on
national policies. We focus on proposed changes to migration policy with impli-
cations for aggregate number of foreign residents. The votes took place between
2000 and 2014. Vote outcomes reveal the degree of native support for immigra-
tion. Recent changes to migration policies have been implemented conditional
on accompanying measures, including the enforcement of existing collective bar-
gaining agreements. The country does not have a national minimum wage, but
relies heavily on collective agreements to regulate industry- and region-specific
wage conditions with a coverage rate of 43% in 2016.
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The empirical analysis links native labor market outcomes and voting behavior to
local exposure to immigrants under different levels of collective bargaining cov-
erage. We use information on generally valid CBAs and employment by industry
to build a regional measure of the share of workers employed in an industry with
a collective agreement. A number of steps address concerns that agreements are
a response to deteriorating working conditions or to the inflow of immigrants.
We construct a leave-one-out measure of coverage at the industry level, where
we ignore employed in the region, and fix employment by industry at baseline.
Similarly, immigrants could self-select into regions with more positive attitudes
towards immigrants or better labor market conditions. To mitigate these con-
cerns, we rely on an instrumental variable strategy that uses past settlement
patterns to allocate migrants to regions within Switzerland.
We start by comparing native skill levels to those of immigrant workers, and
calculate collective bargaining coverage rates by level of skill. Immigrants are
overrepresented to the left of the skill distribution and underrepresented to the
right. Similarly, low-skilled natives are more likely to be employed in industries
with a CBA than high-skilled natives. Collective agreements, therefore, protect
labor market outcomes for the subset of natives who are likely to compete against
foreign workers.
The analysis of voting outcomes reveals a positive but insignificant effect of a
higher immigrant exposure on the share of pro-immigrant votes. Native edu-
cational attainment determines how vote outcomes respond to the presence of
migrants. Specifically, as the skill level of the native population declines, the
response becomes more negative. At the low end of the skill distribution we esti-
mate that a rise in immigration equal to 1 percent of the native population leads
to a decline in pro-immigration vote shares of 0.2 percentage points. Results
show that in these municipalities the negative response is weaker under higher
collective bargaining coverage. At the upper end of the skill distribution the re-
sponse to a higher local presence of immigrants is positive and does not depend
on the level of labor market protection.
To assess the relevance of labor market concerns as a determinant of voting
behavior, we turn to native labor market outcomes. Results show that a rise in
immigration is linked to a reduction in wages for low- to medium-skilled workers.
For natives at the lower end of the skill distribution a rise in the number of
migrants equal to 1 percent of the native population decreases wages by 0.6
to 0.7 percent. Results confirm that collective bargaining agreements mitigate
these negative effects – at high levels of coverage estimates are around -0.4 to
2
-0.5 percent. Similarly, we find that negative employment effects are mitigated
by a higher CBA coverage.
Our main contribution is to link vote outcomes to the presence of immigrants and
the underlying labor market institutions. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the
first attempt to draw a causal link between labor protection and preferences over
migration policies. The analysis of wage and employment outcomes complements
the voting results and provides evidence that labor concerns affect support for
immigration.
The determinants of native attitudes towards immigration have been studied
using social survey data with mixed evidence. Exposure to migrants could the-
oretically reduce prejudice as suggested by intergroup contact theory (Allport
et al., 1954). Schindler and Westcott (2017) find that the historic presence of
black American military units in the United Kingdom during the Second World
War is linked to lower stated prejudice and lower implicit bias towards blacks. In
contrast, Dustmann and Preston (2001) find that racial intolerance can explain
negative attitudes towards ethnic minorities again in the UK. Card et al. (2012)
argue that the desire to preserve a country’s customs and culture is the main
driver of anti-migrant sentiments. Similarly, using Swiss data Hainmueller and
Hangartner (2013) and Diehl et al. (2018) find that preferences over migration
policies vary with the country of origin of the migrant population considered.
Exposure to migrants could also increase anti-migrant sentiments if it raises eco-
nomic concerns among the native population. A number of studies link concerns
over the fiscal burden of immigration to negative attitudes towards migrants
(see Dustmann and Preston, 2007; Facchini and Mayda, 2009; Alesina et al.,
2018). Another strand of the literature argues that natives who are likely to
compete against foreigners in the labor market hold more negative attitudes (see
Scheve and Slaughter, 2001; Mayda, 2006; O’Rourke and Sinnott, 2006; Ortega
and Polavieja, 2012). Pecoraro and Ruedin (2019) argue that occupation-level
exposure to foreigners affects negatively native attitudes particularly when job
prospects are worse in Switzerland. In contrast, d’Hombres and Nunziata (2016),
Cavaille and Marshall (2019) and Margaryan et al. (ming) find that education
decreases the probability of holding anti-migrant views but this is not driven by
a labor market channel. While we also proxy exposure to foreign competition in
the labor market with skill level, we use regional variation in labor protection to
credibly test the relevance of labor market concerns.
A growing literature links election outcomes and exposure to immigrants. Evi-
dence from Austria (Halla et al., 2017), Denmark (Dustmann et al., 2019), Ger-
3
many (Otto and Steinhardt, 2014), Italy (Barone et al., 2016), France (Edo et al.,
2019) and United States (Tabellini, 2019) suggests that higher local migrant pres-
ence is associated with more votes for right-wing parties. Similarly, Cavaille and
Ferwerda (2017) argue that support for the far-right rose in response to a regu-
latory change that granted non-EU migrants access to public housing in Austria.
Guiso et al. (2017) link votes for populist parties to economic insecurity induced
by immigration. On the other hand, Mayda et al. (2018) find that Republi-
can vote shares are lower in US counties with higher share of migrants but the
response to low-skilled immigration is positive. Steinmayr (ming) finds that long-
term interaction reduces far right vote shares in the context of Austria, evidence
in line with the contact hypothesis, while short interaction has the opposite effect.
Rather than looking at stated attitudes towards migrants or inferring support for
immigration from election outcomes, we focus on popular votes on immigration
regulation. Facchini and Steinhardt (2011) argue that votes on immigration
policy in the US House of Representatives are driven by labor market concerns as
proxied by the skill level of the constituency. The Swiss direct democracy allows
us to observe directly voting behavior of the native population. Most relevant
to our work is the study of Brunner and Kuhn (2018) who look at Swiss votes
related to immigration regulation. Their results point at a sizeable increase in
anti-immigration vote shares as a response to the presence of culturally different
migrants in the municipality. Our paper focuses on labor market concerns and
asks whether protective labor market institutions are effective in alleviating them.
The literature has found mixed evidence of how immigration affects native wages
(see Borjas, 2003; Ottaviano and Peri, 2012a; Dustmann et al., 2016a). Using a
skill-cell approach and Swiss data, Gerfin and Kaiser (2010) document positive
effects for the low-skilled and negative for the high-skilled natives, while Basten
and Siegenthaler (2019) find no significant wage effects. Following Dustmann
et al. (2016a), we do not allocate migrants to skill groups but take a geographic
area approach. Our empirical strategy is similar to Beerli et al. (2018) who look
at exposure to high-skilled cross-border commuters in Switzerland and find a
positive effect on the wages of tertiary educated natives. In contrast, we study
resident foreigners.
Union membership received significant attention in the economics literature in
the 1990s (see Card, 1996; Lemieux, 1998). With respect to collective bargain-
ing agreements, recent papers have found mixed evidence on the wage effects
(Card and De La Rica, 2006; Gürtzgen, 2016) and some evidence of negative em-
ployment effects (Kahn, 2000; Magruder, 2012). Our focus is on how collective
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bargaining affects native labor market outcomes in the context of rising immigra-
tion. In an early paper focusing on European states, Angrist and Kugler (2003)
argue that labor regulation can protect some native workers from immigrant
competition, but it can also lead to worse employment outcomes. Recent work
investigates employment protection (D’Amuri and Peri, 2014), fixed versus indef-
inite term contracts (Edo, 2016) and minimum wages (Edo and Rapoport, 2019).
A number of papers focus on negative employment effects of immigration under
rigid wages (see Boeri and Brücker, 2005; Brücker and Jahn, 2011; Brücker et al.,
2014). In a meta analysis Foged et al. (2019) argue that institutional differences
are vital in reconciling findings from different countries. Collective bargaining,
specifically, is not found to have a significant effect. In contrast, we use within
country variation in labor market protection and take steps to alleviate endo-
geneity concerns with respect to collective bargaining coverage.
Recent work on labor market effects of immigration is often motivated by anti-
migrant sentiments. We contribute to this field by examining labor market effects
and explicitly looking at support for immigration. This approach is also followed
by Tabellini (2019) who studies the period of Mass Migration in the United States
and argues that not economic concerns but cultural differences are the drivers of
hostility against migrants in that context. The combination of a voting and labor
market analysis, and the variation in labor market protection allow us to draw a
link between labor market concerns and preferences over migration policies.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows: in Section 1.2 we discuss
context-specific immigration policies and collective bargaining agreements, and
data used; in Section 1.3 we describe the empirical strategy and present basic
trends in the data; in Sections 1.4 and 1.5 we present our results; Section 2.6
concludes.
1.2 Context and Data
1.2.1 Swiss Context
Migration regulation Swiss migration policies differentiate migrants on the ba-
sis of country of origin. Current policies in place imply that European Union and
European Free Trade Association countries face preferential treatment relative
to third-country nationals.
The Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons (AFMP) was negotiated as a
part of the Bilateral Agreements I with the European Union. Initially it applied
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to workers from EU-15/EFTA member states and was later extended to new EU
members.1 The policies were implemented specifically for country groups and
over several years. EU-15/EFTA and EU-10 members have enjoyed unconditional
free movement of persons since 2014, EU-2 members since 2019. In contrast,
immigration policy applicable for non-EU/EFTA workers is strictly regulated.
Rules are guided by the Federal Act on Foreign Nationals and Integration which
came into force in January 2008. Quotas are decided on an annual basis by the
federal government.2 Prerequisites for a working permit to be granted include a
high skill level, non-violation of the local priority requirement, wage and working
conditions that correspond to local and professional standards to prevent wage
dumping.3 Note that different rules apply to foreign nationals who migrate for
family reunion reasons and to asylum seekers.
The Swiss direct democracy allows its citizens over eighteen years of age to take
part in compulsory and optional referendums, as well as popular initiatives.4
Voters can challenge newly approved migration policies by the parliament with
optional referenda and in addition propose changes through popular initiatives.
Since only Swiss nationals are eligible to vote, results reflect native preferences.
Popular votes are scheduled three to four times per year and each eligible voter
receives a voting booklet with details of the proposal. Hence, voters understand
well the principles of direct democracy and have access to all relevant information
to make an informed choice.
According to data from the Swiss State Secretariat of Migration (SEM), the
number of foreign residents in Switzerland rose by more than 53% between 2000
1EU-15 member states are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom; EFTA are
Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway; EU-10 are Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary,
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia; EU-2 are Bulgaria and Romania;
EU-28 includes EU-15, EU-10, EU-2 and Croatia.
2Determinants are economic demand, utilization of the previous year’s quotas, hearings of
the cantonal authorities and employer/employee representatives.
3High-skilled people are defined as tertiary educated with several years of professional ex-
perience as a manager or a specialist. To fulfil the local priority requirement employers need
to present proof that there are no other suitable Swiss or EU/EFTA candidates available for
the specific position.
4Constitutional amendments or accessions to supranational organizations are by default
subject to a compulsory referendum. Optional referendums can challenge an act passed by
parliament. A popular majority is sufficient for approval. Popular initiatives allow voters to
submit proposals that will be incorporated into the federal constitution conditional on being
accepted. A sufficient condition for a popular initiative is that 100,000 signatures are collected
within 18 months after having fulfilled some formalities that are confirmed by the Federal Chan-
cellery. For comparison, a minimum of 50,000 signatures have to be collected within 100 days
after the official publication of the act for an optional referendum to be called. Alternatively, a
minimum of eight cantons can demand a vote. A majority of voters and a majority of cantons
must vote in favor of the initiative for it to be approved. A double majority is also required for
a compulsory referendum to pass.
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and 2018 to above 25% of the population. This observed rise in immigration is
largely driven by foreigners coming from EU/EFTA countries. They account for
69% of all immigrants at the end of the period. There are significant differences in
motives for migration among the EU/EFTA and third-country nationals. In 2018
64.7% of EU-28/EFTA nationals entered for employment reasons and only 22.8%
for family reasons. In contrast, 10% of the inflow of non-EU/EFTA nationals in
the same year came for reasons of employment, while 47.3% of them entered for
reasons of family reunification. This can be linked to the policies in place which
make it difficult for non-EU/EFTA nationals to acquire a working permit.
Collective bargaining The Swiss labor market is considered relatively unregu-
lated – it ranks 35 out of 42 countries in 2013 according to the employment protec-
tion legislation index of the OECD.5 Collective bargaining agreements (CBA) are
a common tool to set working conditions in Switzerland. A collective bargaining
agreement is a fixed-term contract with normative provisions such as minimum
wages, working hours, holidays and wage eligibility during sickness, motherhood
and military service. These conditions are binding for the contracting parties,
which are the involved employers and employees. Unions often negotiate these
conditions on behalf of the employees. However, an employee must not necessarily
be union member to benefit from the negotiated clauses because of firms apply-
ing the conditions to the entire workforce or of extension mechanisms making the
agreement generally valid for an occupation or industry.
According to the Survey on Collective Labour Agreements (SCLA), the number of
covered employees rose from 1.26 million to 2 million between 1999 and 2014. In
the end of the period around 41% of the employed are covered.6 The upward trend
is driven by a rising number of workers covered by agreements with minimum
wage clauses, which account for 87% of the covered population in the end of
the period. Agreements often specify minimum wage levels for individuals by
educational attainment, while some also condition on experience. The rise is due
to new CBAs being signed but also existing CBAs made generally valid.
Since 1956 it is possible to declare an existing CBA generally valid.The procedure
starts with a written request from the contracting parties. Certain conditions
must be met for a request to be approved – importantly there is a quorum
requirement where initial contracting parties should account for a majority of
5The index measures the strictness of regulation on individual and collective dismissals. The
US is ranked most liberal.
6While the number of covered includes employers as well as employees, we consider the
former as insignificant.
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covered employers and employees.7 Once declared generally valid, agreements
are binding for everyone in the industry or the occupation. Although only a
small share of all CBAs are generally valid, they account for 50% of all covered
workers. The total number of such agreements rose from 36 in 2000 to 71 in 2014,
and the number of total workers covered doubled. We concentrate on generally
valid CBAs as we think of such agreements as setting industry-wide standards.
Such agreements are divided into cantonal and national ones, where at least two
cantons are involved in the latter. Minimum wages as a form of labor protection
can alleviate concerns over labor market outcomes, so we focus on agreements
with minimum wage clauses (86% of all generally valid agreements).
Labor market considerations played a dominant role in the discussions prior to the
votes. The AFMP, specifically, was predicted to significantly increase the inflow
of EU/EFTA workers with potentially negative consequences for native workers.
Implementation was, therefore, conditional on accompanying measures aimed at
ensuring that all firms and employees adhere to the Swiss wage and working
conditions. The accompanying measures came into force in 2004, and include
systematic wage controls to prevent abusive wage undercutting and sanctions for
breaching the rules. The systematic wage controls are conducted by the parity
and tripartite commissions. It is the responsibility of the parity commission (in-
cluding representatives from unions and employer associations) to check whether
CBA conditions are fulfilled and hence strengthen the enforcement of agreements.
If violations are found, an existing CBA can be declared generally valid in a sim-
plified procedure8 or if it already exists, fines and sanctions are imposed. The
cantonal tripartite commissions consist of representatives from unions, employer
associations, and the canton itself. They conduct risk-based wage and working
condition controls in industries without a CBA. Parental union organizations rec-
ommended a vote in favor of the AFMP as accompanying measures were deemed
sufficient to protect working conditions.
7The following conditions defined by law must be fulfilled for an agreement to be declared
generally valid: (1) necessity; (2) non-infringement of general interest and minority interests
considered; (3) quorum conditions – more than half of the employers being covered by the
generally valid CBA must be part of the current CBA; more than half of the employees being
covered by the generally valid CBA must be part of the current CBA; the employers involved
in the current CBA must employ more than half of the employees that will be covered under
the generally valid CBA.
8In a simplified procedure only the third quorum condition has to be satisfied. Note that




We use a combination of administrative data and large-scale surveys.
Voting outcomes We look at votes that relate to Switzerland’s migration policy
towards EU/EFTA nationals or third-country nationals. The six votes we focus
on have direct implications for immigration levels and took place in the period
2000–2014. Specifically, we include four optional referenda, which relate to the
AFMP and the Federal Act on Foreign Nationals and Integration (AuG), and
two popular initiatives, which propose quantitative restrictions (for a list of votes
see Table A1).
Results of national votes at the municipality level are provided by the Federal
Statistical Office (FSO).9 Available information includes the number of citizens
with the right to vote, participation and acceptance rate. In line with Brunner
and Kuhn (2018), we classify proposals as pro- or anti-immigration based on
implications for aggregate immigration levels. The outcome of interest is the
share of pro-immigration votes in a municipality and we also look at participation
rates.
We supplement these data with information from the Vox Survey (Vox Survey,
2019). This is a post-vote telephone survey covering eligible voters. While it
has been conducted since 1981, we restrict the sample to the six votes used in
our main analysis. The questionnaire asks whether and how respondents voted
in a specific vote, about demographic characteristics, income level and a set of
attitudinal questions. We link self-reported voting behavior to stated attitudes
towards foreigners in the country.
Labor market outcomes The Swiss Earnings Structure Survey (SESS) is a
large-scale firm survey conducted biennially in the month of October between
1994 and 2016. It is a repeated cross-section of firms covering the secondary
and tertiary sectors of the economy. Respondents provide information about a
random subset of employees. The number of workers covered depends on firm
size, with information available for at least one third of all workers. In 2014 the
survey included about 32,000 public and private enterprises with approximately
1.6 million workers. At a firm level there is information about the region where
the firm is located, industry and size. The SESS has information on the gross
9Out of the 2,222 municipalities in 2018, seven do not have an own voting office leaving us
with a sample of 2,215 municipalities.
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hourly wages of individual workers and their educational attainment.10 We dif-
ferentiate between three skill levels based on highest education attained – at most
up to lower-secondary, upper-secondary and tertiary education. Data allows us
to distinguish native from foreign workers, and within the latter group foreigners
with different permit types. The sample is limited to employees 18–65 years of
age, working in private sector enterprises with available region of work and per-
mit type as well as gender. We collapse the employee-level data at the regional
level using survey weights provided. Our main outcome of interest is the mean
hourly wage by skill level where we proxy skill with educational attainment and
percentiles of the native skill distribution (see Dustmann et al., 2013).11
While the SESS covers only employed individuals, the Swiss Labor Force Survey
(SLFS) includes individuals aged 15 years and older. The survey was conducted
annually in the second quarter of the year from 1996 to 2009 and quarterly in the
period 2010 to 2018. For consistency, annual data is used over the full period.
In 2014 around 125,000 interviews were conducted. Information about munic-
ipality of residence, demographic characteristics (sex, age and marital status),
educational attainment and employment outcomes is available for the household
head. We limit the sample to individuals in the age group 18–65. Employment
is defined as being employed for a salary, by a family member or self-employed.
The main outcome of interest, constructed using survey weights, is the native
employment rate in a region – the number of employed relative to population
18–65 years of age. We construct outcomes by educational levels defined as in
the analysis of wage outcomes.
Immigration Our main data source is the Swiss Central Migration Information
System (ZEMIS). Among migrants, we use information on individuals with short-
term (L), resident (B) and settled status permit (C).12 Individuals are covered if
they reside in the country on December 31 for the period 1996–2018. The data
are provided at the municipality level before 2002 and at the individual level
after. They offer information on the flow and stock of migrants by country of
citizenship, permit type, gender, age and civil status.
To calculate local exposure to migrants, we combine these data with information
10Gross hourly wages include social contributions, Sunday or night work compensation, 1/12
of 13th salary and other non-periodic payments but exclude overtime pay. Real values are
constructed using CPI data indexed to December 2015.
11Following Dustmann et al. (2013), we trim observations above the 99th and below the 1st
percentile of the wage distribution in each region.
12Provisionally admitted foreigners (F permit), asylum seekers (N permit) and people in
need of protection (S permit) are excluded. These types of permits are granted only to non-
EU/EFTA nationals. We also exclude cross-border commuters (G permit) who come mainly
from EU/EFTA member states.
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on population size at the municipality level from the FSO. Our measure is the
number of migrants in a region in a year divided by the native population in 2000.
By fixing the denominator we abstract from issues related to native mobility as
well as naturalization of foreign nationals. Additionally, we use data on migrant
stocks by citizenship at the municipality level from the 1970 and 2000 census and
2000 census data in constructing demographic controls for the vote analysis.
Collective bargaining The State Secretariat of Economic Affairs (SECO) pro-
vides a list of the universe of generally valid agreements from June 2000 onwards.
We restrict the sample to CBAs with a minimum wage clause, which account
for 89% of all agreements. Our database shows for each CBA the name, the
period when it was in force, its geographic coverage and the 4-digit NOGA-08
industry. We calculate the share of workers employed in an industry with a CBA
by combining time-varying information about coverage at the industry level and




ShEmpli,r,1995 × 1{CBAr,i,t = 1}
A region is indicated with r, t is year, i is industry at the 3-digit NOGA-08 level
and I the total number of such industries (259 for 3-digit). The first term on the
right-hand side is the share of native employees in region r that work in industry i
in 1995. The second term is a dummy variable equal to one if there is a generally
valid CBA in region r in industry i and year t.
1.3 Empirical Strategy and Trends
1.3.1 Empirical Strategy
We are interested in how the regional exposure to immigrants affects views on
immigration policies and labor market outcomes. Our main contribution is to
investigate whether these effects depend on the level of collective bargaining
coverage. The empirical analysis builds on the following two regression equations.
yr,t =αmr,t + X
′
r,tγ + δr + δt + εr,t (1.1)
yr,t =α1mr,t + α2mr,t × ShCBACovr,t + α3ShCBACovr,t + X′r,tγ + δr + δt + εr,t
(1.2)
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Region r and year t define the unit of observation. In the analysis of voting
outcomes r stands for municipality. Municipalities are the smallest administrative
units – a total of 2,222. Their large number makes them attractive for the
analysis of vote outcomes in the absence of individual-level data. In the labor
market analysis the geographical unit is the commuting zone or MS-region.13
A commuting zone – 106 in total – consists of municipalities that are spatially
similar, so obey the principles of small-scale labor market areas.
Outcome variables yr,t measure the share of pro-immigration votes, the natural
log of gross hourly native wages and the native employment rate. The latter
two outcomes are analysed by educational attainment while wage effects are
additionally proxied with percentiles along the native wage distribution. The
analysis is separately conducted for five-percentile steps following Dustmann et al.
(2013). Our main independent variables are mr,t, the migrant exposure measure,
and ShCBACovr,t which measures the extent of CBA coverage.
As control variables we add characteristics of natives that are consistent in the
two parts of the empirical analysis to Xr,t – gender, average age and highest
educational attainment. In the labor market analysis those refer to time-varying
native worker and respondent characteristics from the SESS and SLFS, respec-
tively. In the voting analysis age and education are fixed in 2000 and interacted
with a year variable (for an overview of control variables see Table A2). We
include region fixed effects, as well as year or referenda fixed effects in the la-
bor market or voting analysis, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the
regional level.
The place of residence of immigrants likely depends on labor market conditions
as well as native attitudes towards foreigners and is, therefore, not random. To
address this, we follow an instrumental variable approach where we create a shift-
share instrument for immigration exposure (see Altonji and Card, 1991; Card,
2001). We fix the share of immigrants from origin o across regions r in 2000 and





13MS comes from the French “mobilité spatiale”.
14We use 162 separate countries of origin in the construction of the instrument. Seventeen
countries of origin are not in the 1970 census data, while only one is not in the 2000 census. We
allocate migrants from those countries according to initial geographical distribution of migrants
with an unknown origin. Alternatively, we can group countries based on geographical location.
Results, not reported for brevity, remain consistent.
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This identification strategy has been widely applied in the migration literature.
The intuition is that past immigration can predict location choice of newly arriv-
ing migrants. This strategy addresses the endogeneity problem if past immigra-
tion is uncorrelated with current demand shocks. In a robustness check we use
the 1970 distribution of migrants by origin which one could argue is less likely
to be correlated with current location-specific shifts in demand. Results remain
qualitatively similar.
Recent criticisms of the use of shift-share instruments in this context were raised
by Jaeger et al. (2018) who argue that estimates are likely positively biased as
they reflect dynamic adjustments of economic conditions to previous migration
waves. We consider this less of a concern in our context for a number of reasons.
First, the origin composition of migrants changed substantially since the 1990s.
The correlation between changes in immigrant stock by country from 1990 to 2000
and 2000 to 2010 is 0.11 and not significant.15 Second, we document negative
wage effects for natives in skill groups affected by immigration which is unlikely
under dynamic adjustments to past migration.
Other studies raise general concerns with the use of a shift-share type of in-
strument (see Borusyak et al., 2018; Goldsmith-Pinkham et al., ming). The
underlying variation in our instrument comes from 159 origins over a period of
fifteen years. Following the literature we compute the Rotemberg weight (RW)
for each country. The three origins receiving the highest positive weights turn
out to be the same in the analysis of vote, wage and employment outcomes –
Germany, France and Portugal. These are cases where estimates tend to be sen-
sitive to misspecification. We exclude these countries in a robustness check when
constructing the instrumental variable. Results are shown to be robust.
Generally valid CBAs are attractive for identification purposes as they are binding
for firms that did not initiate the agreement, making variation more likely to be
exogenous. Although they are publicly available, people are likely not aware
of them, especially as individual working contracts can deviate in favor of the
worker. Hence, neither native not foreign workers are expected to take generally
valid CBAs systematically into account when deciding in which region to live or
work. In our baseline measure of coverage we fix the industrial structure to 1995
values. By abstracting from over-time changes in Swiss employment by industry,
we rule out variation in industrial structure due to the new CBAs or to the inflow
of foreign workers.
15The correlation between changes from 1980 to 1990 and 1990 to 2000, on the other hand,
is 0.86 indicating that the origin composition of immigrants remained very similar over period.
Results are comparable if one looks at changes in the share of migrants by origin group.
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In the specification in which we instrument migrant exposure, we use a modified








ShEmplr′,i,1995 × 1{CBAr′,i,t = 1},∀r′ 6= r
ShEmplr′,i,1995 is share of industry i’s employment in 1995 that is in region r
′.
1{CBAr′,i,t = 1} is an indicator function equal to one if there is a collective
agreement in region r′ in industry i in year t and zero otherwise. By focusing
on individuals employed in other regions, we aim to mitigate concerns about
reverse causality or that new agreements are a response to changes in local labor
market conditions. The limitation of such a specification is that we can interpret
estimates only as reduced form effects.
1.3.2 Summary Statistics and Stylized Facts
Table 1.1 shows summary statistics for the main variables of interest in the em-
pirical analysis.
Voting outcomes as measured by the share of pro-immigration votes are sum-
marized first. There is substantial variation in outcomes across the six votes we
consider and some policy proposals faced much higher voter approval than oth-
ers. For example, the Bilateral Agreements I with the EU which is the first vote
we consider (a pro-immigration proposal) was approved by a clear majority of
voters. The AuG vote which took place in 2006 (an anti-immigration proposal)
also had wide voter support. Additionally, there is considerable variation across
municipalities for each of the votes included.
Wage and employment outcomes for native workers at the commuting zone level
for the period 2000–2014 are presented next. The mean log gross hourly wage
received by native workers is 3.6 (35 CHF in levels). There is a large wage
premium to upper-secondary but particularly to tertiary education. For the
average region a low-skilled worker earns a gross hourly wage of about 28 CHF
while a high-skilled worker earns approximately 48 CHF.16 The average native
16The exchange rate USD/CHF is approximately 1.03 (August, 2019).
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Table 1.1: Summary statistics
N Mean Sd Min Max
Share pro-immigration votes: 2000 I 2215 0.671 0.119 0.059 0.960
Share pro-immigration votes: 2000 II 2215 0.638 0.091 0.191 0.947
Share pro-immigration votes: 2005 2215 0.558 0.106 0.068 0.824
Share pro-immigration votes: 2006 2215 0.320 0.101 0.063 0.705
Share pro-immigration votes: 2009 2215 0.595 0.110 0.081 0.860
Share pro-immigration votes: 2014 2215 0.495 0.112 0.064 0.810
Mean ln gross hourly wage of natives 848 3.594 0.109 3.246 3.837
...lower-secondary educated 848 3.345 0.082 2.924 3.732
...upper-secondary educated 848 3.526 0.081 3.219 3.729
...tertiary educated 847 3.879 0.103 3.277 4.078
Native employment rate 1590 0.776 0.047 0.332 1.000
...lower-secondary educated 1576 0.451 0.117 0.000 1.000
...upper-secondary educated 1590 0.787 0.059 0.132 1.000
...tertiary educated 1585 0.909 0.053 0.000 1.000
Immigrants to 2000 native population 1590 0.294 0.137 0.038 0.685
Share CBA covered 1590 0.158 0.045 0.074 0.448
Note: The table presents summary statistics for voting and native labor market outcomes,
immigrant exposure and collective bargaining agreement coverage. See Table A1 for a descrip-
tion of the votes considered. Voting outcomes are weighed using the number of voters, labor
market variables with the number of native workers in 2000 (SESS data) and the number of
native respondents 18-65 years of age in 2000 (SLFS data). The migrant exposure measure
is weighed with the total population level in 2000 and the share of CBA covered with the
number of workers in 2000. SESS, SLFS, migrant exposure and CBA coverage variables are
measured at the commuting zone level, vote outcomes at the municipality level. Source: FSO,
SECO, SESS, SLFS, ZEMIS.
employment rate is 77.6% and varies widely across skill groups. Among lower-
secondary individuals it is 45.1% and among tertiary educated 90.9%.
Due to institutional differences, educational degrees are not necessarily compa-
rable across countries. In addition, skills acquired abroad may not be perfectly
transferable and, thus, be discounted. Wages allow an alternative view on how
education is valued on the labor market. Figure 1.1a follows Dustmann et al.
(2013) and plots the share of migrants along the native wage distribution.17 The
horizontal line at 1% is a natural point of comparison as it represents the equal
split of natives along own wage distribution. The graph shows that migrants are
overrepresented not only at the very bottom of the income distribution but up to
the fortieth percentile. Overall, this evidence suggests that natives with a low-
to medium-level of skill are the ones who face labor market competition with
foreign workers. This is confirmed by Figure A1a which plots the share of native
and migrant workers by educational attainment.
The SESS does not provide information on nationality. Hence, we are not able to
17Following Dustmann et al. (2013), the kernel estimates are calculated on the log of the
odds of the position in the native distribution and are then transformed.
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Figure 1.1: Skill level and CBA coverage
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Note: Figure (a) presents kernel estimates of the density of migrant workers along the native
wage distribution. Figure (b) presents a local linear smooth plot of the share of native workers
employed in an industry with a CBA by percentile of the native wage distribution. Source:
SECO, SESS.
compare the skill of EU/EFTA and non-EU/EFTA to the one of Swiss workers
as proxied by educational attainment or wage percentiles. The SLFS database,
however, offers information on the occupation of Swiss workers as well as migrants
by nationality. In 2014 migrants are overall more likely than Swiss workers to hold
occupations at lower levels of the ISCO-08 classification. Therefore migrants tend
to hold jobs with lower skill requirements. Furthermore, a comparison between
EU/EFTA and non-EU/EFTA nationals shows that this pattern is even more
pronounced in the latter group. Therefore, we expect that low-skilled natives are
the ones who compete against migrants and particularly against non-EU/EFTA
workers.
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The share of CBA covered in employed among natives is 15.8%. Given the ob-
jective of CBAs and the industries in which they fall, we expect that agreements
apply in particular to workers with low levels of skills. Figure 1.1b shows that
the share of covered workers is higher at lower percentiles of the wage distribu-
tion in 2000 and 2014. Therefore, coverage level drops as skill level rises. In
addition, as in most agreements managers are explicitly excluded, coverage for
the high-skilled workers is likely to be overestimated by simply looking at in-
dustry of employment. Figure A1b offers similar evidence when proxying skill
with educational attainment – it is among the tertiary educated that coverage is
lowest.
Overall the summary statistics and stylized facts suggest that there is substantial
variation across regions in support for immigration and labor market conditions.
The objective of this study is to test the extent to which this variation can be
attributed to differences in migrant exposure and the level of labor protection
across regions.
1.4 Voting Analysis
1.4.1 Votes and Preferences
Our proxy for support for immigration comes from vote outcomes, which is in
contrast to the majority of studies that use social survey responses. The benefit
of votes is that they show revealed rather than stated preferences. A potential
concern with the vote outcomes could be that they do not represent the prefer-
ences of the general population. The mean participation rate across the six votes
considered is slightly more than fifty percent of eligible voters. Although absten-
tion in single votes can be large, the share of permanent abstainers is estimated
to be only between ten and twenty percent in the Swiss context (Sciarini et al.,
2016).
An additional concern is that voting results reflect preferences over a specific pol-
icy proposal which may not be representative of attitudes towards immigration
more generally. This issue is mitigated by including outcomes from several votes.
Additionally we rely on the Vox survey data. It offers information on individual-
level voting behavior for the same set of votes, and on attitudes. Respondents are
asked whether they would prefer Switzerland (1) that gives equal opportunities
to foreigners or better chances for the Swiss; (2) that is more open to the outside
or more closed. In Table A3 in the Appendix we test whether voting behavior
and attitudes are correlated after controlling for individual-level attributes. All
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regressions include place of residence and vote fixed effects.18 Consistently, re-
spondents who state that they are in favor of equal opportunities for foreigners
and an open Switzerland are found to be more likely to cast a pro-immigration
vote. Therefore, voting behavior is representative of general attitudes towards
immigrants.
1.4.2 Immigrant Exposure and Native Voting Behavior
We are motivated by a conceptual framework in which labor market concerns
affect support for immigration (see Scheve and Slaughter, 2001). Given that
immigrants are overrepresented at the bottom of the skill distribution, we think
that labor market concerns are relevant to low-skilled natives. In what follows
we test whether such concerns lead to negative voting behavior.
Table 1.2 presents estimates of the impact of a higher foreigner exposure on
the share of pro-immigration votes from Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) in Panel
A and Instrumental Variable (IV) regressions in Panel B. OLS estimates are
insignificant and small in magnitude, while the evidence from the IV specification
suggests a positive effect. The magnitude of the latter estimate goes down in the
full control specification and becomes insignificant at the ten percent level. A
positive effect is in line with the contact hypothesis (Allport et al., 1954).
We modify Equation 1.1 to allow for the direct effect of migrants to depend on
native skill levels. We proxy the share of skilled voters using the proportion of
upper-secondary or higher educated natives in the municipality based on 2000
census data. In columns (2) and (5) of Table 1.2 skill enters as a continuous
variable and in columns (3) and (6) as quintiles to allow for non-linearities. It
is evident that as the average skill level in a municipality rises, the response to
immigration becomes more positive. To ease interpretation, Figure 1.2a plots
estimates from the IV full control specification and shows how a higher foreigner
share affects vote outcomes at different quintiles of the skill distribution. Effects
are negative for municipalities in the bottom quintile of the distribution, where
the share of individuals with at least an upper-secondary degree is less than
61%. An increase in the number of immigrants equal to 1 percent of the native
population decreases the share of pro-immigration votes by 0.2 percentage points.
At the top of the distribution, where the share of individuals with at least an
upper-secondary degree is more than 75%, the effect is opposite – an increase in
18Note that place of residence is defined based on a separate classification with sixty-four
categories, referred to as agglomerations.
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Table 1.2: Voting analysis by native educational level
Outcome: share of pro-immigration votes
Without controls With controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: OLS
Sh. migrants 0.018 -0.644 -0.069 -0.020 -0.217 -0.056
(0.034) (0.342) (0.030) (0.025) (0.235) (0.029)
Sh. migrants x sh. skilled 0.933 0.283
(0.508) (0.354)
Sh. migrants x Q2 sh. skilled -0.010 0.007
(0.038) (0.039)
Sh. migrants x Q3 sh. skilled -0.011 -0.025
(0.044) (0.048)
Sh. migrants x Q4 sh. skilled 0.176 0.117
(0.061) (0.057)
Sh. migrants x Q5 sh. skilled 0.145 0.048
(0.102) (0.083)
N 13290 13290 13290 13290 13290 13290
Panel B: IV
Sh. migrants 0.251 -1.341 -0.059 0.109 -1.687 -0.155
(0.135) (0.625) (0.063) (0.095) (0.871) (0.065)
Sh. migrants x sh. skilled 2.068 2.481
(0.946) (1.310)
Sh. migrants x Q2 sh. skilled 0.013 0.060
(0.043) (0.077)
Sh. migrants x Q3 sh. skilled 0.040 0.102
(0.050) (0.100)
Sh. migrants x Q4 sh. skilled 0.282 0.318
(0.075) (0.128)
Sh. migrants x Q5 sh. skilled 0.316 0.346
(0.146) (0.234)
First stage F-stat 23.036 18.728 18.337 9.219
N 13290 13290 13290 13290 13290 13290
Note: The table presents estimates from OLS and IV regressions using municipality-level data.
Share of migrants is the number of foreign residents in a municipality in a year divided by na-
tive population in a municipality in 2000. Share skilled is the share of native residents with
upper-secondary or higher level of education in 2000. Controls are listed in Table A2; all spec-
ifications include municipality and vote fixed effects. Weights assigned to observations equal
the number of Swiss residents in 2000. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the mu-
nicipality level. Source: FSO, ZEMIS.
the number of immigrants equal to 1 percent of the native population raises vote
shares by close to 0.2 percentage points. Similarly, Figure A3a plots estimates
from column (5) against the distribution of the continuous skill measure. While
the linearity assumption affects magnitudes, results are qualitatively similar.
Panel A of Table A4 shows a robustness check where we use the distribution
of immigrants across Swiss regions in 1970 when constructing the instrumental
variable. The initial distribution of immigrants across the country is unlikely to
be correlated with current shocks to either attitudes or labor demand if migrant
shares from an earlier year are used. While the first stage becomes weaker and
significance levels drop in the second stage, results remain similar to the baseline
specification – municipalities with a higher share of low-skilled natives respond
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Note: The figure presents estimates from an IV regression using municipality level data. The
outcome is the share of pro-immigrant votes. Share of migrants is the number of foreign
residents in municipality and year divided by native population in municipality in 2000. Share of
skilled natives is the share of native residents with upper-secondary or higher level of education
in 2000. Controls are listed in Table A2; all specifications include municipality and vote fixed
effects. Weights assigned to observations reflect the number of Swiss residents in 2000. Standard
errors are clustered at the municipality level, 95% confidence intervals plotted. In Figure (b)
effects at the 10th and 90th percentile of the coverage measure are reported. Source: FSO,
SECO, ZEMIS.
more negatively to immigration.
We also find evidence that education level is positively associated with the prob-
ability of voting pro-immigration. Pro-immigration vote shares are significantly
positively correlated with the skill level in the data from the FSO (correlation
coefficient 0.18) and in the survey evidence as presented in Table A3. This pat-
tern and the estimated responses to higher migrant exposure are consistent with
a labor market channel where natives who compete against migrants are less
in favor of immigration. However, education is likely to affect support for im-
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migration through a number of channels. Specifically, it is argued to directly
promote tolerance and improve knowledge and appreciation of foreign cultures
(see Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014). Additionally, competition for public goods
and services could affect in particular low-skilled natives if they are more likely
to use them. If labor protection raises support for immigration for natives who
it aims to protect, we consider this as evidence that labor market concerns shape
preferences over migration policies. Therefore, our main focus of analysis is on
how immigrant presence interacts with collective bargaining coverage in deter-
mining vote outcomes.
1.4.3 Collective Bargaining and Vote Effects of Immigra-
tion
In the analysis of collective bargaining coverage we follow Equation 1.2. Specif-
ically, Table 1.3 tests the importance of labor protection by introducing a triple
interaction between the migrants exposure measure, the proxy for native skill
and the share CBA covered. Panel A shows OLS regressions, while Panel B
uses an instrumental variable approach for migrant shares and reports reduced
form estimates for coverage. In line with our hypothesis, we observe that it is
in municipalities with low levels of native educational attainment that CBAs
raise pro-immigration vote shares. This holds regardless of whether we use a
continuous or a discrete skill measure and is not affected by the inclusion of
control variables. Results tend to be stronger in terms of magnitudes in the IV
specification relative to the OLS.
In Figure 1.2b we plot the estimates from Panel B column (4). The y-axis shows
the marginal effect of a higher foreigner share on vote outcomes at different
levels of native skill level and under low versus high levels of coverage. Vote
outcomes depend less on the level of skill of the native population under higher
levels of CBA coverage. When coverage is low (tenth percentile, i.e. around ten
percent coverage), we estimate a significantly negative effect of a higher foreigner
presence for municipalities with low native educational attainment. A 1 percent
rise in immigration relative to the native population decreases pro-immigration
vote shares with 0.5 percentage points. At high levels of coverage (ninetieth
percentile, i.e. around twenty percent coverage) the magnitude is much smaller
– 0.17 percentage points. At the upper end of the skill distribution, in the forth
and fifth quintile, marginal effects are positive and the difference between low
and high coverage is insignificant. The difference is alsomarginally insignificant
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Table 1.3: Voting analysis by native educational level and CBA coverage
Outcome: share of pro-immigration votes
Without controls With controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: OLS
Sh. migrants -1.170 -0.254 -0.701 -0.291
(0.628) (0.078) (0.476) (0.074)
Sh. migr. x Sh. CBA cov. 2.394 0.687 2.136 0.862
(1.461) (0.258) (1.298) (0.255)
Sh. migr. x Sh. skilled 1.795 1.080
(0.914) (0.675)
Sh. migr. x Sh. CBA cov. x Sh. skilled -3.852 -3.469
(2.053) (1.785)
Sh. migr. x Q2 sh. skilled 0.064 0.123
(0.115) (0.117)
Sh. migr. x Q3 sh. skilled 0.262 0.295
(0.120) (0.119)
Sh. migr. x Q4 sh. skilled 0.500 0.502
(0.099) (0.087)
Sh. migr. x Q5 sh. skilled 0.451 0.380
(0.166) (0.137)
Sh. migr. x Sh. CBA cov. x Q2 sh. skilled -0.304 -0.458
(0.332) (0.350)
Sh. migr. x Sh. CBA cov. x Q3 sh. skilled -0.984 -1.157
(0.361) (0.365)
Sh. migr. x Sh. CBA cov. x Q4 sh. skilled -1.204 -1.430
(0.266) (0.273)
Sh. migr. x Sh. CBA cov. x Q5 sh. skilled -1.216 -1.304
(0.359) (0.336)
N 13290 13290 13290 13290
Panel B: IV
Sh. migrants -4.529 -0.646 -4.139 -0.667
(1.534) (0.171) (1.403) (0.162)
Sh. migr. x Sh. CBA cov. 11.997 1.915 10.124 1.792
(3.848) (0.481) (2.983) (0.491)
Sh. migr. x Sh. skilled 6.395 5.740
(2.217) (2.044)
Sh. migr. x Sh. CBA cov. x Sh. skilled -16.523 -13.707
(5.556) (4.337)
Sh. migr. x Q2 sh. skilled 0.083 0.048
(0.163) (0.185)
Sh. migr. x Q3 sh. skilled 0.405 0.422
(0.201) (0.204)
Sh. migr. x Q4 sh. skilled 0.847 0.806
(0.187) (0.175)
Sh. migr. x Q5 sh. skilled 1.035 0.896
(0.308) (0.344)
Sh. migr. x Sh. CBA cov. x Q2 sh. skilled -0.317 -0.122
(0.476) (0.520)
Sh. migr. x Sh. CBA cov. x Q3 sh. skilled -1.175 -1.135
(0.594) (0.589)
Sh. migr. x Sh. CBA cov. x Q4 sh. skilled -1.910 -1.786
(0.544) (0.543)
Sh. migr. x Sh. CBA cov. x Q5 sh. skilled -2.651 -2.142
(0.861) (0.781)
N 13290 13290 13290 13290
Note: The table presents estimates from OLS and IV regressions using municipality-level data.
For specification details see notes to Table 1.2. Source: FSO, SECO, ZEMIS.
for the third quintile. In Figure A3b we present results from column (2) where
we use a continuous skill measure. The evidence is consistent.
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We conduct a number of robustness checks with respect to the CBA measure.
First, we change how agreements are linked to industries. In our baseline speci-
fications we assign each CBA to 3-digit NOGA-08 codes. Alternatively, we can
link contracts to more disaggregated industries at the 4-digit level. While this
could improve the precision of the treatment assignment, it might give noisier es-
timates as assigning contracts to narrowly defined industries is ambiguous. This
could introduce a measurement error which, if random, results in an attenuation
bias.19 Moreover, large agreements are likely to set standards beyond narrowly
defined industries. Results presented in Table A4 are consistent with our baseline
findings. Second, we abstract from newly introduced agreements by fixing col-
lective bargaining levels in 2000. This does not alter results qualitatively (results
available upon request). Next, we test whether results are robust to the specific
votes included. While estimates are generally consistent, including the AuG vote
appears crucial for our results (see Table A5).
We conduct our analysis at the municipality level, which relates to the place
of living of voters. The benefit of this unit of analysis is the high number of
municipalities compared to more aggregated geographical units. On the other
hand, voters do not necessarily work in the municipality of living which makes
its collective agreements potentially not relevant. Generally valid agreements
tend to cover an industry in several municipalities in the same region, so local
coverage correlates with coverage in nearby areas. At the same time, low-skilled
occupations, which are typically the ones covered by CBAs, are more likely to be
locally available than skilled jobs. Therefore, labor protection in the municipality
of living is likely to be applicable to the type of workers who are the focus of the
study. To alleviate remaining concerns, we run the analysis at the commuting
zone level and report the results in Table A6. Significance levels tend to decline
compared to the municipality level specification. In line with our baseline results
we observe that a higher level of labor market protection increases support for
immigration in commuting zones where the native population is relatively low-
skilled.
Finally, we look at differences in participation rates between municipalities more
and less exposed to immigration. We find some evidence that participation rises
as immigration goes up in municipalities at the bottom of the skill distribution
and that it falls at the top of the distribution. These effects are the inverse of the
vote estimates we previously observed. Furthermore, the response to immigration
19The FSO provided the link between collective agreements and industries. Therefore, we
do not expect that there is any systematic bias in the measure that could affect estimates in a
specific direction.
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tends to be more positive in magnitude in municipalities with higher coverage
levels. As this effect is consistent across skill levels of the native population, it
cannot explain our results.
We have provided evidence that labor protection is linked to a more positive re-
sponse to immigration and argue that this is in line with a conceptual framework
in which individual labor market concerns shape voting behavior. In the next
section we test how native labor market outcomes respond to immigration and
whether this response depends on the extent to which native workers are covered
by collective agreements.
1.5 Labor Market Analysis
1.5.1 Immigrant Exposure and Native Wage Outcomes
In the main analysis of wage outcomes we follow Dustmann et al. (2013) and
proxy returns to skill with percentiles of the native wage distribution. Table 1.4
presents estimates at the 50th, 5th, 10th and 95th percentile while Figure 1.3a
shows full control IV results at every 5th percentile of the native wage distribu-
tion. It is evident that all estimates below the 30th percentile are negative and
significant at the five percent level. Individuals at the tenth percentile are the
most negatively affected where an increase in immigration equal to 1 percent of
the native population leads to a 0.7 percent decrease in wages. At the 5th per-
centile the estimate is slightly lower in absolute magnitude indicating a drop of 0.6
percent. Estimates among the very high-skilled individuals, on the other hand,
are positive though too noisy to reject the null hypothesis of no effect. Including
controls alters the magnitude of the estimates while results remain qualitatively
unchanged. The more negative IV estimates compared to those from the OLS
regressions suggest that migrants, particularly those with low to medium skill
levels, sort themselves into areas with improving economic conditions. Overall,
our results are in line with predictions from a classic labor market model where
an inflow of workers in a skill group reduce wages in the same group.
Dustmann et al. (2013) show that under a nested constant elasticity of substitu-
tion (CES) production function, estimated parameters at each percentile of the
wage distribution are proportional to the density of immigrants at that point.
Assuming that migrant location in the distribution is constant across regions
and years, and capital is perfectly elastic in supply, one can combine the point
estimates with the density of migrants in the wage distribution and derive the
elasticity of substitution across skill types. Figures 1.1a and A2 show that dif-
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Table 1.4: Wage analysis by native percentiles of the wage distribution










Sh. migrants -0.110 -0.240 -0.273 0.138
(0.093) (0.105) (0.101) (0.174)
Mean outcome 3.553 3.062 3.157 4.224
Sd outcome 0.103 0.070 0.068 0.195
N 848 848 848 848
Panel B: OLS with controls
Sh. migrants -0.077 -0.218 -0.242 0.165
(0.070) (0.095) (0.086) (0.159)
Mean outcome 3.553 3.062 3.157 4.224
Sd outcome 0.103 0.070 0.068 0.195
N 848 848 848 848
Panel C: IV
Sh. migrants -0.056 -0.625 -0.701 0.493
(0.092) (0.241) (0.241) (0.339)
Mean outcome 3.553 3.062 3.157 4.224
Sd outcome 0.103 0.070 0.068 0.195
First stage F-stat 9.056 9.056 9.056 9.056
N 848 848 848 848
Panel D: IV with controls
Sh. migrants -0.082 -0.628 -0.697 0.472
(0.153) (0.250) (0.261) (0.347)
Mean outcome 3.553 3.062 3.157 4.224
Sd outcome 0.103 0.070 0.068 0.195
First stage F-stat 9.722 9.722 9.722 9.722
N 848 848 848 848
Note: The table presents estimates from OLS and IV regressions using biennial data at the
commuting zone level between 2000 and 2014. Share of migrants is the number of foreign res-
idents in a commuting zone in a year divided by native population in a commuting zone in
2000. Controls are listed in Table A2; all specifications include commuting zone and year fixed
effects. Weights assigned to observations equal the number of natives employed in commut-
ing zone in 2000. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the commuting zone level.
Source: FSO, SESS, ZEMIS.
ferences across time and geographical areas exist, but trends are overall fairly
similar. Therefore, we find no evidence that the necessary assumptions behind
the methodology are not satisfied in our context. Indeed, results shown in Fig-
ure 1.3a vary inversely with the position of immigrants in the wage distribution
presented in Figure 1.1a. We compute the position of migrants along the native
wage distribution for the whole period and calculate an elasticity of substitution
across labor types of approximately 1.1. Compared to a value of 0.6 for the UK
estimated in Dustmann et al. (2013), wages in the Swiss context appear to be
less responsive to a labor supply shock in the same skill group.20
20Note that the rank sensitivity assumption is satisfied under the estimated elasticity of
substitution (see p.149-150 of Dustmann et al., 2013)
25



























0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Native wage percentile
























0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Native wage percentile
Low coverage High coverage
Note: The figure presents estimates from IV regressions using biennial data at the region level
between 2000 and 2014. The outcome is the ln real gross hourly wage at the m-th percentile.
Share of migrants is the number of foreign residents in region and year divided by native
population in region in 2000. Effects at the 10th and 90th percentile of the coverage measure
are reported. Controls are listed in Table A2; all specifications include commuting zone and
year fixed effects. Weights assigned to observations equal the number of natives employed
in commuting zone in 2000. Standard errors are clustered at the commuting zone level, 95%
confidence intervals plotted. In Figure (b) effects at the 10th and 90th percentile of the coverage
measure are reported. Source: FSO, SECO, SESS, ZEMIS.
Next we report a number of robustness checks. In Table A7 Panel A we con-
struct the instrumental variable using 1970 instead of 2000 census data on the
distribution of immigrants across Swiss regions. Table A8 Panel A presents sim-
ilar evidence when we separate workers based on educational attainment. While
average effects are insignificant, they mask considerable differences across skill
groups. Individuals with lower- and upper-secondary education tend to be nega-
tively affected while effects in the group of tertiary educated workers are positive
and not significant. Results are, therefore, consistent with the main estimates.
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1.5.2 Collective Bargaining and Wage Effects of Immigra-
tion
We have documented that low-skilled natives are more likely to be employed in
industries with collective bargaining agreements. Low-skilled natives are also neg-
atively affected by immigration in the labor market. Therefore, we test whether
the magnitude of the wage effects depends on the level of labor protection. Table
1.5 shows our main results where skill is proxied with percentiles of the native
wage distribution. Panels A and B report OLS estimates, while Panels C and D
report IV results. In both types of specifications, we find evidence that a higher
coverage mitigates the negative effects of immigration in particular for the very
low-skilled workers – those at the fifth and tenth percentiles of the wage distri-
bution. The interaction term is also significant at the fifteenth percentile and at
the twentieth percentile it becomes marginally insignificance at the ten percent
level. Adding controls does not affect the size of the estimates significantly.
To give some intuition about the magnitude of these effects, in Figure 1.3b we
show how wages at every fifth percentile respond to immigration under low and
high levels of coverage. Under higher coverage levels the effects of migration are
generally less pronounced. At high levels of coverage at the bottom of the skill
distribution marginal effects go down in absolute terms and are close to 0.4–0.5
percent. At low levels of coverage, on the other hand, marginal effects are close
to -1.
We have so far provided evidence that CBAs introduce a rigidity in wages. How
is the elasticity of substitution across skill groups affected by different coverage
levels? Following the same methodology as before and using parameter estimates
reported in Figure 1.3b, we obtain an elasticity of 0.8 at low and 1.65 at high
levels of CBA coverage. As the level of wage rigidity goes up with collective
bargaining coverage, wages are less responsive to a relative labor supply shock.
This by construction translates into a higher elasticity. Therefore, the estimate
of a production function parameter is dependent on the level of labor market
protection. This evidence is consistent with the work of Foged et al. (2019)
who argue that estimates of wage elasticities obtained from immigration studies
conducted in different countries reflect the nature of labor market institutions at
destination.
In the Appendix we confirm that wage results are robust to changes in how we
construct the CBA coverage measure (see Table A7). Results remain unchanged –
collective agreements unambiguously improve native wage outcomes under higher
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Table 1.5: Wage analysis by native percentiles of the wage distribution and CBA
coverage









Panel A: OLS interaction
Sh. migrants -0.212 -0.447 -0.454 0.128
(0.120) (0.120) (0.119) (0.261)
Sh. migr. x Sh. CBA cov. 0.362 0.939 0.872 -0.119
(0.198) (0.329) (0.333) (0.509)
Mean outcome 3.553 3.062 3.157 4.224
Sd outcome 0.103 0.070 0.068 0.195
N 848 848 848 848
Panel B : OLS interaction with controls
Sh. migrants -0.088 -0.375 -0.349 0.230
(0.094) (0.108) (0.094) (0.250)
Sh. migr. x Sh. CBA cov. 0.001 0.726 0.560 -0.403
(0.223) (0.308) (0.264) (0.507)
Mean outcome 3.553 3.062 3.157 4.224
Sd outcome 0.103 0.070 0.068 0.195
N 848 848 848 848
Panel C: IV interaction
Sh. migrants -0.029 -1.415 -1.452 0.647
(0.270) (0.474) (0.496) (0.608)
Sh. migr. x Sh. CBA cov. -0.358 4.605 4.516 -1.241
(1.323) (1.712) (1.725) (2.074)
Mean outcome 3.553 3.062 3.157 4.224
Sd outcome 0.103 0.070 0.068 0.195
First stage F-stat 3.483 3.483 3.483 3.483
N 848 848 848 848
Panel D : IV interaction with controls
Sh. migrants -0.015 -1.454 -1.454 0.689
(0.462) (0.558) (0.604) (0.678)
Sh. migr. x Sh. CBA cov. -0.555 4.711 4.426 -1.535
(1.778) (1.999) (2.090) (2.402)
Mean outcome 3.553 3.062 3.157 4.224
Sd outcome 0.103 0.070 0.068 0.195
First stage F-stat 3.638 3.638 3.638 3.638
N 848 848 848 848
Note: The table presents estimates from OLS and IV regressions using biennial data at the
commuting zone level between 2000 and 2014. Share of migrants is the number of foreign resi-
dents in a commuting zone in a year divided by native population in a commuting zone in 2000.
Controls are listed in Table A2; all specifications include commuting zone and year fixed effects.
Weights assigned to observations equal the number of natives employed in commuting zone in
2000. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the commuting zone level. Source: FSO,
SECO, SESS, ZEMIS.
immigration rates. Similarly, using a time-invariant coverage measure does not
affect results qualitatively. Finally, we run the analysis using educational attain-
ment as a proxy for skill in Table A8. Wage percentiles are particularly attractive
in the analysis of collective agreements which are likely relevant to those at the
bottom of the skill distribution. We show that the mitigating effect of CBAs
holds for native workers with up to lower-secondary education who are likely at
28
the bottom of the wage distribution. Results are, thus, robust to the skill proxy
used.
1.5.3 Immigrant Exposure and Native Employment Out-
comes
Wage effects are of first-order interest given the nature of the labor protection
we study. Another possible margin of adjustment is employment. For instance,
firms may dismiss employees as a response to increasing labor costs caused by
the collective bargaining clauses. In Table 1.6 we investigate employment effects.
Our most stringent specifications in which we instrument for migrant presence
and include the full set of controls (see Panel D) show an insignificantly negative
overall effect. Upper-secondary educated natives, however, have lower employ-
ment rates in regions with a higher migrant exposure. On the other hand, we
see no significant change in employment among the lower-secondary educated,
i.e. those individuals who experience a drop in wages. We interpret results as
driven by differences in the labor supply elasticity across skill groups (Dustmann
et al., 2017). Table 1.7 shows that collective agreements mitigate the negative em-
ployment effects for the group of upper-secondary educated natives. Robustness
checks with respect to an alternative instrument and CBA measure are presented
in Table A9 and confirm the baseline results. Overall the evidence we provide for
labor market effects is consistent with the findings of Edo and Rapoport (2019)
who study the response of native labor market outcomes under different levels of
minimum wages in the United States.
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Table 1.6: Employment analysis by native educational attainment
Outcome: share of natives employed in population 18-65





(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: OLS
Sh. migrants -0.260 -0.361 -0.224 -0.073
(0.068) (0.250) (0.079) (0.084)
Mean outcome 0.776 0.451 0.787 0.909
Sd outcome 0.047 0.117 0.059 0.053
N 1590 1576 1590 1585
Panel B: OLS with controls
Sh. migrants -0.166 -0.215 -0.226 -0.092
(0.061) (0.256) (0.078) (0.083)
Mean outcome 0.776 0.451 0.787 0.909
Sd outcome 0.047 0.117 0.059 0.053
N 1590 1576 1590 1585
Panel C: IV
Sh. migrants -0.683 -0.385 -0.583 -0.313
(0.306) (0.444) (0.270) (0.233)
Mean outcome 0.776 0.451 0.787 0.909
Sd outcome 0.047 0.117 0.059 0.053
First stage F-stat 7.730 7.710 7.730 7.721
N 1590 1576 1590 1585
Panel D: IV with controls
Sh. migrants -0.418 0.050 -0.609 -0.390
(0.259) (0.420) (0.277) (0.252)
Mean outcome 0.776 0.451 0.787 0.909
Sd outcome 0.047 0.117 0.059 0.053
First stage F-stat 7.451 7.424 7.451 7.444
N 1590 1576 1590 1585
Note: The table presents estimates from OLS and IV regressions using annual data at the
commuting zone level between 2000 and 2014. Share of migrants is the number of foreign res-
idents in a commuting zone in a year divided by native population in a commuting zone in
2000. Controls are listed in Table A2; all specifications include commuting zone and year fixed
effects. Lower-secondary level of education is compulsory education as highest degree, upper-
secondary is an apprenticeship or a matura, tertiary is a degree from a university, university
of applied sciences, university of teacher education or a professional degree. Weights assigned
to observations equal the number of native respondents 18-65 years of age in commuting zone
in 2000. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the commuting zone level. Source:
FSO, SLFS, ZEMIS.
30
Table 1.7: Employment analysis by native educational attainment and CBA
coverage
Outcome: share of natives employed in population 18-65





(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: OLS interaction
Sh. migrants -0.248 -0.522 -0.170 -0.017
(0.111) (0.519) (0.131) (0.172)
Sh. migr. x Sh. CBA cov. 0.024 0.718 -0.127 -0.192
(0.434) (2.160) (0.495) (0.679)
Mean outcome 0.776 0.451 0.787 0.909
Sd outcome 0.047 0.117 0.059 0.053
N 1590 1576 1590 1585
Panel B : OLS interaction with controls
Sh. migrants -0.204 -0.476 -0.180 -0.022
(0.126) (0.522) (0.133) (0.170)
Sh. migr. x Sh. CBA cov. 0.239 1.134 -0.109 -0.246
(0.512) (2.268) (0.490) (0.662)
Mean outcome 0.776 0.451 0.787 0.909
Sd outcome 0.047 0.117 0.059 0.053
N 1590 1576 1590 1585
Panel C: IV interaction
Sh. migrants -1.509 -1.319 -1.143 -0.673
(0.721) (1.067) (0.573) (0.602)
Sh. migr. x Sh. CBA cov. 4.538 3.836 3.378 1.790
(2.462) (4.194) (1.937) (2.232)
Mean outcome 0.776 0.451 0.787 0.909
Sd outcome 0.047 0.117 0.059 0.053
First stage F-stat 3.225 3.211 3.225 3.222
N 1590 1576 1590 1585
Panel D : IV interaction with controls
Sh. migrants -1.058 -0.424 -1.198 -0.831
(0.617) (0.978) (0.579) (0.650)
Sh. migr. x Sh. CBA cov. 3.393 1.155 3.556 2.269
(2.105) (3.923) (1.935) (2.363)
Mean outcome 0.776 0.451 0.787 0.909
Sd outcome 0.047 0.117 0.059 0.053
First stage F-stat 3.142 3.128 3.142 3.140
N 1590 1576 1590 1585
Note: The table presents estimates from IV regressions using annual data at the commut-
ing zone level between 2000 and 2014. Share of migrants is the number of foreign residents
in a commuting zone in a year divided by native population in a commuting zone in 2000.
Controls are listed in Table A2; all specifications include commuting zone and year fixed ef-
fects. Lower-secondary level of education is compulsory education as highest degree, upper-
secondary is an apprenticeship or a matura, tertiary is a degree from a university, university
of applied sciences, university of teacher education or a professional degree. Weights assigned
to observations equal the number of native respondents 18-65 years of age in commuting zone
in 2000. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the commuting zone level. Source:
FSO, SECO, SLFS, ZEMIS.
1.6 Conclusion
We examine how exposure to migrants affects native support for immigration
and labor market outcomes. Our results show that subgroups of natives that are
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negatively affected in terms of labor market outcomes are less in favor of loose
immigration regulation. Support for immigration, however, rises under stronger
labor protection for these subgroups. Our results are consistent with labor mar-
ket concerns shaping preferences over alternative immigration policies. At a time
of rising anti-migrant sentiments, this study contributes to a debate on what
determines attitudes towards foreigners. Importantly, our findings have impli-
cations for the type of policies which alleviate economic concerns and increase
support for immigration.
The need for social protection in the broader context of globalization has been
emphasized in the literature (Rodrik, 1997). We add to the discussion of policies
which affect attitudes towards immigration by assessing the role of labor market
protection. This paper shows that CBAs can be effective in boosting support for
immigration by preserving labor market standards. Compliance with the negoti-
ated clauses can be imperfect, however, and reduce their effectiveness. Switzer-
land and other countries such as Austria have introduced supporting measures
to strengthen the enforcement of labor protection at the same time as removing
restrictions to immigration. The general policy lesson of our findings is that set-
ting common labor market standards within industries and effectively enforcing
them raises support for immigration by mitigating labor market concerns.
Our labor market results measure short-term effects. Capital adjustments, incen-
tives to switch occupations and acquire more skills likely offset any short-term
effects of migrant inflows. Similarly, labor regulation could slow down such ad-
justments and, thus, affect long-term native wage and employment outcomes.
For example, D’Amuri and Peri (2014) provide evidence that natives are less
likely to switch their occupations following an immigrant inflow if employment
regulation is stricter. If such adjustments occur in the longer run, the evidence
offered in this study is not indicative for how CBAs affect labor market outcomes
after markets have adjusted. Any policy recommendations are, thus, conditional
on the weight one puts on alleviating current labor market concerns and raising
support for immigration in the short-run.
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Governments play an important role in shaping access to education and often aim
at achieving specific national educational targets. However, other factors are also
relevant in the decision to accumulate human capital. For example, labor market
reforms can alter relative wages and are therefore likely to have an impact on
demand for schooling. Ultimately, such changes affect the composition of human
capital and, thus, the economy’s potential to innovate and grow (Lucas, 1988).
In this paper, we focus on demand for degrees acquired at the tertiary level of
education. We investigate whether changes in labor market conditions induced
by an inflow of foreign workers affect enrolment and study field choice of natives.
This question is especially relevant for today’s knowledge-based societies in a
context of free movement of workers.
We study a major Swiss migration reform that abolished quotas and introduced
free movement of workers between Switzerland and the member states of the
European Union (EU) and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). The
Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons (AFMP) was signed in 1999 and
approved by the electorate in 2000. The proposed changes were in particular
important for cross-border commuters, i.e. individuals who work in Switzerland
but reside abroad. Restrictions on commuting were gradually relaxed during the
transition period 2002 to 2007 until their complete abolishment. As a result, the
number of frontier workers substantially increased. Their share relative to total
employed rose from 4% in 2001 to 5.8% in 2015. These values understate the
commuters’ relevance for border regions, where their share was 13.7% in 2015.
The Swiss context offers advantages in addition to the exogenous policy change.
Since cross-border commuters reside abroad, they leave demand for goods and
services in the country of work largely unaffected. Importantly, they are unlikely
to demand publicly provided services such as education. The inflow of commuters
can, therefore, be regarded as an almost pure labor supply shock. The country’s
dual education system gives access to tertiary education to graduates from general
training at Universities and from vocational training at Universities of Applied
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Sciences. These two groups of students are interesting to compare as they differ
in their opportunity costs of studying and in their outside options. Importantly,
the Swiss education system enables us to isolate education demand from supply
forces since fulfilling the admission requirements generally guarantees enrolment.
In our identification strategy, we distinguish between affected and non-affected la-
bor market regions based on driving distance to the national border. We combine
this cross-sectional variation in exposure with the timing of the reform implemen-
tation in a difference-in-differences framework. Our main outcome of interest is
native educational enrolment at the tertiary level by institutional type and study
field. We look at regional labor market outcomes by educational level to examine
incentives to accumulate human capital. Enrolment data come from administra-
tive sources and labor market outcomes from large-scale surveys.
The analysis of the policy change reveals an increase in the share of cross-border
commuters of 6 percentage points in the treated relative to the control regions in
the post-reform period. This is driven by upper-secondary and tertiary educated
commuters. Therefore, labor market competition increases in particular for na-
tives who are at the point of deciding whether to join the labor market or enrol
in tertiary education. We observe that commuters are overrepresented in STEM
occupations and expect this to play a role in the choice of study field.
Our results show that natives in regions affected from cross-border commuting
respond by demanding more tertiary education relative to natives from regions
less affected. Enrolment in undergraduate degrees from universities of applied
sciences rises in the post-reform period in treated regions by 1.8 percentage points.
This effect is statistically significant and economically large relative to the mean
enrolment rate of 13%. In line with this finding, we estimate a drop in wages of
upper-secondary educated and a rise in wages of tertiary educated workers. These
changes mean lower opportunity costs to studying for upper-secondary graduates
and higher returns to tertiary degrees. Upper-secondary graduates for whom the
labor market is relevant are mainly those with a vocational training. A majority
of them joins the labor market immediately after completing the apprenticeship
but this becomes less attractive as an option due to the fall in upper-secondary
wages. As a possible response vocationally trained can gain access to tertiary
education through universities of applied sciences, which is indeed what we see
in the data. We do not observe a difference in the evolution of enrolment at
universities between treatment and control regions. We explain this result by
the fact that the very purpose of a general education is enrolment in tertiary
education.
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Furthermore, we map occupations to fields of study using survey data and mea-
sure the extent to which specific fields are affected by the labor supply shock.
Subjects are considered to be affected if they are linked to occupations that
commuters hold relatively more often than resident workers. Those coincide
with STEM (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) fields. We find
that enrolment in less affected fields of study rises in the post-reform period in
treated regions. These are non-STEM subjects that often require skills tied to
the country-specific context compared to STEM fields.
Our results add to different strands of the literature. First, we contribute to the
research on educational choice that aims to understand what motivates individu-
als to acquire tertiary education (see Altonji et al., 2016, for a summary). There
is a general consensus that expected earnings matter (e.g., Beffy et al., 2012;
Wiswall and Zafar, 2015) but also some evidence of limited knowledge of returns
(Xia, 2016). We find that enrolment in tertiary education responds to changes in
returns to schooling but field choice does not. A closely related literature links
enrolment decisions to changes in opportunity costs of studying as induced by
business cycle fluctuations. There is evidence that enrolment is countercyclical in
lower educational levels (Ayllon and Nollenberger, 2016), in college (Dellas and
Sakellaris, 2003; Long, 2014) and in graduate school for women (Johnson, 2013).
The majority of these studies use unemployment rates to measure business cycle
fluctuations. We test how changes in wages and unemployment induced by an
inflow of frontier workers affect undergraduate enrolment decisions at the tertiary
level. We distinguish between students with a vocational and general background
who are likely to respond differently to changing labor market returns to edu-
cation. While recessions could have additional implications on budget cuts and
therefore on the supply of education, immigration reforms are unlikely to have
such indirect effects.
A number of studies link native demand for education to immigration. An inflow
of foreign students can affect school resources while foreign workers may change
labor market returns to education. Betts (1998) finds an overall negative effect of
immigrant inflows on high school graduation rates of American-born minorities.
Hunt (2017) finds that a higher share of low-skilled adult immigrants has a pos-
itive impact on high-school completion, while immigrants of school age have no
significant effect. Similarly for college enrolment, Jackson (2018) shows a signifi-
cant positive impact of labor immigrants but no effect of foreign students in the
cohort. Focusing on labor immigrants, McHenry (2015) documents an increase
in native post-secondary degree attainment. Llull (2018) considers education,
participation and occupation as margins of adjustments to immigration. Educa-
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tional attainment depends on relative changes in wages, which in turn depend on
the capital adjustments in the economy. A subset of this literature investigates
how an increase in the number of international students affects native educa-
tional decisions at the tertiary level. Shih (2017) finds an increase in domestic
enrolment at US universities, Machin and Murphy (2017) in postgraduate studies
in the UK, while Borjas (2004) shows crowding-out effects for white men at US
elite universities. Our contribution is to differentiate native tertiary enrolment
according to institutional types. In addition, we isolate the effect of a labor
supply shock by focusing on cross-border commuters, who do not compete with
natives for school resources.
Studies document that foreign-born workers are more often employed in scientific
and technical occupations than natives (Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle, 2010; Peri
and Sparber, 2011; Hanson and Slaughter, 2016). Related research links migrant
employment into occupations to native enrolment in specific study fields. Ransom
and Winters (2020) find an outflow of native-born Americans, specifically blacks,
from STEM subjects related to occupations with more foreign workers. Cortés
and Pan (2015) document a similar crowding-out effect from nursing studies. We
add to this literature by considering native enrolment in all study fields and by
grouping fields by the intensity of the labor supply shock.
Related research looks at demand for specific education fields as a response to
immigrant students. Orrenius and Zavodny (2015) find that demand for STEM
fields is lower among women in age cohorts with a higher share of foreign-born
students. Similarly, Anelli et al. (2018) show that a higher share of foreign-born
students in the introductory math course lowers the probability that natives will
graduate with a STEM degree, while the subset of international students has
a positive effect. While we are interested in how foreign workers affect native
educational enrolment, we test whether our study field results can be explained
by crowding-out effects of foreign students. We do not find evidence in favor of
this hypothesis.
We further build on the migration literature which finds mixed evidence on the
impact of immigrant labor on native wages (see e.g., Borjas, 2003; Ottaviano
and Peri, 2012b; Dustmann et al., 2016b). A subset of the studies focuses on
cross-border commuting. Looking at the same reform, Beerli et al. (2018) show
a positive effect of relaxing restrictions on the inflow of foreign workers on the
wages of high-skilled natives and no negative employment effects. Dustmann
et al. (2017) investigate a temporary increase in low-skilled Czech cross-border
commuters into Germany after the fall of the Berlin wall. They find a negative
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impact on native wages and in particular on employment levels. We complement
this literature by studying how policy induced changes to labor market returns
affect incentives for human capital formation.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. In Section 2.2 we discuss the
Swiss context with the regulatory framework applied to cross-border commuters
and the educational system. In Section 2.3 we describe the data and outline the
empirical strategy. In Sections 2.4 and 2.5 we present our results on enrolment in
tertiary education and on enrolment by field of study. In Section 2.6 we conclude.
2.2 Context
2.2.1 Policy Change on Cross-Border Commuting
Cross-border commuters with a citizenship from a European Union (EU) or Eu-
ropean Free Trade Association (EFTA) member state working in Switzerland are
subject to the rules outlined in the Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons
(AFMP). It was signed in June 1999, approved by the electorate in May 2000
and introduced on the 1st of June 2002. While the agreement affects all for-
eign workers from EU and EFTA countries, we focus on cross-border commuters.
Cross-border commuters are non-Swiss by nationality and require a G-permit to
work in Switzerland. Since they need a working contract from a Swiss employer to
receive or extend such a permit, the number of cross-border commuters consists
of foreign workers only.
Prior to the AFMP, cross-border commuters and firms that wanted to hire them
had to fulfil several requirements. Commuters had to live in formal border zones
in the neighboring countries. Within Switzerland, they were only allowed to work
in defined border zones. Permits were tied to a specific employer and valid for
up to one year after which they had to be renewed. Commuters had to return to
their place of origin on a daily basis. Furthermore, employers had to prove that
the vacancy could not be filled by a native worker (local priority requirement).
The policy change was implemented in three steps. After June 2002 cross-border
commuters were free to reside outside the border zones of the home country. In
addition, they were required to return to their place of residence only once a week
rather than every day. The work permit was no longer bound to a specific job and
its validity was extended to the length of the working contract, for a maximum
of five years. In June 2004 the local priority requirement was abolished and as
a result, cross-border commuters could be hired under the same conditions as
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resident workers in the Swiss border zones. Full liberalization across the entire
country came into force in June 2007 when all restrictions on cross-border working
were removed. In particular, cross-border commuters from countries within the
EU-17 and EFTA were allowed to work anywhere in Switzerland, while interim
regulations applied for other EU member states.
The new rules on the free movement of cross-border commuters led to a large
increase in the number of foreign workers. The majority of them commutes into
border regions because commuting costs increase with distance. In these regions,
the share of commuters in total employed rose from 9.9% in 2001 to 13.7% in 2015.
In 2017, 95% of all cross-border commuters are nationals of France, Germany,
Italy or Austria. They generally commute to municipalities in which their mother
tongue is spoken, suggesting that language skills matter. 97–98% of the Austrian
and German commuters work in a municipality in which German is spoken by
the majority of residents. The share of Italian and French commuters that go to
Italian- and French-speaking municipalities is 88% and 80% respectively.
Earnings survey data show that in 2016 48% of cross-border commuters have an
upper-secondary degree, 23% up to a lower-secondary degree, 19% an academic
tertiary and 10% a professional tertiary degree. In comparison, the share of native
workers with a lower secondary education is significantly lower (11%) and the
share with upper-secondary significantly higher (59%). These differences persist
during the study period. The share of tertiary educated workers has been rising
for both native and frontier workers since 1996 but the trend is stronger for the
latter group. Given that the focus of the study is academic tertiary education,
we abstract from professional tertiary degrees.
Data from the Federal Statistical Office show that in the period 1999–2017 a
considerable share of cross-border commuters are employed in manufacturing
compared to the industry’s share in total employment (26% compared to 14%).
In particular, the production of computer and electronic, chemical and pharma-
ceutical goods is highly reliant on frontier workers. Since 2006, commuters are
overrepresented in administrative and support services relative to industry size.
Throughout the period commuters are underrepresented in industries with a high
level of government involvement such as education (3% compared to 7% in to-
tal employment), health care and social work (10% compared to 14%), public
administration and defence (1% compared to 4%).
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2.2.2 Dual Education System
Three types of tertiary education institutions exist in Switzerland: Universities
and Federal Institutes of Technology, Universities of Applied Sciences, Universi-
ties of Teacher Education. Universities and the Federal Institutes of Technology
(UNI) are the oldest institutions with a right to grant tertiary level degrees. In
1995 the foundation for a dual tertiary education system was laid with the in-
troduction of the vocational matura at the upper-secondary level. This allowed
the establishment of Universities of Applied Sciences (UAS) in 1997. While uni-
versities are committed to a combination of teaching and research, universities of
applied sciences impart professional skills with a practice and application oriented
focus. The difference is apparent in how the two types of institutions select pro-
fessors. Professors at a UAS require several years of professional experience and
expert knowledge in the field. Universities, on the other hand, look for professors
with a purely academic career. Teacher education has belonged to the tertiary
level since 2001. Some parts of the country have independently organized Univer-
sities of Teacher Education (UTE), whereas in others teacher education is taught
at universities of applied sciences or at universities. Of all tertiary students in
the academic year 2017/2018, 61% are enrolled in a university, followed by 31%
in universities of applied sciences and the remaining 8% in universities of teacher
education.
Both UNI and UAS offer STEM and non-STEM education. Around 69% of
all university students in the year 2017/2018 are enrolled in a non-STEM field.
At universities of applied sciences this share is almost 74%. In the first years
after their foundation, the UAS specialized in STEM education. Over time they
heavily expanded to non-STEM teaching. The UNI and the UAS teach courses
that are offered by both institutions and also exclusively by only one. As a
consequence, the introduction of the UAS increased the available study fields
and hence the range of skills that can be acquired through higher education.
Different educational pathways give access to tertiary education. Figure 2.1 shows
that at the upper-secondary level one can follow a vocational or a general edu-
cation track. According to the Swiss Federal Statistical Office 68.3% of students
in upper-secondary education pursued a vocational degree in 2016, while the rest
were enrolled in general education. Depending on the chosen track of vocational
education, an apprentice can graduate with a diploma, tailored for joining the
labor market, or gain in addition a vocational matura. Such a matura can be
obtained during or after the vocational training. It is required for admission to
a university of applied sciences. A general education results in either a general
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or a specialised matura. The general matura grants access to universities and
universities of teacher education, but can also be used to enter a university of ap-
plied sciences. The specialised matura has both general and vocational education
components and grants access to universities of applied sciences and universities
of teacher education. In 2016, 21.2% of the Swiss residents under the age of 25
hold a general, 15.4% a vocational, and 3% a specialised matura.
Figure 2.1: Swiss education system
Note: Three different types of universities with different admission requirements exist at the
tertiary level of education. Of all enrolled students in the academic year 2017/2018, 61% are
at a university, 31% at a university of applied sciences and the remaining 8% at a university of
teacher education. Source: SHIS-studex.
Figure 2.2 shows the locations of the tertiary education institutions across Switzer-
land in 2017. Most of the institutions are in the northern and western part of
the country and clustered in the main centres. There are ten cantonal universi-
ties and two federal institutes of technology spread over ten cities. In contrast,
most of the nine universities of applied sciences have several locations, which are
often specific to a study field. Finally, there are twenty institutions that offer
teacher education. The high density of institutions enables daily commuting to
classes for a large share of the population. This allows living with parents while
studying and, therefore, reduces study costs.1 Semester fees for Swiss nationals
are generally below CHF 1,000 and make up a small part the study costs.
Besides a degree requirement, no major supply side entry restrictions exist for
Swiss residents at the undergraduate level. A general matura typically grants
access to any degree in the chosen university.2 As an exception, health degrees
can have a cap on the number of students enrolled in a year. To enrol in a specific
degree, universities of applied sciences can require a certain thematic focus of the
1The yearly costs of living are estimated by study advisory services to be around CHF 23,000
(e.g., University of Zurich).
2This does not hold for foreign students without a Swiss matura (12.5% of all first-year
students in the academic year 2017/2018) for which explicit quotas may be imposed.
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Figure 2.2: Locations of tertiary institutions
University
University of Applied Sciences
University of Teacher Education
Note: This map shows Switzerland’s 106 commuting zones split into treated (grey) and control
regions (white). The locations of the tertiary institutions in 2017 are shown by institutional
type.
vocational matura or relevant work experience. Interviews are often conducted
to test the ability of candidates in social or health related fields at UAS. While
there is little screening when entering a tertiary institution, the pool of eligible
students is already selective by the admission requirements for upper-secondary
education tracks resulting in a matura. Furthermore, graduation rates are below
unity with 85% of those who enrolled in a bachelor program in 2007 and having
completed their education by 2017. Therefore, in the analysis we will look at
both enrolment and graduation rates.
2.3 Data and Methods
2.3.1 Data
We combine several data sources to conduct our analysis.
In the analysis of the educational choice we use administrative data referred to as
SHIS-studex, an abbreviation for the Swiss Higher Education Information Sys-
tem. This is an individual-level database covering all matriculated students at
the academic tertiary level of education in Switzerland. The data is provided
by the Federal Statistical Office (FSO). It includes students at universities since
1990, universities of applied sciences since 1997, and universities of teacher educa-
tion since 2001. The variables used are age, nationality, place of residence prior
to beginning a study, certificate granting access to tertiary education, type of
tertiary institution and field of study. The structure of the SHIS-studex dataset
allows tracking individuals from the point of enrolment up to graduation and
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provides information on received degrees.
We are interested in demand for undergraduate degrees and focus on first-year
students enrolled in a bachelor study over the period 1997–2017. We select stu-
dents who completed their matura in Switzerland in order to assign them to the
region of residence at the time of receiving the certificate. Additionally, we focus
on Swiss nationals because they are likely to be more familiar with the choice
set in a dual tertiary education system compared to non-Swiss. To calculate the
share of students enrolled we divide the number of first-year students by the birth
cohort size. The cohort is the Swiss population in each region at the median age
of first-year students in year 1997. In the full sample the median age is 21, in
the sample of students enrolled in universities it is 20 and in universities of ap-
plied sciences and universities of teacher education 22. FSO provides information
about the size of the native population at the municipality level and age structure
of the population at the canton level.
We add to the SHIS-studex dataset information from the Survey of Higher Edu-
cation Graduates (EHA) which has been conducted biennially since 2003. It has
a panel structure where individuals respond to questions related to their working
experience and acquired skills one and five years after graduation. Additionally,
it is linked to administrative information from the SHIS-studex dataset about
the participants’ tertiary education. In the first-wave survey, all graduates who
have successfully completed a degree in a Swiss institution of tertiary education
in the previous year are asked to complete a questionnaire. Only graduates who
participated in the first-wave survey are asked to take part in a second-wave sur-
vey four years later. Our focus lies on first-wave results because we are interested
in information collected a short time after graduation. We consider the subset of
Swiss graduates with a bachelor or master who have in addition a Swiss matura.
We use information about place of living, place of work and the mapping between
fields of study and occupations.
The Swiss Earnings Structure Survey (SESS) is a large-scale firm survey con-
ducted biennially in the month of October since 1994. It is a repeated cross-
section of private sector firms in the secondary and tertiary sectors of the econ-
omy. We use information on the region in which the firm is located and its
industry. Companies provide information on a random subset of employees. The
number of workers covered depends on the firm size, with data for at least one
third of all workers. The sample is limited to employees 18–65 years of age, with
available gross hourly wages, region of work, permit type, gender and education.
Working permit information distinguishes native from cross-border employees.
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We differentiate three types of education based on the highest level attained –
tertiary, upper-secondary and up to lower-secondary training. Our analysis cov-
ers the years from 1996 to 2016. We use data on native gross hourly wages and
on the share of cross-border commuters. For the latter measure we divide the
number of commuters by the number of total employees in 1996. In the anal-
ysis by educational level, the share of cross-border commuters is the number
of commuters by education divided by the total number of employees in 1996,
independent of the educational level.
While the SESS covers only employed individuals, the Swiss Labor Force Sur-
vey (SLFS) includes individuals aged 15 years and older. The survey has been
conducted annually in the second quarter of the year from 1996 to 2009 and
quarterly from 2010. For consistency, we use annual data. In 2018 almost 65,000
individuals were surveyed. Information about municipality of residence, demo-
graphic characteristics, educational attainment and employment outcomes for
the household head is available. We limit the sample to individuals in the age
group 18–65. Unemployment is defined as not being employed, but searching and
being available for a job. Employment is defined as being employed for a salary,
by a family member or self-employed. Students, retired individuals and people
inactive for other reasons are considered to be out of the labor force. The native
unemployment rate is the number of unemployed relative to total labor force by
educational category. The native employment rate is the number of employed
relative to total number of individuals by educational category.
Additionally, we obtain the travel time data for each municipality from www.map.
search.ch, which we accessed in December 2018. We measure the distance by
car from each municipality to the closest border crossing or border checkpoint
according to the Federal Customs Office. The travel time for a region is the
time weighed by total number of employed in 1995 in each municipality within a
region. Regions with a border crossing or border checkpoint are assigned a value
of zero minutes.
2.3.2 Empirical Strategy
Motivated by the nature of the policy change, the empirical analysis is based on
a standard difference-in-differences strategy. We investigate the reform effects by
comparing regions close to the border with those further away before and after
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the regulatory change. To focus on local labor markets, we take the MS-region3 or
commuting zone – short region – as unit of observation. Regions are constructed
based on commuting patterns and are, therefore, considered small-scale labor
markets. The allocation of municipalities to the total 106 regions rests on 2000
census data and is provided by the FSO. We follow Beerli et al. (2018) and use
a fixed threshold to define the treated group. Out of the 106 regions, 35 are
less than or equal to thirty minutes of travel time away from the national border
and are assigned to the treatment group as shown in Figure 2.2. We consider
the remaining 71 regions to be too far from the border to attract cross-border
workers and hence assign them to the control group. While this is consistent with
the commuting pattern observed in the data, we also use alternative thresholds
in sensitivity checks.
We run the following specification
yrt = α+β1Transitiont × 1(Distr ≤ 30min)+
β2Postt × 1(Distr ≤ 30min) + X′rtγ + δr + εrt
(2.1)
where r is region, and t year. First-year students are allocated to their region of
residence at the time of taking the matura, while in the labor market analysis
individuals are assigned to the region of the workplace. The observation period
1997–2017 is split into pre-reform (1997–2001), transition (2002–2007) and post-
reform (2008–2017) periods. The outcome yrt measures either the enrolment rate
or labor market conditions. The coefficients of interest, β1 and β2, show the
difference in the dependent variables between treated and control regions during
and after the reform compared to pre-reform years.
In our baseline specification we include region fixed effects to capture time-
invariant regional variation in the outcomes of interest and we limit the control
variables to NUTS II region × year fixed effects. The latter control for changes
over time occurring at the larger geographical level.4 In the enrolment analysis,
we also control for the natural log of native population that may drive enrolment
rates. Further variables that could vary during the period and across regions are
introduced in robustness checks of the analysis of educational outcomes. We use
weights to account for the different employment and population sizes across re-
3MS comes from the French “mobilité spatiale”. According to commuting data from the
FSO, 63% of employees work and live in the same commuting zone in 2014. The equivalent
unit in the USA is also called commuting zone.
4Switzerland has seven NUTS II regions, each containing between one and seven cantons.
Cantons are the largest administrative sub-national units, followed by districts and munici-
palities. The education system is organized on a cantonal level, while a tertiary institution’s
catchment area often extents over several cantons.
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gions. In the regressions on enrolment we weigh by native cohort size in 1997, in
the wage analysis by the number of native employees in 1996, in the regressions
on unemployment rates by the labor force in 1996, and in the case of employment
rates by the total number of individuals in 1996. Finally, the labor supply shock
regressions are weighed by total employment in 1996. In a robustness check we
confirm that the weights do not drive our results. Standard errors are clustered
at the regional level.
While β1 and β2 are the only estimates we report in tables, graphically we present
the results from an event study. The coefficients capture the effect of the reform




βtY eart × 1(Distr ≤ 30min) + X′rtγ + δr + εrt (2.2)
The key assumption under which our results are valid is that enrolment rates and
labor market conditions would have followed the same trend in treatment and
control regions absent the reform. We compare yearly coefficients as visualized
in the figures to investigate whether this assumption is likely to hold. We find no
evidence that the common trends assumption is violated. Similarly, results are
robust to adding additional control variables which could have evolved differently
over time in the treatment and control regions. These results are reported in more
detail in Section 2.4.1.
The Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA) is the second important
precondition to be fulfilled. We argue that spillovers between the treatment and
control group do not play a significant role. Such spillovers could emerge if,
for instance, individuals from the treatment and control group attend the same
high-school and are taught about labor market competition and outcomes in
their common surrounding. First, our unit of analysis is the commuting zone
which is the relevant local labor market given the place of residence prior to
enrolment. Second, information frictions naturally make someone more aware of
local employment conditions, especially at a young age. Third, we know from
the EHA survey where former students work and live and can compare these
locations with the one where they grew up. In 2017 59% of the graduate students
live one year after graduating in the same region where they resided during their
upper-secondary education. 29% even work in that same region – a considerable
share given that many high-skill jobs are not available throughout the country.
Fourth, our sample consists of natives with a Swiss entry exam. Natives are likely
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to perceive the local labor market conditions as more important than foreign
residents, who may also consider opportunities abroad or be internally more
mobile (Schündeln, 2014).
2.3.3 Summary Statistics
In this section we present summary statistics distinguishing treatment and control
regions. To justify the treatment assignment rule, we estimate Equation 2.1
and compare the share of cross-border commuters across treatment and control
regions in the different periods. Column (1) of Table 2.1 shows that regions within
thirty minutes of travel time from the national border experienced a positive
labor supply shock relative to regions further away, in particular in the post-
reform period. The magnitude of the effect is almost 6 percentage points – an
impact that is both statistically significant and economically relevant. Figure 2.3a
presents the size and timing of the inflow of commuters for each year. Magnitudes
increase after the second implementation step of the AFMP in 2004 from 0.8 to 8.3
percentage points in 2016. Figure B1a replicates these results with administrative
data. In line with survey data, we find increasing effects from the transition
period onwards. Administrative data shows that cross-border commuting was
already slightly on the rise in the last years of the pre-treatment period. This
could be explained by the informal relaxation of migration regulations prior to
2002. We take this into account when discussing the timing of the enrolment
results.
Table 2.1: Exposure to cross-border commuters by educational level




(1) (2) (3) (4)
30min * 2002-2007 0.013 -0.003 0.011 0.005
(0.006) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
30min * after 2008 0.059 0.005 0.036 0.018
(0.017) (0.004) (0.009) (0.006)
Mean outcome 0.070 0.020 0.038 0.012
Sd outcome 0.115 0.053 0.056 0.021
Commuting zones 106 106 106 106
within 30 min 35 35 35 35
N 1166 1166 1166 1166
Note: This table shows difference-in-differences estimates using biennial data at the commuting
zone level for the period 1996–2016. Outcome is the share of cross-border commuters in total
employment. Denominator is fixed at first year. Observations are weighed by number of to-
tal employees in first year. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the commuting zone
level. Sources: SESS.
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Figure 2.3: Exposure to cross-border commuters
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Note: This figure shows difference-in-differences estimates using biennial data at the commuting
zone level for the period 1996–2016. The vertical lines indicate the beginning of the transition
period (2002) and of the post-treatment period (2008). Outcome is the number of cross-border
commuters divided by total employment. Denominator is fixed at first year. Observations are
weighed by number of total employees in 1996. Standard errors are clustered at the commuting
zone level, 95% confidence intervals shown. Source: SESS.
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In Table 2.1, columns (2)–(4), and Figures 2.3c and 2.3d we find that the labor
supply shock consists of upper-secondary and tertiary educated commuters. More
than half of the total increase of 6 percentage points reflects a rise in upper-
secondary educated commuters. The share of tertiary educated commuters grows
by 1.8 percentage points in the post-reform period. Results show no significant
increase in commuting of lower-secondary educated workers during the period.
In the Appendix we present robustness checks. In Table B1 we test the sensitivity
of the results to lower and higher cut-off values.5 We find that the estimated
magnitude of the supply shock declines as we choose a higher threshold value.
As a generalization, we use a continuous measure for travel time. The treatment
is defined as an exponential function of travel time, taking into account the non-
linear link between share of commuters and a region’s distance from the border.
The continuous measure confirms that the inflow of commuters is increasing over
time in regions which are closer to the border. These results assure us that
the chosen baseline threshold, which is motivated by observed commuter flows,
is robust to alternative definitions of the treatment variable. A last concern we
address is whether resident migrants are like the commuters more often employed
in border regions. Figure B1b shows that the share of resident migrants does not
evolve differently across treatment and control regions during the study period.
We therefore focus on cross-border commuters as the relevant group of foreign
workers.6
The summary statistics in Table 2.2 reveals further differences and similarities
across treatment and control groups. The average share of first-year students is
41% in the treated and 36% in the control regions. This is driven by enrolment at
universities while rates are similar for the other two institutional types. Although
enrolment rates vary across subjects and regions, the relative attractiveness of
the study fields is similar among the two groups with the exception of teacher
training. Average wages are comparable in both groups and there is a consider-
able wage premium for tertiary graduates relative to upper-secondary educated
workers. The share of unemployed natives in the treatment group is 3.4% com-
pared to 2.7% in the control group. Similarly, employment is on average higher in
5According to data from the FSO on commuting patterns of the resident population, around
68% of the commuting workers need thirty minutes or less to reach the place of work in 2010.
Although cross-border commuters are excluded from this data, we do not have any indication
that their average travel time should differ largely.
6According to individual level migration data (ZEMIS) provided by the State Secretariat
of Migration (SEM), the share of cross-border commuters that switched from a G-permit to a
resident permit between 2002 and 2018 is 15.5%. The robustness test performed alleviates con-
cerns about a potentially determining role of former cross-border commuters in the distribution
of resident migrants across treatment and control regions.
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the control region. These differences hold for each of the three education groups.
Table 2.2: Summary statistics
Treatment group Control group
N Mean Sd N Mean Sd
Share of cross-border commuters 385 0.162 0.138 781 0.010 0.016
... with lower-secondary education 385 0.048 0.076 781 0.002 0.007
... with upper-secondary education 385 0.088 0.062 781 0.005 0.008
... with tertiary education 385 0.026 0.028 781 0.002 0.004
Share enrolled 735 0.411 0.127 1491 0.355 0.109
... at UNI 735 0.237 0.103 1491 0.191 0.071
... at UAS 735 0.145 0.056 1491 0.134 0.050
... at UTE 625 0.032 0.023 1236 0.035 0.019
... in agriculture 735 0.004 0.003 1491 0.004 0.003
... in arts and humanities 735 0.044 0.020 1491 0.035 0.015
... in business and law 735 0.108 0.039 1491 0.093 0.033
... in education 735 0.043 0.021 1491 0.042 0.022
... in engineering 735 0.057 0.019 1491 0.054 0.018
... in health 735 0.054 0.036 1491 0.040 0.027
... in ICT 735 0.013 0.007 1491 0.013 0.007
... in math and sciences 735 0.037 0.014 1491 0.033 0.013
... in services 735 0.005 0.006 1491 0.004 0.005
... in social sciences 735 0.043 0.023 1491 0.035 0.017
Mean ln gross hourly wage 385 3.574 0.102 781 3.563 0.109
... of lower-secondary educated 385 3.295 0.087 781 3.298 0.086
... of upper-secondary educated 385 3.522 0.083 781 3.498 0.081
... of tertiary educated 385 3.935 0.086 774 3.936 0.086
Share unemployed 735 0.034 0.022 1491 0.027 0.018
... with lower-secondary education 730 0.070 0.082 1354 0.055 0.077
... with upper-secondary education 735 0.035 0.026 1491 0.028 0.023
... with tertiary education 692 0.025 0.027 1445 0.017 0.023
Share employed 735 0.758 0.051 1491 0.786 0.046
... with lower-secondary education 735 0.445 0.117 1433 0.467 0.129
... with upper-secondary education 735 0.768 0.063 1491 0.799 0.057
... with tertiary education 711 0.889 0.057 1446 0.917 0.051
Note: Share of cross-border commuters is in 1996 total employment. Lower-secondary level of
education is compulsory education as highest degree, upper-secondary is an apprenticeship or
a matura, tertiary is a degree from a university, university of applied sciences or teacher edu-
cation. Share enrolled is number of first-year students divided by cohort size in 1997. UNI is
short for university, UAS for university of applied sciences and UTE for university of teacher
education. One-digit ISCED fields of studies are considered. Share unemployed is number of
unemployed divided by labor force. Share employed is the number of employed divided by the
population of working age. Weights assigned to the observations reflect number of native em-
ployees in 1996, native cohort size in 1997, number of total employees in 1996, native labor
force in 1996, and native population of working age in 1996. All data is at the commuting
zone level. The observation period for the enrolment outcomes is 1997–2017 and for the other
outcome variables 1996–2016, respectively. Sources: SESS, SLFS, SHIS-studex.
2.4 Enrolment in Tertiary Education
2.4.1 Demand for Tertiary Degrees
We begin with examining whether regions more affected by the introduction of
the free movement of cross-borders commuters have different enrolment rates rel-
ative to regions less affected. Results in Table 2.3 show a rise in overall enrolment
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in the post-reform period among individuals residing in the affected region prior
to beginning their studies. The magnitude of the effect is 2.6 percentage points,
which is equivalent to 7% relative to the mean enrolment rate. The analysis by
institutional type in columns (2)–(4) indicates that individuals from regions close
to the border experienced a rise in enrolment at universities of applied sciences.
The magnitude of the effect is 1.8 percentage points or approximately 13% rel-
ative to the mean of the outcome.7 In contrast, we find no evidence that entry
into universities and universities of teacher education differs between the treat-
ment and the control regions in any of the periods.8 For the pre-reform period,
Figure 2.4 shows that there is no significant difference in enrolment between the
treatment and control group. This evidence suggests that the parallel trend as-
sumption is not violated. Indeed, the timing of the increase in enrolment is in
line with the intensity of the labor supply shock presented in Figure 2.3a. While
we observe a small increase in commuting prior to 2002, we find that enrolment
goes up only in the post-reform period when all barriers were abolished and the
inflow of frontier workers was substantial.
Table 2.3: Enrolment by institutional type
Outcome: share of enrolled native first-year students




(1) (2) (3) (4)
30min * 2002-2007 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.000
(0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003)
30min * after 2008 0.026 0.008 0.018 0.000
(0.011) (0.008) (0.005) (0.004)
Mean outcome 0.372 0.207 0.136 0.035
Sd outcome 0.119 0.086 0.052 0.020
Commuting zones 106 106 106 106
within 30 min 35 35 35 35
N 2226 2226 2226 1802
Note: This table shows difference-in-differences estimates using annual data at the commuting
zone level for the period 1997–2017. Outcome is the share of native first-year students in birth
cohort. Denominator is fixed at first year and specific to the education category. Observations
are weighed by cohort size in a specific education category in first year. Standard errors in
parentheses are clustered at the commuting zone level. Source: SHIS-studex.
7The range of the coefficient is between 1.4 and 2.1 percentage points when leaving out a
labor market region one by one. All results are statistically significant at the 5% level. Note
that there are sixteen labor market regions covering between two and eighteen commuting
zones.
8For university enrolment as an exception, data is available from the early 1990s. In a
setting with an extended pre-reform window from 1992–2001, we find no statistical differences
between treatment and control regions over all years. Consistently, when leaving out a labor
market region one by one the range of the coefficient for university enrolment after 2008 is
between 0.2 and 1.4 percentage points and the coefficients are in fifteen out of sixteen cases
not statistically significant at the conventional levels. In one exception the coefficient becomes
marginally significant at the 10% level.
50


























1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016












1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016












1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016
Note: This figure shows difference-in-differences estimates using annual data at the commuting
zone level for the period 1997 – 2017. The vertical lines indicate the beginning of the transition
period (2002) and of the post-treatment period (2008). Outcome is the share of native first-
year students in birth cohort. Denominator is fixed at first year and specific to the education
category. Observations are weighed by cohort size in a specific education category in first year.
Standard errors are clustered at the commuting zone level, 95% confidence intervals shown.
Source: SHIS-studex.
In the Appendix we provide a number of robustness checks. Panel A of Table
B2 shows that the threshold of thirty travel minutes is not decisive for the main
results. The estimates remain similar when using the continuous measure for
travel time (Panel B) or if we run the specification at the municipality level (Panel
C). The latter shows that there may be an accompanying rise in enrolment in
universities but this is of lower magnitude than the university of applied sciences
result and gives noisy estimates in an event study.
Table B3 investigates whether our results are sensitive to additional control vari-
ables and the weighting scheme. Changes in the supply of education and demand
for labor could be confounding factors to the common trend assumption if they
differ over time and across regions. Since our observation period coincides with
the expansion of the UAS, we test whether enrolment rates are driven by the
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availability of new study locations and study fields.9 Column (2) shows that
results are robust to controlling for the presence of tertiary institutions as well
as the number of study fields offered within a radius of 20km from the largest
municipality in a region in 1990. Labor demand could confound the results if
regions closer to the international market face a different trend in their labor
demand than regions in the inner part of Switzerland. We proxy labor demand
with a Bartik type measure of employment, relying on the industrial composition
of each region in 1995 and aggregate annual employment growth at the industry
level (see Bartik, 1991, for an initial application to labor demand).10 As shown
in column (3), controlling for labor demand does not change results compared to
our baseline specification. Additionally, in column (4) we confirm that weights
do not drive the results.
2.4.2 Mechanism
Returns to education To explain the relative rise in demand for tertiary ed-
ucation in treated regions, we look at changes occurring in the labor market. If
the policy change has persistent effects on local labor market outcomes, incen-
tives to study change. We expect that lower opportunity costs of studying or
better employment prospects for those with a tertiary degree drive enrolment in
tertiary education. We consider wages, unemployment and employment rates as
labor market outcomes of interest.
We consider the inflow of commuters as an almost pure labor supply shock be-
cause their consumption is concentrated in the country of residence and not
country of work. Following a classic labor market model with fixed labor de-
mand, we expect a fall in the wages of native workers in increasing competition
with foreign workers. Table 2.4 shows a decrease in wages for upper-secondary
educated workers and an increase in wages for tertiary educated workers in af-
fected regions, with statistically significant effects in the post-treatment period.
In Figure B2 we focus on the evolution of wages across regions and periods. The
wage pressure on upper-secondary educated started in the early transition years.
In contrast, tertiary educated see an upward trend in their wages in the post-
treatment period, while these results are imprecisely estimated. This evidence is
9Hoxby (2009) finds for the USA that university choice is less driven by distance partly due
to lower transportation costs. In the context of Switzerland, Denzler and Wolter (2011) argue
that the distance to university matters for both the decision to enrol and the study field choice
in particular for individuals from middle and low socio-economic groups.
10We construct the variable as follows: Bartikrt =
∑




where i denotes industry, r region and t year. The industry is measured by two-digit NOGA-08
codes.
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in line with the results reported in Beerli et al. (2018) who investigate the Swiss
labor market consequences of the introduction of the free movement reform. The
authors explain the rise in wages for tertiary degrees by an increase in the labor
demand of skill-intensive incumbent and new firms. This can lead to higher in-
novation, productivity or capital formation in a setting with increasing returns
to high-skilled labor.11
Table 2.4: Wages by educational level




(1) (2) (3) (4)
30min * 2002-2007 -0.007 -0.018 -0.011 0.018
(0.008) (0.012) (0.008) (0.011)
30min * after 2008 -0.010 -0.011 -0.012 0.035
(0.007) (0.016) (0.006) (0.016)
Mean outcome 3.567 3.297 3.504 3.936
Sd outcome 0.106 0.083 0.082 0.086
Commuting zones 106 106 106 106
within 30 min 35 35 35 35
N 1166 1166 1166 1159
Note: This table shows difference-in-differences estimates using biennial data at the commuting
zone level for the period 1996–2016. Outcome is the mean natural log of gross hourly wage of
natives in a region. Observations are weighed by number of native employees in a specific ed-
ucation category in first year. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the commuting
zone level. Source: SESS.
Switzerland is split into four language regions.12 The inflow of commuters in the
post-reform period is significant in the German and French speaking regions and
larger in the latter. Since the number of units with the main spoken language
Italian or Romansh is small, we do not investigate them separately. We perform
a leave-one-out analysis by language region to test whether wage effects and
enrolment responses are similar (results available upon request). Overall, the
reported results are not driven by a single region. Dropping German speaking
regions, however, tends to reduce significance levels as it decreases the sample
to 31 regions only. The negative effect on wages for upper-secondary educated
workers is robust in magnitude to leaving out any region. Excluding the French
11Our framework deviates from Beerli et al. (2018) in at least two respects that may explain
the different magnitude of the wage effect on tertiary educated natives. First, we use 2000 as
the reference year in our event study analysis, while they take 1998. Second, in our measure for
tertiary educated we only include individuals with an academic degree, while they also consider
individuals with professional tertiary degrees. Our analysis leads to the same qualitative results
as theirs.
12In 75 out of 106 regions the majority speaks German, in 23 French and in 8 either Italian
or Romansh. Within the treated regions, the French speaking regions (eleven) and the Italian
speaking regions (three) are overrepresented while the German speaking regions are underrep-
resented (twenty). There are only two regions with the main language Romansh, whereas one
is treated.
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speaking regions reduces the magnitude of the wage increase for tertiary educated,
while excluding German speaking Switzerland raises it. These results suggest
that the wage effect on high-skilled is driven by the French speaking Switzerland.
Dropping one language region at a time has little effect on enrolment results.
The increase at universities of applied sciences is apparent in all specifications.
University enrolment rises when leaving out the German speaking regions but
this effect is imprecisely estimated.
In Table 2.5 we look at native unemployment rates. Our analysis shows that
rates do not statistically differ over time between treated and control regions
for any of the three educational levels. In spite of the large inflow of cross-
border commuters, natives in affected regions are not pushed into unemployment.
This result suggests that there is some skill complementarity between native and
foreign employees. We also look at native employment rates across affected and
non-affected regions. Results in Table B4 do not show statistically significant
effects.
Table 2.5: Unemployment rates by educational level




(1) (2) (3) (4)
30min * 2002-2007 0.001 -0.015 0.003 0.000
(0.003) (0.016) (0.004) (0.005)
30min * after 2008 0.003 -0.005 0.003 0.004
(0.003) (0.014) (0.004) (0.005)
Mean outcome 0.030 0.062 0.031 0.020
Sd outcome 0.017 0.064 0.020 0.020
Commuting zones 106 103 106 103
within 30 min 35 35 35 34
N 1166 1122 1166 1132
Note: This table shows difference-in-differences estimates using biennial data at the commuting
zone level for the period 1996–2016. Outcome is the number of native unemployed divided by
the total labor force in an education category. Observations are weighed by the labor force in a
specific education category in the first year. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the
commuting zone level. Source: SLFS.
Given the lack of evidence on (un)employment, we consider changes in wages
and therefore returns to education as the main channel driving higher enrolment.
Another complementary mechanism is the observed rise in labor market compe-
tition. When measuring the level of competition by the inflow of commuters in
the same education category, individuals with upper-secondary training are the
ones most affected by the reform. Whether it is the decrease in wages or the
increase in labor market competition that drives the enrolment results depends
on the visibility of the two factors.
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Labor market experience Why does enrolment only increases in universities
of applied sciences and not in universities? Students at tertiary institutions have
different educational backgrounds that expose them to different opportunities on
the labor market. The majority of students at a university have a general educa-
tion while at a university of applied sciences students typically have a vocational
training. Numbers from FSO for 2012 graduates show that 64% of those with
a vocational matura enrol in tertiary education within 42 months after gradua-
tion. This is significantly lower compared to 94% with a general and 84% with
a specialised matura (Strubi et al., 2018). The labor market is thus relevant as
an outside option for the vocationally trained, while the objective of a general
training is to prepare for enrolment at university. Consistently, there are around
3% natives with a matura on the labor market in 2016, while the share of those
with an apprenticeship is around 58%. Furthermore, vocationally trained indi-
viduals have at least three years of work experience and are therefore likely to be
informed about labor market conditions in their field.13 Based on these numbers,
we expect individuals with a vocational matura to respond stronger to changes
in labor market prospects than individuals with a general training.
We test our hypothesis by splitting the first-year students at a UAS by their
certificate granting access to tertiary education. A vocational matura can be
completed during the vocational training (Type I), or in two to four semesters
after the vocational education (Type II). A smaller number has either a general or
a specialised matura. The three kinds of matura have distinct curricula, resulting
in different labor market experiences and opportunity costs of studying. Table
2.6 illustrates that the higher demand for tertiary education is driven by people
who do their vocational matura at the same time as their vocational education
or have a specialised matura. Columns (1) and (2) reveal differences in the
impact of the inflow of foreign workers on first-year students with a vocational
matura completed during and after the apprenticeship, respectively. To better
understand the differential response we look at the fields in which the two groups
of upper-secondary graduates gained their labor market experience. A vocational
matura is offered in six major fields. These fields are typically closely related to
the vocational education and hence to the occupation in which the apprentice
is trained. From the pooled SHIS-studex dataset over the period 1997–2017
we know that more than 90% of the UAS first-year students have a vocational
13In contrast, students are likely to be less familiar with change in returns to tertiary degrees.
We hence expect that individual perceptions about future earnings deviate from the earnings
data used in our analysis (Jensen, 2010; Schweri and Hartog, 2017). This makes the observed
decline in upper-secondary wages a more accurate driving force of tertiary enrolment compared
to tertiary wage changes.
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matura in the three major fields: economics, business and services; technology,
architecture and life sciences; health and social work. A larger share of first-year
students with a Type I matura has a background in economics, business and
services (48.9%) compared to those with a Type II matura (36.7%). The latter
group, in contrast, is relatively more often educated in occupations related to
health and social work (13.2% versus 3.6%). This descriptive evidence suggests
that the higher sensitivity to labor supply shocks of Type I matura students
could be linked to their stronger background in market-driven occupations such
as business administration or retail.
Table 2.6: Enrolment at UAS by type of entry exam





Specialised matura General matura
(1) (2) (3) (4)
30min * 2002-2007 0.000 0.001 0.002 -0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
30min * after 2008 0.008 0.000 0.008 -0.002
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Mean outcome 0.049 0.037 0.012 0.023
Sd outcome 0.026 0.023 0.015 0.014
Commuting zones 106 106 106 106
within 30 min 35 35 35 35
N 2226 2226 2226 2226
Note: This table shows difference-in-differences estimates using annual data at the commuting
zone level for the period 1997–2017. Outcome is the share of native first-year students at uni-
versities of applied sciences in birth cohort. Denominator is fixed at first year. Observations
are weighed by cohort size in first year. Column (1) shows first-year students with a vocational
matura done during the apprenticeship, column (2) first-year students with a vocational matura
done after the apprenticeship. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the commuting
zone level. Source: SHIS-studex.
Selection Individuals who are induced to enrol in tertiary education by the
reform can be positively or negatively selected (see Cortés and Pan, 2015, for
a positive selection into the nursing study). We investigate whether academic
achievement as an indicator for student quality differs between the treatment
and control regions. We compute the graduation rates of students and allocate
them to the first year of enrolment. In Table B5 we find no significant differences
between treated and control regions. The higher demand for tertiary degrees
in affected regions is driven by students with an average quality similar to that
in control regions. Hence, the increase in enrolment leads to a higher share of
tertiary graduates coming from affected regions. As a degree is considered to be
a key signal for high ability, our evidence suggests that those who responded to
the reform on average improve their labor market prospects (Arrow, 1973).
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2.5 Enrolment by Field of Study
2.5.1 Affected Study Fields
The enrolment analysis has shown that natives respond to the inflow of frontier
workers by demanding more tertiary education. A further margin of adjustment
for those who enrol is the choice of study field. In this section we investigate the
extent to which specific study fields are affected by the free movement reform. We
start by linking subjects to occupations and create the variable Sh emplj which




Sh empl in o× Sh empl in o with j, j ∈ [1, 22] (2.3)
Sh empl in o with j is the share of employed in an occupation o with a degree
in field j, which we multiply with the share of employed in the same occupation
Sh empl in o. Intuitively, we allocate individuals employed in an occupation to
fields of study and take into account the size of the occupation.
We infer the link between study fields and occupations from their joint distribu-
tion provided by the EHA survey (2003–2017). This approach is consistent with
the fact that natives do not observe the education of commuters but have some
knowledge of their occupations. We use the study fields at the two-digit ISCED
level with twenty-two categories and consider ten high-skilled occupations, de-
fined as ISCO-08 level 1 (managerial occupations) and level 2 (professional oc-
cupations). FSO administrative data provides the distribution of cross-border
commuters across occupations in 1999 – the first year with available occupation
information – while census data from 2000 offers information on the occupation
of all resident employees in Switzerland.14
We build a relative measure based on the values from Equation 2.3 for cross-
border commuters (Sh commutersj) and resident workers (Sh residentsj).
Relative skill supplyj =
Sh commutersj
Sh residentsj
, j ∈ [1, 22] (2.4)
14We focus on occupations held by resident workers living in the border region to control
for potential differences in the industrial structure of places where cross-border commuters and
resident employees work.
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The measure Relative skill supplyj indicates how the highly educated commuters
are allocated across study fields j relative to the workers living in the country. In
other words, a higher value of the measure implies that commuters are relatively
more likely to have received training in this specific field than resident workers.
In Table 2.7 we present for each study field the skill supply of commuters relative
to that of resident workers. The least affected fields, those with the lowest ratio,
are listed first in column (2) and the most affected fields come last. Education,
languages and law have the lowest ratio and are non-STEM fields. Architecture
and construction, information and communication technologies and forestry have
the highest ratio and are STEM fields. Comparing columns (1) and (2) in Table
2.7 makes clear that there is a strong link between affected and STEM fields.
Table 2.7: Cross-border commuter shock by field of study







Journalism and information 0 0.595
Personal services 0 0.616
Humanities (except languages) 0 0.687
Social and behavioral sciences 0 0.698




Mathematics and statistics 1 1.391
Biological and related sciences 1 1.432
Agriculture 1 1.575
Manufacturing and processing 1 1.652
Environment 1 1.683
Physical sciences 1 1.687
Forestry 1 1.991
Engineering and engineering trades 1 2.073
Architecture and construction 1 2.478
Information and communication technologies
(ICT)
1 2.972
Note: Two-digit ISCED study fields considered. STEM (science, technology, engineering,
mathematics) and non-STEM fields are distinguished. Column (2) shows the ratio of the
share of commuters trained in a field relative to the share of residents trained in the same
field according to Equation 2.4. Source: EHA (2003–2017), FSO (1999, 2000).
2.5.2 Demand for Affected versus Non-Affected Fields
The literature on the occupation choice of foreign-born workers suggests that
STEM skills are more transferable across countries than non-STEM skills (Hunt
and Gauthier-Loiselle, 2010). STEM fields build analytical and quantitative abil-
ities compared to non-STEM skills that often require institutional or cultural
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knowledge or a high level of language skills. In their study, Hanson and Slaugh-
ter (2016) similarly observe in the US context that high-skilled immigrants are
more likely to be employed in STEM than in non-STEM professions. The authors
conjecture that these trends are explained by a higher quality of STEM training
offered abroad or a lack of cultural and communication skills, which likely result
in an absolute disadvantage for non-natives. In our context, we rule out the first
argument because the largest Swiss institutions providing tertiary level STEM
education and research are world leaders.15 We hence document that STEM
skills persist as more transferable even among foreign workers who have languge
proficiency and are culturally similar. Hanson and Liu (2016) find that occupa-
tional comparative advantages specific to the country of origin persist even after
adapting to the culture and language of the receiving country.
We divide the study fields into those with a value of the variable Relative skill supplyj
above and below one, where the former are referred to as “affected” and the latter
as “non-affected”. If natives try to avoid direct competition with foreign workers
in the labor market, demand for less affected skills would increase in the treated
regions. In the analysis of enrolment by field of study we find evidence that this
is indeed the case. Table 2.8 shows a rise in enrolment in non-affected subjects
in the post-treatment period of 2 percentage points, which is a sizeable growth
of 7.8% relative to the mean of the outcome. The rise in the group of non-
STEM fields is also statistically significant and of similar magnitude.16 Figure
2.5 shows that the timing of the effects is in line with the implementation of the
free movement reform. In contrast to Ransom and Winters (2020) who estimate
crowding-out effects from STEM fields in regions with more foreign workers, we
find no such evidence.
The higher enrolment in non-affected fields shows that natives in treated re-
gions specialise more often in skills that are required in occupations less exposed
to competition from foreign-born workers and that are less transferable across
countries. This pattern is observed despite increasing wages paid in STEM occu-
pations, as Table 2.9 shows. The returns to STEM degrees rise in the transition
and post-treatment period, while returns to non-STEM degrees do not change
significantly.
15In the academic year 2019/2020, the ETH ranked 6th and the EPFL 18th out of 1,001 in
the QS World University Ranking. In the same year, the ETH ranked 13th and the EPFL 38th
out of 1,001 in the THE World University Ranking.
16The range of the coefficient for enrolment in non-affected subjects is between 1.4 and 2.6
percentage points when leaving out one of the sixteen labor market regions one by one. The
range of the coefficient for enrolment in non-STEM subjects is between 1.6 and 2.8 percentage
points. In both exercises, the coefficients are statistically significant at least at the 5% level
with two exceptions.
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Table 2.8: Enrolment by type of study field
Outcome: share of enrolled native first-year students
Affected Non-affected STEM Non-STEM
(1) (2) (3) (4)
30min * 2002-2007 -0.000 0.003 -0.001 0.004
(0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006)
30min * after 2008 0.003 0.020 0.002 0.021
(0.003) (0.009) (0.003) (0.009)
Mean outcome 0.117 0.254 0.104 0.267
Sd outcome 0.032 0.093 0.029 0.098
Commuting zones 106 106 106 106
within 30 min 35 35 35 35
N 2226 2226 2226 2226
Note: This table shows difference-in-differences estimates using annual data at the commuting
zone level for the period 1997–2017. Affected fields are those with a supply shock measure above
one as shown in Table 2.8. STEM fields include science, technology, engineering, mathematics.
Outcome is the share of native first-year students in birth cohort. Denominator is fixed at first
year. Observations are weighed by cohort size in first year. Standard errors in parentheses are
clustered at the commuting zone level. Source: SHIS-studex.
Table 2.9: Wages of tertiary educated by study field
Outcome: ln gross hourly wage rate of natives
STEM Non-STEM
(1) (2)
30min * 2002-2007 0.040 0.012
(0.018) (0.021)
30min * after 2008 0.038 0.027
(0.022) (0.028)
Mean outcome 3.909 4.027
Sd outcome 0.086 0.107
Commuting zones 94 105
within 30 min 34 35
N 1001 1144
Note: This table shows difference-in-differences estimates using biennial data at the commuting
zone level for the period 1996–2016. STEM fields include science, technology, engineering,
mathematics. Outcome is the mean natural log of gross hourly wage of tertiary educated
natives in a region. Observations are weighed by number of tertiary educated native employees
in first year. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the commuting zone level. Source:
SESS.
In the literature on study field choice there is an established link between foreign
students in a cohort and the choice of natives. Previous studies have shown that
a higher share of foreign students reduces natives’ demand for STEM subjects
(Anelli et al., 2018; Orrenius and Zavodny, 2015). If tertiary institutions close
to the border receive an increasing share of foreign students over time, this may
alternatively drive natives into non-STEM fields – a result similar to what we
observe. In our setting, first-year enrolment and study field choice takes place
before the beginning of the studies and hence before knowing the composition of
the cohort. This sequential timing mitigates the likelihood that our results are
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Note: This figure shows difference-in-differences estimates using annual data at the commuting
zone level for the period 1997–2017. The vertical lines indicate the beginning of the transition
period (2002) and of the post-treatment period (2008). Affected fields are those with a supply
shock measure above one as shown in Table 2.8. STEM fields include science, technology,
engineering, mathematics. Outcome is the share of native first-year students enrolled in specific
group of fields relative to birth cohort. Denominator is fixed at first year. Observations are
weighed by cohort size in first year. Standard errors are clustered at the commuting zone level,
95% confidence intervals shown. Source: SHIS-studex.
affected by foreign students.
2.6 Conclusion
We examine the impact of the introduction of free movement of workers on native
demand for tertiary education. We find an increase in tertiary enrolment and
link it to lower opportunity costs of studying and higher labor market rewards to
tertiary degrees. Students with a vocational training at the upper-secondary level
are more sensitive to changes in labor market returns as their higher demand for
degrees at universities of applied sciences shows. The education system in the
Swiss context grants access to tertiary degrees to individuals with a vocational
and general background at the upper-secondary level. At the tertiary level, they
usually enrol at different institutions with a focus on specific or general skills,
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respectively. This institutional feature contributes to a highly educated labor
force with a diverse skills set. It also gives vocationally trained an important
margin of adjustment as shown in this study.
We also study how the reform affects study field choice and find no evidence
that it is impacted by changes in monetary returns. We show that affected
natives choose fields that build skills less transferable across countries compared
to the STEM skills that the foreign workers typically bring to the labor market.
Initial occupational specialization of high-skilled native and foreign workers could,
thus, become more pronounced over time. Changes towards a more restrictive
migration policy or deteriorating relative economic conditions in the host country
can lead to a sudden outflow of foreigners. Such reversals could create a shortage
of skills that foreign workers were previously supplying. Since skill acquisition is
typically a long-term process, these findings should be taken into account when
considering changes to immigration policies.
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3 How to Improve Tax Compliance? Evidence from
Population-wide Experiments in Belgium
with Jan-Emmanuel De Neve, Clément Imbert, Johannes Spinnewijn and Maarten
Luts
3.1 Introduction
Tax compliance sits at the heart of the healthy functioning of societies. It is
therefore of little surprise that gaining a robust understanding of the drivers of
tax compliance is an important topic in the economics literature. Tax compliance
involves both the truthful reporting of taxable income and the timely payment of
tax dues. The growth in third-party reporting of income has limited the ability
to misreport income (see Kleven et al. (2011, 2016); Jensen (2019)).1 Tax admin-
istrations, however, continue to devote considerable resources to the collection of
taxes. In the United States the annual cost of non-compliance with individual
income taxes due to nonfiling, underreporting, and underpayment is estimated
to total about $319 billion (Internal Revenue Service, 2016). Closing the “tax
gap” is a key objective for governments around the world, and requires to know
the drivers of tax compliance and the cost effectiveness of further interventions
(OECD, 2010; HM Revenue & Customs, 2018).
The classic work by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) provided a work-horse model
for understanding tax compliance through pecuniary incentives that deter non-
compliance. Since then, a large body of research has stressed the role of non-
pecuniary motives more broadly (e.g., Kirchler (2007); Luttmer and Singhal
(2014); Besley et al. (2019)), often referred to as tax morale. There is now
scattered evidence for these different drivers of tax compliance to be important
across a variety of settings (see Slemrod (2018)), but several questions remain
unanswered. In particular, while information frictions and complexity are shown
to be important in related contexts (e.g., Bhargava and Manoli (2015); Cox et al.
(2018)), their role in the context of tax compliance is less understood.
This paper studies the simplification of the communication by the tax authority
and compares its impact on tax compliance to, on the one hand, the use of
1Recent empirical work investigates the misreporting of foreign income in developing coun-
tries (e.g., Alstadsæter et al. (2018)) and of taxable income in developing countries (e.g., Pomer-
anz (2015); Naritomi (2018)) where paper trails are missing or the enforcement capacity falls
short.
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deterrence and tax morale nudges and, on the other hand, the use of standard
enforcement measures. We study compliance effects throughout the tax process
– including the timing of tax filing, the reporting of taxable income, and the
payment of taxes – for all individuals subject to personal income taxation in
Belgium. We compare the potential drivers of tax compliance in the same context
and put them on equal footing by varying the content of the tax letters sent by the
Belgian tax authority (Federal Public Service Finance, FPS Finance). In total,
we ran five population-wide natural field experiments in collaboration with the
FPS Finance over the course of three fiscal years, 2014-2016. This comprehensive
approach allows us to replicate findings at different stages of the tax process and
across fiscal years, and to estimate longer-term, repetition and interaction effects.
The standard communication from the tax administration to taxpayers consists
of a request to file a tax return and a request to pay taxes. Follow-up correspon-
dence takes place in the event of taxpayers being late either in filing their tax
return or in paying their tax dues. In order to estimate the impact of simplifi-
cation and compare it to the use of deterrence or the appeal to tax morale, we
leverage the different phases of communication and simultaneously test a variety
of treatments. The simplification treatments shorten the length of the letters,
reduce the information overload and highlight the action-relevant information to
the taxpayer. The deterrence treatments add a message to the simplified letter
that makes the financial penalties explicit and/or highlight the enforcement ac-
tions in case of non-compliance. The tax morale treatments add a message that
highlights the public good value of tax expenditures and/or the social norms
attached to filing and paying taxes on time.
Our experiments provide precise and remarkably consistent results across the
tax process and the respective samples of taxpayers addressed. We find the
largest compliance effects for the simplification treatments. Simplified tax filing
reminders increase subsequent tax filing by 8% (relative to the baseline reminder).
Simplifying the tax letter sent to all taxpayers with a positive tax bill increases
timely payment by 0.7%.2 For the late tax payers, the simplified reminder in-
creases subsequent tax payment by as much as 23% (relative to the baseline
reminder). Reducing information overload and emphasizing action-relevant in-
formation seem particularly effective in increasing compliance. We find that
adding tax deterrence messages further increases tax compliance, with the av-
erage effect often being comparable in magnitude to the effect of simplification.
2Despite tax withholding one out of three taxpayers has a positive outstanding balance on
their tax bill, adding up to a total of 3.8 billion euros in 2016 (about 10 percent of personal
income taxes).
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Tax payers are successfully induced to comply by making potential penalties and
their enforcement explicit, and by the encouragement to pay or file immediately
to avoid these penalties. In contrast, treatments that seek to improve tax morale
obtain no compliance effects and sometimes even backfire. The ineffectiveness
of tax morale messages is replicated across all treatments arms, which include
messages that invoke social norms and/or emphasize the social value of public
expenditures. For the latter, we also experiment with a pop-up pie chart of gov-
ernment expenditures for online tax filers and find that it does not affect reported
taxable income, but neither does it affect the perceived importance of honesty
as measured in an endline survey. While the survey shows that the treatment
does increase taxpayers’ knowledge and appreciation of public services, this seems
insufficient to increase tax compliance.
More timely tax payments do not necessarily translate into greater tax revenues.
In particular, we study the full dynamics of the treatment effects on late payers,
and find that they diminish over time as the tax administration takes further
enforcement measures (including imposing garnishments and sending bailiffs) to
eventually reach close to full compliance. The simplification treatment effects
at the end of the tax cycle are 1.0pp, which is ten times smaller than their
effect at the payment deadline. Still, the cost savings on follow-up enforcement
imply a large return to the simplification treatment. We exploit an enforcement
discontinuity, combined with our experimental variation, to disentangle their
respective effects. We estimate that the simplification treatment would have
increased compliance by 5.2pp in the absence of enforcement actions, and that it
is six times more cost-effective than standard enforcement.
Our empirical setting thus allows us to push the frontier on the evaluation of
letter treatments by comparing their compliance effects to standard enforcement
actions. While nudges are by definition low-cost interventions, knowing how
they compare to the standard policy levers that they complement has been a
key challenge (Benartzi et al., 2017). The enforcement discontinuity allows us to
compare the causal impact of regular enforcement interventions and the exper-
imental letter treatments for the exact same people (i.e., late taxpayers around
the enforcement threshold). Projected on the sample of late taxpayers, whose tax
liability was about e434 million, a back-of-the envelope calculation tells us that
the simplification treatment for this experiment alone could have increased tax
collection by e17.5 million, or alternatively, amounted to savings on enforcement
costs worth e5.4 million. In comparison, the costs of the nudge intervention were
trivial (e79,511).
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Our experimental design also allows us to tackle a second important concern
for the evaluation of letter interventions and nudge interventions more generally,
which is whether the gains are long-lived (Allcott and Rogers, 2014; Cronqvist
et al., 2018). To that purpose, we repeated the experiment on the late taxpayers
in two consecutive years. We first find that there are no diminishing marginal
returns to repeating the treatment in that recidivists are equally responsive to
a simplified letter independent of the letter type they received in the previous
year. Moreover, we find that the effects extend to the following fiscal year: late
payers are less likely to be late again in the next year after having received a
simplified reminder letter in the first year, but this effect is offset if they received
a tax morale treatment as well. These effects become smaller, and statistically
insignificant two years after the intervention.3
The particular features of our experimental setting help advancing the growing
literature on randomized controlled tax trials and the evaluation of nudge-type
interventions. More generally, our paper aims to contribute to the rich literature
that studies the drivers of tax compliance (see Slemrod (2018)).4 The first contri-
bution of our paper is to focus on the role of complexity as a behavioral driver of
tax compliance. While we do not address the complexity of the tax schedule itself
(e.g., Chetty and Saez (2013), Abeler and Jäger (2015), Aghion et al. (2017)),
our paper does shed new light on how simplifying communication can help to
overcome information frictions and/or hassle costs associated with the process
of filing and paying taxes (see e.g., Slemrod et al. (2001); Kleven and Kopczuk
(2011); Hoopes et al. (2015); Dwenger et al. (2016); Benzarti (2017)). Relat-
edly, but in another context, Bhargava and Manoli (2015) identify barriers to the
take-up of EITC benefits due to information complexity – with the mere simpli-
fication of the mailing leading to a significant increase in take-up. Second, we do
not only show that simplifying the communication of the tax administration has
a substantial effect on tax compliance, but also that this effect can outweigh the
effects of nudges related to deterrence and to tax morale. Our study compares
these various drivers of tax compliance in the same way, in the same setting, and
on the same sample, which ensures comparability. This is particularly valuable
as the results in the literature on tax morale are mixed. A number of experiments
3These findings extend on Brockmeyer et al. (2019), who find sustained effects from a
deterrence message on firms’ tax compliance in Costa Rica. These findings differ from Guyton
et al. (2016), who find no long-term effects and positive returns from repeating reminders in
claiming EITC.
4On the role of enforcement and deterrence, see reviews by Andreoni et al. (1998) and
Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002). An example of an RCT changing audit probabilities is Kleven
et al. (2011). An example of an RCT changing the penalty information is Cranor et al. (2018).
On the psychological, cultural, social, and normative factors underlying tax compliance, see
Torgler (2007); Alm (2012); Luttmer and Singhal (2014) .
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have found positive impacts from invoking social norms on tax compliance (e.g.,
Del Carpio (2014); Bott et al. (2017); Hallsworth et al. (2017); Perez-Truglia
and Troiano (2018)), while several other experiments testing normative appeals
have found null or even negative results (e.g., Blumenthal et al. (2001); Fellner
et al. (2013); John and Blume (2018); Cranor et al. (2018)).5 Third, we ran five
population-wide natural field experiments that changed the communication be-
tween the tax authority and tax payers, which allows us to test the effects of the
interventions at scale, at all stages of the tax process and for different subsets of
the tax payer population, thus strengthening the internal validity of our design.6
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a simple model of tax com-
pliance and characterizes the cost-effectiveness of different interventions. Sec-
tion 3 describes the context and empirical setting. Section 4 discusses the main
experimental results, presents the dynamics and sheds some light on mecha-
nisms. Section 5 analyzes the regression-discontinuity in enforcement, compares
the cost-effectiveness of simplification with traditional enforcement and studies
its long-term effects. Section 6 concludes.
3.2 Model
We consider a stylized model of tax compliance, revisiting the model of criminal
behavior in Becker (1968) and its adaptation to tax evasion by Allingham and
Sandmo (1972). A taxpayer decides whether to comply with their tax duties,
which include the accurate reporting of their taxable income y and the timely
filing and payment of taxes dues τ (y). We model tax compliance behavior as an
action ỹ ∈ [0, y], which solves
min
ỹ∈[0,y]
T (ỹ) + Φnon−compliance (y − ỹ) + Φmorale (y − ỹ) + Φcompliance (ỹ) ,
with T ′ ≥ 0 and Φ′j ≥ 0. The first and most natural cost from complying
is the loss of resources from paying taxes, T (ỹ). However, by complying the
taxpayer can avoid follow-up costs enforced by the tax authority, captured by
Φnon−compliance (y − ỹ). This is the central trade-off in the deterrence framework
5For example, Hallsworth et al. (2017) find that social norms and public services messages in
official reminder letters increased payment rates for overdue tax in the UK. In contrast, Cranor
et al. (2018) find that invoking social norms has no compliance effects on late tax payers in
Colorado, while making the penalty explicit does. Another recent example is Perez-Truglia
and Troiano (2018), who find that shaming tax payers by making their non-compliance public
increases compliance. However, they find no effects from providing information on others’
non-compliance.
6We also test different variations of similar treatments and study heterogeneous treatment
effects with causal forests (Wager and Athey, 2018), which helps to establish robustness and
uncover underlying mechanisms.
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by Allingham and Sandmo (1972), where the tax authority increases the costs
of non-compliance by increasing penalties for non-compliant behavior and the
probability of actual enforcement.7 In addition to the resource costs, taxpayers
may also face an intrinsic cost of non-compliance given their tax morale, captured
by Φmorale (y − ỹ). This cost may depend on the perceived fairness of the tax
system, the taxpayer’s valuation of the government’s use of the tax revenues,
social norms determined by the compliance behavior of other tax payers, etc.
Finally, we also allow for a direct cost of compliance Φcompliance (ỹ), which can
capture the hassle cost of filing and paying taxes, the attention needed in order
to take the appropriate action, etc.
To induce compliant behavior, the tax authority needs to ensure that the cost of
compliance is exceeded by its return. Assuming linear cost functions (H (x) =
h× x), this can be represented by
t+ φcompliance ≤ φnon−compliance + φmorale.
The tax authority has a set of instruments available that can affect the vec-
tor of cost parameters φ determining the taxpayer’s compliance ỹ (φ). This
includes standard enforcement interventions (which affect compliance through
φnon−compliance), but also the letter interventions that we consider below. We cat-
egorize our interventions as affecting φcompliance through simplifying/improving
the letter design, φnon−compliance through making enforcement and penalties ex-
plicit, and φmorale by invoking tax morale.
The optimal mix of instruments will depend on their cost effectiveness, deter-
mined by their impact on tax revenues ∂T/∂φj and their resource cost to the tax
authority ∂C/∂φj. Leaving aside other considerations, the tax authority should
equalize the marginal cost of raising an extra euro of revenue
∂C/∂φj
∂T/∂φj
, as shown by
Keen and Slemrod (2017). In practice, especially in the case of payment recovery,
the tax authority may aim to reach near full compliance ỹ (φ) ≈ y and rely on
stronger enforcement to recover the remaining taxes due. In that case, the re-
turn to alternative interventions is not the increase in tax revenues, but the costs
savings on the standard enforcement measures. The relative cost-effectiveness of








7Note that the cost Φnon−compliance (y − ỹ) can also include the resources taxpayers expend
to camouflage non-compliance (see Slemrod (2018)).
68
This is exactly the metric we will calculate after having estimated the compliance
effects and costs of the letter interventions and standard enforcement.
3.3 Context and Design
This section presents the five experiments we study and describes the experimen-
tal samples. We also provide some background on the tax filing and payment
cycle for personal income taxation in Belgium.
3.3.1 Tax Process
In Belgium the tax-to-GDP ratio was 44.6% in 2017, which is above the OECD
average of 34.2%. We focus on individual income tax, which is the largest source
of tax revenues in Belgium. In the fiscal year 2016, individual income tax raised
27.7% of overall tax revenues from 7.1 million taxpayers. Income taxes are col-
lected solely at the federal level. There is a personal tax-free allowance which
stood at 7,130 EUR and marginal taxes rise from 25 to 50%.8 Fiscal years run
from January 1st to December 31st, and the tax cycle starts in July of the year
after the fiscal year in which the income has been earned. There are four main
steps in the annual personal income tax cycle, as shown in Figure 3.1a: tax filing,
filing reminders, tax payment and payment reminders. We vary the correspon-
dence between the tax administration and taxpayer at each of these steps.
Tax filing (TF): Taxpayers can file their taxes on paper or online, either
by themselves or with the help of an accountant or a tax official.9 The online
portal called “Tax-on-Web” is increasingly popular and in 2017 it was used by 3.8
million taxpayers, of which 1.7 million submitted their declarations individually.
The remainder filed with the help of an accountant or a government official.
Filing reminders (TFR): Figure 3.1b depicts what happens when taxpayers
miss the filing deadline. Filers who have not submitted by the deadline are sent
a filing reminder letter, and given 14 days to file. If a taxpayer has still not
filed seven days after this second deadline, the tax administration uses its own
estimates to compute their tax liability. In the fiscal year 2016, about 170,000
8In comparison, in the US, the tax-to-GDP ratio is lower (27.1%) and income taxes are
more important as a share of tax revenues (38.6%). Federal marginal tax rates are lower (10
to 37%), but lower levels of government levy additional taxes.
9Not all taxpayers need to file. About a third of taxpayers (2.2 million in the fiscal year
2016) receive pre-filled tax returns with no further action required.
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taxpayers had not filed by the deadline, which represents about 3.5% of taxpayers
who were expected to file.
Tax payment (TP): A majority of taxpayers are taxed at the source if they
are employed or pre-pay their taxes based on estimates of their tax liability if
they are self-employed. A significant share of taxpayers also have taxable income
below the exemption threshold and thus pay no income taxes. As a result, less
than a third of taxpayers (1.9 million in the fiscal year 2016) receives a tax bill
with a positive payable balance, which they need to pay within the next two
months. The majority of such cases can be explained by insufficient withholding
at the source in situations that made it difficult to calculate the exact tax liability
(e.g. tax payers who hold several jobs, students who work part-time, etc.). Total
taxes due at that stage are 3.8 billion euros.
Payment reminders (TPR): Figure 3.1c depicts what happens when tax-
payers miss the payment deadline. Taxpayers who have not paid two months
after receipt of the tax bill are sent a payment reminder. Taxpayers who still do
not comply are then exposed to further enforcement actions, which start after 14
days. In the fiscal year 2016, about 220,000 taxpayers had still not paid 14 days
after the deadline, and owed a total of 0.8 billion euros, which represents 12% of
taxpayers who received a positive tax bill, and 21% of taxes they owed.
3.3.2 Experiments
We report on a total of five experiments: one on tax filing (TF), one on tax filing
reminders (TFR), one on tax payment (TP) and two on tax payment reminders
(TPR). The experiments spanned the three fiscal years (FY) from FY2014 to
FY2016. The experiments involve various randomly assigned treatments that we
categorize in three groups: simplification, deterrence and tax morale.
In four experiments out of five, the treatment involved simplifying the letter to
communicate more clearly what the tax administration expected from taxpayers.
Simplification included shortening the letter while retaining the action-relevant
information. To attract the attention of the reader, important information was
highlighted in color and/or placed in boxes. The simplified letters were also
personalized, i.e., it was addressed to the taxpayer using his/her name.10 As we
10Only for the TP experiment, we have within-experiment variation in the design of the
simplified letter as the non-personalized address is used for a random subgroup.
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discuss below, the exact design of the simplified letter varies across experiments
as does the design of the old letter.
The experiments also tested the effect of deterrence and tax morale through
the addition of short messages in the simplified letter. The deterrence messages
aimed at making the consequences of non-compliance explicit, by stating fines
and tax increases and/or by mentioning follow-up enforcement. We also tested
messages that encouraged immediate action to avoid the fines. The tax morale
messages, on the other hand, aimed at raising compliance by increasing the de-
sire of taxpayers to comply with social norms or to reciprocate for public goods
provision. Appendix Table C1 lists all the deterrence and tax morale messages
used (translated in English).
TP Experiment: The Tax Payment experiment modified the tax bill sent
to taxpayers with a positive liability: the experiment was carried out between
November 2017 and May 2018 with 1,216,317 taxpayers (fiscal year 2016). All
treated taxpayers received a simplified letter, only keeping action-relevant infor-
mation and improving the overall outline. For a subset of treated individuals, the
letter included either deterrence messages or tax morale messages (see Panel A
of Appendix Table C1). For this experiment, outcomes include the probability of
making a payment following letter receipt (extensive margin response), and the
fraction paid conditional on a payment having been made (intensive margin). As
baseline outcome, we use the probability of payment within 60 days after the let-
ter was sent: 60 days is the deadline given to taxpayers to pay their outstanding
debt.
TPR Experiments: The Payment Reminder experiments were conducted with
taxpayers who were late in paying their tax: 229,751 taxpayers in 2015/16
(FY2014) and 188,180 taxpayers in 2016/17 (FY2015).11 The treatment group
received a simplified reminder letter, in which the outstanding tax liability and
the deadline were highlighted and other information shortened. Again, for differ-
ent subsets of the treatment group, the letter also included deterrence and tax
morale messages (see Panel B of Appendix Table C1). The baseline outcome
we consider is now the probability of payment within 14 and 180 days after re-
minder receipt: 14 days corresponds to the time at which enforcement actions
11In both trials, German speaking taxpayers, taxpayers who had raised objections to the
outstanding amount they owed and taxpayers for whom the government did not have a name
were not included in the randomization and received an old letter. Only debts related to the
current fiscal year and letters that are first means of communication with the taxpayer (no
updates on balances owed) are included in the analysis.
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begin. To validate the results and to test the effect of repeated treatments, the
TPR experiment was conducted in two consecutive years.
TF Experiment: The Tax Filing experiment was conducted in 2017 (FY2016)
with 1.5 million online tax filers.12 The tax filers were shown a pop-up pie chart
either before (treatment) or after (control group) they filed their taxes. The
pie chart presented the breakdown of government spending by categories.13 The
chart was accompanied by a sentence highlighting that these public services were
funded by taxes.14 We consider this as a similar treatment to the tax morale
message in the other experiments. For this experiment, outcomes come from two
sources: administrative data on tax compliance and answers to an online survey
to which all online filers were invited. Due to confidentiality concerns, the ad-
ministration did not provide individual information but only average outcomes
(or taxpayers characteristics) within a gender-age cell. The main compliance out-
come is reported taxable income. Other outcomes are tax liability, self-employed
profits and expenses, expenses of salaried workers and general expenses. These
are also based on declared values. Survey data is available for those who agreed
to answer the questionnaire, which gauges taxpayers’ knowledge and agreement
with the way tax revenue is spent, and their evaluation of public services and the
tax system more generally. 15
TFR Experiment: The Filing Reminders experiment was conducted with
148,925 taxpayers who were late in filing their tax returns in 2016 (FY2015).
The treatment group received a simplified letter, which emphasized the new fil-
ing deadline. A subset of the treatment group received a letter which included
deterrence messages (see Panel D of Appendix Table C1).16 For these experi-
ments, the baseline outcome is the probability of filing within 21 days after letter
12This excludes taxpayers who used an accountant or tax officer to submit their taxes via the
online portal. Our dataset covers taxpayers who submitted their tax returns before mid-August
2017.
13The tax administration also provided a pie chart of government expenditures by region,
which was available when scrolling down.
14For some randomly selected sub-groups, the administration added at the very bottom of the
pop-up an additional sentence that either added a public goods message, mentioned penalties in
general terms, or appealed to social norms in general terms (see Panel C of Appendix Table C1).
We do not find any differential effect of this second sentence and pool all treatment groups in
the analysis.
15All outcome variables were pre-specified in the Pre-analysis Plan (AEARCTR-0002196).
16In the previous year (FY2014), the administration carried out a separate experiment on
filing reminders, in which it included tax morale messages without simplifying the letter first.
We managed to collect data from this experiment and found no effect of the treatment. Results
are not reported here.
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receipt: 21 days is the time at which the tax administration begins to calculate
the tax liability based on income estimates.
3.3.3 Randomization Design
The allocation of taxpayers to the different treatment groups was done in two
different ways. For the TPR, the TF and the TFR experiments, it was based
on the last two digits of the national identity number, which are random (see
Appendix Table C2). For the TP experiment, treatment allocation was based on
the day of the month the taxpayer was born, which is also random and indepen-
dent of the last digits of the national identity number (see Appendix Table C3).
There are three things to note.
First, treatment allocations for the two tax payment reminder experiments (TPR
2014 and the TPR 2015) were done in such a way that taxpayers of each treatment
group in TPR 2014 had a similar probability to be assigned to each treatment
group in TPR 2015. It follows that the two allocations are almost independent
from each other, as in a cross-cutting randomization design.17 Since there is sig-
nificant overlap between 2014 and 2015 late payers (see Appendix Table C4), we
have sufficient power to estimate the effect of the two treatments both separately
and jointly, to identify the effect of repeated treatment.
Second, treatment allocations for the TPR 2014 (tax payment reminder) and
TFR 2015 (tax filing reminder) experiments coincide partially, but not com-
pletely. A potential concern could be that treatment status in one experiment
affects outcomes in a following experiment. Fortunately, the two experiments
were done on different target populations, since the late payers of 2014 need not
be late filers in 2015. Indeed, the overlap between the two populations is small:
as Appendix Table C4 shows, only 6% of late payers for the fiscal year 2014
were also late filers for the fiscal year 2015. As a robustness check, we estimate
the results of the TFR 2015 experiment controlling for the TPR 2014 treatment
assignment and show that our results do not change.
Third, treatment allocation for the TF 2016 experiment again split the tax sam-
ple in two based on the two last digits of the national identity number, which
made it partly, but not completely coincide with treatment allocations for the
TFR and the TPR 2014 experiments. Unfortunately, to protect privacy the tax
17Since 97 digits had to be allocated to 9 treatment groups in TPR 2014 and 10 treatment
groups in TPR 2015, the two allocations are independent up to seven digits (11, 22, 33, 64, 75,
86 and 97).
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administration did not share individual identifiers for the TF 2016 experiment,
which prevents us from measuring the exact overlap with the sample of the other
two experiments, or controlling for assignment to previous treatments. However,
since the sample of the TF experiment is much larger (1.5 million, against 150,000
for TFR and 230,000 for TPR 2014), the overlap is likely to be small.
3.3.4 Population comparison
As the five experiments take place at different stages of the tax process, they test
the effect of simplification, deterrence and tax morale on different parts of the
taxpayer population. Table 3.1 shows descriptive statistics on socio-demographic
characteristics of the different experimental samples, as compared to the uni-
verse of Belgian taxpayers. The Belgian personal income taxpayer is on average
49 years old, in a couple in 35% of the time and has 0.4 children (column 1). By
convention, in the case of households composed of individuals of both genders,
only the gender of the woman is recorded, so that there are many more female
than males (70%). 33% of the taxpayer population lives in Wallonia and 42%
speak French. On average, they owe e570, but only 28% have a positive tax lia-
bility. Taxpayers in the TP experiment have a tax liability which is by definition
positive, with an average of e2676. As column 2 shows, they are older, more
likely to be in a couple and less likely to have children. In contrast, taxpayers
in the TF experiment (column 4), who file online, are younger, and have more
children. Taxpayers in the reminder experiments (TPR and TFR in columns 3
and 5) differ from the overall population in similar ways: they are more likely
to be male, less likely to be in a couple, younger, more likely to speak French
and to live in Wallonia. Taxpayers who are late in paying also have lower tax
liability than the average (e1890). For late taxpayers, we were able to collect two
additional covariates: taxable income and solvency score. The solvency score is
the prediction by the tax administration of the probability that a taxpayer will
not be able to pay their debts permanently, based on their tax returns in the
previous year and their debt settlement history.
3.4 Experimental Results
This section first presents the main results of our experiments, then discusses the
timing of the effect of the different interventions, and finally explores potential
mechanisms.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics of Control Variables
Experiment: All taxpayers Tax Payment Tax Filing
Payment Reminder Filing Reminder
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Demographics
Male dummy 0.309 0.324 0.448 0.276 0.529
(0.462) (0.468) (0.497) (0.447) (0.499)
Couple dummy 0.346 0.415 0.298 0.445 0.132
(0.476) (0.493) (0.457) (0.497) (0.339)
Age 49.495 53.354 47.764 47.596 42.229
(18.129) (16.382) (15.611) (15.585) (16.249)
Number of children 0.413 0.351 0.409 0.579 0.334








Wallonia dummy 0.327 0.316 0.367 0.284 0.390
(0.469) (0.465) (0.482) (0.451) (0.488)
Flanders dummy 0.570 0.596 0.525 0.637 0.390
(0.495) (0.491) (0.499) (0.481) (0.488)
French dummy 0.421 0.386 0.473 0.357 0.592
(0.494) (0.487) (0.499) (0.479) (0.491)
German dummy 0.006 0.011 - 0.003 0.007
(0.076) (0.104) (0.051) (0.084)
Other






N 6,689,779 1,216,317 229,751 942,571 148,925
Note: The table presents means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of control variables
for different samples. In column 1 the sample is composed of all individual income taxpayers
in FY2016. In column 2 it is the sample of the TP FY2016 experiment. In column 3 it is the
sample of the TPR FY2014 experiment. In column 4 it is the sample of the TF FY2016 ex-
periment. In column 5 it is the sample of the TFR FY2015 experiment. The base category for
gender is female, for region Brussels, for language Flemish and for marital status single.
3.4.1 Baseline Results
To estimate the effect of simplification, deterrence and tax morale messages in
each experiment, we take advantage of the randomization and simply regress com-
pliance outcomes on treatment dummies and taxpayer controls. The estimating
equation writes:
Y i = α + βSSi + ΣjβjT
j
i + γXi + εi,
where Yi is the relevant outcome for taxpayer i, Si is a dummy variable equal to
one for taxpayers who received a simplified letter, T ji are dummy variables equal
to one for the different messages added to the simplified letter, and Xi is a vector
of taxpayer characteristics.
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The outcome variable Yi we use for our baseline specification in the tax payment
experiment is whether the tax liability is paid (in full or in part) before the dead-
line, which is 60 days after the letter receipt. For the reminder experiments, the
outcome variable is whether taxes are filed or paid before the start of follow-up
interventions (respectively after 21 and 14 days for the filing and payment exper-
iments). We consider compliance at different time horizons and at the extensive
vs. intensive margin later in this section. For the tax filing experiment, the com-
pliance variable is different in nature, since we consider total reported taxable
income. Table 3.1 presents the full list of controls Xi. Controls include dummies
for gender, couples, age, region, mother tongue, and number of children. For ex-
periments in which letters were sent out in waves, controls also include dummies
for each wave. We include additional controls for some experiments: dummies
for quintiles of amount owed (TP and TPR experiments), quintiles of income and
solvency score (TPR experiment), and marital status (TF experiment).
The coefficients of interest are βS, which identifies the effect of simplification,
and βj, which identifies the effect of adding a deterrence or tax morale message.
Figure 3.2 presents our baseline estimates for the simplification, deterrence and
tax morale treatment. The tax payment and tax filing experiments are in the top
and bottom panels respectively. The experiments on the baseline sample of tax
payers/filers are on the left, while reminder experiments for the late payers/filers
are on the right. The figure conveys a very clear and strong pattern across
the four experiments. In the three experiments in which communication with the
taxpayer was simplified (TP, TPR and TFR), it had a positive and sizeable effect
on tax compliance. In the same three experiments, the deterrence messages had
an additional positive effect, which is significant and can be as large as the effect
of simplification. Finally, in the three experiments in which the administration
tried to increase tax morale (TP, TPR and TF), it had either no effect or even
reduced compliance.18
The regression estimates are also presented in Table 3.2, which has the same
structure as Figure 3.2. The top panel (Panel A) presents the results of the
tax payment experiments. Column 1 shows that simplifying the tax bill had
a positive effect on the probability of paying on time, increasing it by 0.5pp.
Adding a deterrence message increased the probability of paying on time further,
by 0.5pp. These effects are relatively small, but significant: the combined effect
18Another TFR experiment was run in 2014, but unlike the main 2015 experiment, only tax
morale messages were used, and without simplifying the letter. These messages had a null or
negative effect on the probability of filing before enforcement actions started. These results
(not shown here) confirm that tax morale messages do not improve tax compliance.
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Figure 3.2: Summary of the Main Results
(a) Tax Payment (b) Payment Reminder











Simplified Deterrence Tax Morale 95% CI
Note: The figure presents treatment effect estimates from baseline specifications for the TP
(Panel (a)), TPR FY2014 (Panel (b)), TF (Panel (c)) and TFR FY2015 (Panel (d)) exper-
iments. The outcome is partial payment probability at 60 days (deadline) in Panel (a), and
at 14 days (enforcement) in Panel (b). The outcome is reported taxable income in Panel (c)
and filing probability at 21 days (enforcement) in Panel (d). Control variables are listed in
Table 3.1, for exact estimates refer to Table 3.2. 95% confidence intervals based on robust
standard errors are plotted. Standard errors are clustered by date of letter receipt in Panels
(a) and (b).
of simplification and deterrence messages is 1.4% of the control mean (72.8%).
The tax morale messages, however, had no additional effect on tax compliance.
The effect of −0.1pp is sufficiently precisely estimated to rule out effects of a
magnitude comparable to the simplification and deterrence treatment. Column 2
presents the results of the payment reminders experiment. The results are qual-
itatively similar. The effects of simplification and deterrence are again positive,
but the former effect clearly dominates. That is, simplifying the reminder letters
increased the probability of paying by 10pp (22.8% of the control mean), and de-
terrence messages had an additional positive effect of 1.2pp (2.7% of the control
mean). Tax morale messages, however, had an opposite effect, slightly reducing
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tax compliance (−0.7pp or 1.6% of the control mean). The bottom panel (Panel
B) presents the results of the tax filing experiments, which are again very similar
qualitatively. The tax morale treatment in the tax filing experiment (Panel B
Column 1) had no effect on declared taxable income, with the null effect again
being precisely estimated. The estimates in Column 2 of Panel B show that sim-
plification and deterrence had a large positive effect on tax compliance among
late filers. Those who received a simplified letter were 2.6pp more likely to file on
time. This probability increased by an additional 2.8pp for those who received a
simplified letter with a deterrence message, making them 17% more likely to file
on time than the control group.19
3.4.2 Dynamic Effects
We have so far reported treatment effects at one point in time, at the deadline
for the tax payment experiment and before the start of enforcement actions for
the reminder experiments. Using the payment and filing history, we can estimate
treatment effects at any time – measured in days – after treatment. Let Yi,t be
the tax compliance outcome of individual i at time t. As before, Si denotes a
dummy variable equal to one for taxpayers who received a simplified letter, T ji
are treatment dummies for the addition of deterrence and tax morale messages
and Xi denotes a vector of controls. We estimate the following equation:
Y i,t = αt + βS,tSi + Σjβj,tT
j
i + γXi + εi.
For the TP experiment, t ranges from the receipt of the tax bill to 60 days
after, corresponding to the deadline. For the TPR experiment, t ranges from the
receipt of the letter to 180 days after. Note that the deadline is two days after,
and that enforcement follow-up does not start until 14 days later. For the TFR
experiment, t ranges from the receipt of the letter, which gives late filers 14 days
to comply, to 60 days after, when the administration automatically files taxes for
non-compliers.
Appendix Figure C1 displays the dynamics of tax compliance in the control
group - the estimated αt - for the three experiments. In the TP experiment,
the proportion of taxpayers who paid in the control group increased slowly after
receipt of the tax bill, and then sharply just before the deadline, so that 72%
19Appendix Table C5 presents the results of the filing reminder experiment controlling for the
treatment assignment in the payment reminder experiment. Due to the partial overlap between
the two experiments, the estimates are less precise, but the magnitude of the treatment effects
is similar.
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Table 3.2: Main Results
Panel A: Payment Probability of some payment
at 60 days (deadline) at 14 days (before enforcement)
Tax Payment Payment Reminders
(1) (2)
Simplified (S) 0.005 0.102
(0.001) (0.010)
+ Deterrence 0.005 0.012
(0.001) (0.003)





S+Tax Morale=Simplified 0.167 0.083
Control mean 0.728 0.447
N 1,216,317 229,751
Panel B: Filing Log pre-check Probability of having filed
taxable income at 21 days (before enforcement)












Control mean 15.041 0.317
N 942,571 148,925
Note: The table presents treatment effect estimates from baseline specifications in four sepa-
rate experiments. Column 1 in Panel A presents the results of the TP experiment (taxpayers
for the FY2016). Column 2 in Panel A presents the results of the TPR 2014 experiment (late
taxpayers in the FY2014). Column 1 in Panel B presents the results of the TF experiment
(online tax filers in the FY2016). Column 2 in Panel B presents the results of the TFR experi-
ment (late tax filers in the FY2015). Control variables are listed in Table 3.1. Robust standard
errors in parentheses, clustered by date of letter receipt in Panel A. p-values are adjusted for
multiple hypothesis testing (List et al., 2016).
of taxpayers met the deadline. In the TPR experiment, only a minority of late
payers (17%) met the renewed deadline, and less than half of them had paid
before the beginning of enforcement actions. The pattern is similar in the TFR
experiment: only 25% of late filers in the control group had filed by the renewed
deadline and only 34% had filed before enforcement actions began.
Figure 3.3 presents the dynamics of the simplification treatment, βS,t. Taxpayers
who received a simplified tax bill were slightly more likely to pay in the first weeks
after tax bill receipt, but the difference with the control group really widened in
the last week before the deadline. For the late payers, who were given a tight
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deadline, the simplified reminders had a strong and immediate effect on payment
probability, which peaked around the time when enforcement actions started.
As enforcement actions began, the control group caught up with treatment, so
that the treatment effects decreased steeply, although they were still statistically
significant at the end of the period. In the filing reminder experiment, the sim-
plified reminders also had a strong and rapid effect on filing probability, which
accelerated close to the deadline and peaked at the time at which enforcement
actions started. Then, as income was automatically filed, the difference in man-
ual filing remained constant between treatment and control. Taken together,
these findings suggest that simplification made both the need to pay and the
actual deadline more salient to taxpayers. For completeness, we also report on
the dynamic effects of deterrence and tax morale messages, βj,t, in Appendix Fig-
ure C2. Across the three experiments, the additional positive effect of deterrence
messages, which emphasized the penalties associated with missing the deadline,
were felt gradually, and peaked at the deadline. In the Payment Reminder ex-
periment, the negative effect of tax morale messages lingered for about a month,
even after enforcement actions begun.
While our results show that the compliance effects peaked at the deadline or
shortly after, they also clearly show that the effects diminished over time as
enforcement actions begun. This is particularly striking in the TPR experiment.
As Table 3.3 shows, compliance was 10pp higher in treatment than in control after
14 days (before enforcement), 6.9pp higher after 30 days, and less than 1pp higher
after 180 days. Hence, the effect of simplification on taxes collected was in the end
much smaller than the effect on compliance at 14 days would suggest. However,
it declined in part because enforcement actions by the tax administration made
the control group catch up with the treatment group. In Section 3.5, we will
disentangle the compliance effect of the simplification treatment and the follow-
up interventions.
3.4.3 Mechanisms
The relative impact of the simplification, deterrence and tax morale treatments
is remarkably consistent across experiments implemented at different stages of
the tax process, and on different populations. This section explores potential
mechanisms underlying this robust pattern. We present treatment variations
within each category, consider their impact on alternative outcome variables and
present heterogeneous effects estimated with causal forests.
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Note: The figure presents simplification treatment effect estimates by days since letter receipt
for the TP (Panel (a)), TPR FY2014 (Panel (b)) and TFR FY2015 (Panel (c)) experiments.
The outcome is partial payment probability in Panels (a) and (b), and filing probability in
Panel (c). The vertical lines indicate the payment/filing deadline and/or the day enforcement
actions start. Control variables are listed in Table 3.1. 95% confidence intervals based on
robust standard errors plotted. Standard errors are clustered by date of letter receipt in Panels
(a) and (b).
Simplification Our experiments show that simplifying the tax correspondence
can have a substantial impact on compliance and highlighted the dynamic pat-
terns of the compliance effects. We briefly compare the compliance effect across
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Table 3.3: Dynamic Effects of Payment Reminders FY2014
Probability of some payment
at 2 days at 14 days at 30 days at 180 days
(deadline) (before enforcement) (after enforcement)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Simplified 0.065 0.103 0.069 0.010
(0.011) (0.010) (0.004) (0.003)
P-values of tests:
Simplified=Control 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Control mean 0.166 0.447 0.598 0.845
N 229,751 229,751 229,751 229,751
Note: The table presents treatment effect estimates from the payment reminders experiment
(TPR FY2014). Control variables are listed in Table 3.1. Standard errors in parentheses are
clustered by date of letter receipt. p-values are adjusted for multiple hypothesis testing (List
et al., 2016).
experiments and across slight treatment variations within one experiment.
To compare the magnitude of the effects of simplification across experiments, it is
important to keep in mind that while the simplified letters look very similar, the
quality of the old letters was different. In particular, in the tax payment experi-
ment, the required actions were already grouped together and highlighted in the
old letter, but they were made even more salient in the new letter. For the old
payment reminder letter, the action-relevant information was hidden and spread
out over a long, technical letter in the old design, also containing information
that was only relevant for internal use. The quality of the old filing reminder
letter was arguably in between. In the payment reminder experiment, the sim-
plified presentation increased tax compliance by as much as 23% before the start
of follow-up enforcement. This effect is larger than in the filing reminder exper-
iment (8%) and an order of magnitude larger than in the payment experiment
(0.7%). Hence, simplification was effective everywhere, but had a larger impact
in contexts where the old letter was more complex.
The dynamic patterns discussed before, with larger effects at the deadline and
after receipt of the letter, suggest that the simplified communication is effective
in making the deadline more salient and reduces chances to forget to pay or file
before. This is confirmed when considering the effects on the extensive and inten-
sive margin. In particular, Panel A of Appendix Table C7 shows the treatment
effects in the tax payment experiments (TP and TPR) on the fraction of the tax
liability paid conditional on paying. We find positive effects of simplification at
the intensive margin, but of much smaller magnitude than the extensive margin
effects (and only significant in TP). The tax payment experiments (TP and TPR)
also included treatments varying the personalization of the letter design. Specif-
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ically, in the TP experiment, some simplified letters did not address taxpayers
by name (Simplified Not Personalized), and in the TPR FY2015 experiment, in
some letters with a deterrence message the female partner in a couple was ad-
dressed before the male (Explicit Penalty FM). These variations did not make
any difference (see Appendix Table C6).
Deterrence While prior work - both theoretical and empirical - has highlighted
the importance of deterrence to tackle tax evasion, our experiments show that
making penalties explicit in tax correspondence can improve timely tax filing and
payment too, with compliance effects between 0.5 and 3pp across the different
experiments. We briefly discuss here the specific deterrence treatments and refer
the reader to Appendix Table C1 for the exact wording of the messages. The
baseline deterrence treatment in the tax payment and payment reminder exper-
iments states the average penalty (of e209) explicitly. In the filing reminder
experiment, the treatment effect is somewhat larger when instead of the average
penalty the deterrence message states the range of possible penalties (from e5 to
e1,250) and tax rate increases (from 10 to 200%). We also find that making en-
forcement explicit by emphasizing the seizing of income/assets to actually collect
penalties further increased compliance.20 We also tested a more implicit variation
of the enforcement message, which emphasized that not paying taxes would be
seen as an active choice, building on Hallsworth et al. (2015). This treatment
had no significant effect, potentially in line with the ineffectiveness of the tax
morale treatments in our context. In contrast, a message that empasized that by
taking immediate action, taxpayers could avoid penalties significantly increased
compliance. In the payment reminder experiment, making the penalty explicit
in combination with the immediacy message increased compliance from 1pp to
1.7pp (see TPR, FY2015 in Appendix Table C6).21 Also in the tax payment ex-
periment, we ran a treatment in which we highlighted the returns to immediate
action to avoid enforcement measures, which increased the treatment effect from
the simplified letter from 0.4 to 0.7pp (see TP in Appendix Table C6). This
complements the earlier finding from the simplification treatment that besides
making the relevant information salient, there is also a role for encouraging im-
mediate action. We do not find an effect of deterrence at the intensive margin,
when looking at the paid tax liability conditional on paying (Appendix Table C7).
20The Explicit Penalty+Enforcement message increases compliance 2.5pp against 1pp for the
Explicity Penalty message in TPR, FY2015 - see Appendix Table C6. The difference between
the two coefficients is significant with a p-value of 0.001.
21The difference in treatment effects between the explicit penalty and the explicit
penalty+immediacy treatment is significant with a p-value of 0.077.
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Tax Morale Our finding that tax morale messages are ineffective in raising tax
compliance contrasts with some earlier studies on tax payment (e.g., Hallsworth
et al. (2017) in the UK) and on tax filing (e.g., Bott et al. (2017) on foreign
income reporting in Norway). However, a series of studies have found no effects
when introducing normative appeals (e.g., Blumenthal et al. (2001), John and
Blume (2018)). We both widen and strengthen the evidence by finding no or
negative results at the payment and the filing stage, for the full population of
tax payers / filers and on the subset of late filers / payers. Since we work on
the universe of Belgium tax payers, the estimates are sufficiently precise to reject
at usual significance levels that tax morale messages have effects of a magnitude
comparable to the simplification and deterrence treatments. The tax morale
message is also consistent across different treatment variations used in previous
papers, either emphasizing the social value of the tax expenditures, or invoking
the social norm of tax compliance by other Belgian taxpayers. For the online
tax filing experiment, the treatment is somewhat different (i.e., the pop-up of a
pie chart of tax expenditures) and so is the compliance measure (i.e., reported
taxable income). However, the conclusions are the same.22
Tax morale messages may be ineffective because the messages were ineffective
at raising tax morale, or because tax morale itself is not an important driver of
tax compliance. To shed some light on the reasons why tax morale messages
are ineffective, we draw from the large-scale survey implemented in combination
with the online TF experiment. Taxpayers were invited to participate to an online
survey immediately after they filed. The response rates were similar in treatment
and control (resp. 5.15% and 5.14%): in total 79,334 tax filers completed the
survey. Appendix Table C8 presents treatment effects on survey responses. As
expected, tax filers who had seen the pie chart were more likely to say that they
knew how taxes were spent (column 1) and were indeed closer to the truth when
asked about the share of government spending in each category (column 2).23
Second, treated taxpayers did not only know better, they also agreed more with
how taxes were spent in general (column 3). When asked to rank expenditures
categories in terms of which the government should give priority to, their stated
preferences were closer to the actual ranking (column 4). They also reported
attaching more value to public services financed with tax revenues (column 5).
In the end, however, treated tax filers were not more likely to be satisfied with
22Panel B of Appendix Table C7 shows the impact of the pie chart treatment on five other
tax compliance outcomes, including self-employed profits and deductible expenses. The average
treatment effect on tax compliance is precisely estimated, but always insignificant.
23Using respondents’ responses, we construct a knowledge index equal to minus the stan-
dardized sum of absolute deviations between the stated and the actual share over all spending
categories.
85
the general tax system and not more likely to agree with the statement that
taxes should be reported honestly (column 6 and 7). These results suggest that
while the pie chart treatment was effective in improving taxpayers’ knowledge
and appreciation of how their taxes were spent, it fell short of improving their
tax morale.
Heterogeneous Effects Average treatment effects can mask important het-
erogeneity, which is important to better target interventions, and to gauge the dis-
tributional consequences of interventions that alleviate heterogeneous frictions.24
We focus on the payment reminder experiments, for which we were able to obtain
a large set of observables (including various demographics like age, family com-
position, region, amount owed, taxable income and solvency score). To discipline
our analysis of treatment effect heterogeneity, we use the causal forests algorithm
created by Wager and Athey (2018).25
Figure 3.4 plots the dispersion of the treatment effects by treatment category (bin
size is set to 0.5pp for all figures). While the figure only uncovers the hetero-
geneity in treatment effects based on observables, it is interesting to compare the
predicted heterogeneity across treatments using the same set of observables. In-
deed, we see a wide dispersion for the simplification treatment, but less so for the
deterrence and tax morale ones. Moreover, the effect of the simplification treat-
ment never turns negative, while the deterrence treatment has negative effects
for some tax payers. Interestingly, the tax morale treatments seem to backfire
for most taxpayers: almost all estimated treatment effects are negative.
Using the same causal forests estimates, we can determine which observable char-
acteristics drive the heterogeneity in treatment effects. Figures C3a to C3h in
Appendix present the average of the different observables in each treatment ef-
fect quintile. The machine learning results identify four relevant dimensions of
treatment heterogeneity: age, number of children, tax liability and solvency. We
confirm that these dimensions matter everything else equal, by regressing tax
compliance on interactions of the treatment with these four main characteristics,
including interactions of the treatment with all other characteristics as controls.
Table C9 presents the results.26 Simplification is more effective among taxpayers
with children, who may have a harder time to track deadlines. Simplification is
24See for example Alcott et al. (2018) in the context of using corrective sin taxes.
25According to Chernozhukov et al. (2018), we are in the case where the Wager and Athey
(2018) method provides robust results: we have 10 dimensions of heterogeneity and about
230,000 observations (log(230, 000) = 12 > 10).
26Appendix Table C10 present similar results for the second TPR experiment (fiscal year
2015).
86







−0.05 0 0.05 0.1 0.15
















−0.05 0 0.05 0.1 0.15
















−0.05 0 0.05 0.1 0.15










Note: The figure presents the distribution of estimated treatment effects in the TPR FY2014
experiment. It uses the generalized random forest (GRF) algorithm (Wager and Athey, 2018)
as described in the text. Figures (a)-(c) differ in the definition of treatment and control groups.
In Figure (a) the control is composed of taxpayers who received the old letter and the treatment
of taxpayers who received a simplified letter without any additional message. In Figure (b) and
(c) taxpayers who received a simplified letter without any additional message are the control
group. In Figure (b) the treatment is composed of taxpayers who received a simplified letter
with a deterrence message. In Figure (c) the treatment is composed of taxpayers who received
a simplified letter with an added tax morale message.
also more effective among taxpayers with a solvency score (as predicted by the
tax administration) that is neither too high nor too low, i.e. it has little effect on
people who pay their taxes readily or on people who face financial difficulties in
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paying their taxes. Deterrence is most effective for younger taxpayers (who may
be less aware of enforcement actions) and taxpayers with a lower outstanding
liability (for whom the average penalty may seem high as compared to what they
owe). There is no obvious pattern for gender, language, region or income.
3.5 Simplification and Enforcement
The previous section compared the effect of different letter interventions on tax
compliance. As shown in Section 3.2, we eventually care about how much the
interventions increase tax revenues and reduce the need for follow-up enforcement
by the tax authority. This section estimates the cost-effectiveness of letter inter-
ventions relative to standard enforcement actions. To that purpose, we exploit a
regression discontinuity in enforcement intensity for the late tax payers, which,
combined with the experimental design of the tax payment reminders, provides a
unique opportunity to compare the compliance effect of letter interventions and
standard policy levers for the same population and in the same setting.
3.5.1 Nudges vs. Enforcement
The tax administration relies on various enforcement actions to make late payers
comply. The first follow-up intervention for late tax filers and taxpayers is natu-
rally the reminder letter, which we experimentally manipulated. Individuals who
do not comply after receiving the reminder are subject to further enforcement ac-
tions. Local tax administrators have some discretion in the choice of enforcement
mechanisms. Commonly used tools for payment non-compliers include sending
registered letters (which require confirmation of receipt), imposing garnishments
and the use of bailiffs. The dynamic pattern of the treatment effects (Figure 3.3)
showed that the letter treatments accelerated tax payments, but that their fi-
nal effect on tax compliance was more modest. The timing of the decline in
treatment effects corresponds to the start of the enforcement actions undertaken
by the administration, which suggests that these actions are responsible for the
control group catching up with treatment.
To provide causal evidence on the effect of enforcement actions, we implement
a regression discontinuity design which exploits exogenous variation in enforce-
ment intensity at a specific threshold for the outstanding tax liability. We then
combine the regression discontinuity with the simplification treatment to under-
stand both how much the simplification treatment reduced the need for follow-up
enforcement and how much the follow-up enforcement reduced the impact of the
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simplification treatment.
As Panel (a) of Figure 3.5 shows, there is a clear jump in the probability of
enforcement actions above the tax liability threshold (normalized to 0 for con-
fidentiality reasons), both in the treatment and control group.27 There is no
evidence of bunching below the threshold, which confirms that it is not known to
the public (see Figure C4). Moreover, before enforcement started, the probability
of paying is smooth at the cut-off in both groups. This probability of paying,
however, is much higher in the treatment than in the control group, which ex-
plains why both to the left and to the right of the cut-off, the treatment group
is less likely to be subject to enforcement interventions. Importantly, the ab-
sence of discontinuities in the density and the pre-enforcement outcomes, both
in the treatment and control group, seems to validate the use of a regression
discontinuity design to estimate the causal effect of enforcement actions.
The impact of enforcement on compliance is illustrated in panel (b) of Figure 3.5.
The fraction of taxpayers who have paid after 180 days is higher to the right
than to the left of the threshold. Interestingly, compliance levels are similar in
the treatment and control group to the right of the cut-off where enforcement
intensity is high, while to the left where intensity is lower the treatment group is
substantially more compliant.
To estimate the causal effects of the simplification treatments and the enforce-
ment actions, we implement the standard regression discontinuity method in the
control group, and add treatment dummies. Formally, let Yi denote the tax com-
pliance outcome of individual i, zi their tax liability, c the tax liability cutoff. As
before, Si a dummy variable equal to one for the randomly assigned group who
received the simplified letter and Xi is a vector of individual characteristics (see
Table 3.1). The estimating equation is:
Yi = α + βSSi + βE1{zi − c > 0}+ βS,ESi × 1{zi − c > 0}
+ δC,l(zi − c) + δC,r1{zi − c > 0} × (zi − c) + δS,lSi × (zi − c)
+ δS,rSi × 1{zi − c > 0} × (zi − c) + γXi + εi
Due to the random assignment, βS identifies the effect of simplification at the cut-
off from the left, where enforcement is weaker. Due to the regression-discontinuity,
βE identifies the effect of additional enforcement actions on tax compliance in the
control group. Combining the two sources of variation, βS,E identifies the differ-
27We exclude taxpayers with a liability exactly at the cut-off. The threshold value is a round
number and the distribution of liabilities shows bunching at all round numbers in the vicinity
of the threshold.
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Figure 3.5: Effects of Enforcement and Simplification
(a) Probability of Enforcement after 180 Days
(b) Probability of Partial Payment after 180 Days
Note: The figure is based on the TPR FY2014 experiment. It shows probability of enforcement
after 180 days (Panel (a)) and probability of partial payment after 180 days (Panel (b)) by
initial amount owed (centred at the enforcement threshold). Bin size is set to e5 and amounts
within e100 of the enforcement threshold are considered. Fractional polynomial predictions
plotted.
ence in treatment effects due to higher enforcement at the threshold. As in a
typical regression discontinuity setting, δC,l and δC,r capture the relation between
the forcing variable (tax liability) and the outcome (tax compliance) to the left
and the right of the discontinuity, while δS,l and δS,r allow this relation to be
different for the treatment group. An alternative interpretation is that the latter
interaction terms allow for heterogeneity in treatment effects depending on the
tax liability, both to the left and to the right of the cutoff.
90
Table 3.4 presents the corresponding regression results, using the Imbens-Kalyanaraman
bandwidth computed for the control group in our experiment. We first consider
the RDD estimates for the control group in our experiment. Column 1 confirms
that the probability of enforcement increased by 15pp, from 21 to 36%, at the
threshold. Before enforcement actions begun, the payment probability, however,
was smooth at the threshold (Column 2). In contrast, 180 days after reminder
receipt, the payment probability increased by 6.1pp at the threshold, reaching a
probability of 87% for taxpayers in the control group to the right of the thresh-
old (Column 3). Second, we consider the effects of simplification, not just on
payment, but also on follow-up enforcement. As Column 1 shows, simplification
decreased the probability of any enforcement action by almost half, from 21%
in the control to 13%. This is due to the fact that simplified reminders made
late payers 15pp more likely to pay before enforcement actions begun: from 49
to 64% (Column 2). Note that these effects are larger than those we report for
the whole late payer sample (see Table 3.2). After 180 days, once payment rates
in the control group have increased to 81%, the treatment effects were smaller,
but still significant: a 4.4pp increase (Column 3). Finally, we estimate the dif-
ference in treatment effects to the left and to the right of the threshold. While
the difference βS,E is not significant, the estimate is negative and large enough
to mostly offset the positive treatment effect on the probability of paying at 180
days (Column 3).28 This confirms the graphical evidence that with high intensity
enforcement the effects of simplification in the long run are virtually zero.
Table 3.4: RDD: Effect of Simplification vs. Enforcement in TPR 2014
Probability of enforcement Probability of some payment
at 180 days at 14 days at 180 days
(before enforcement) (after enforcement)
(1) (2) (3)
Simplified (S) -0.078 0.151 0.044
(0.025) (0.025) (0.019)
Enforcement 0.146 0.006 0.061
(0.034) (0.034) (0.027)
S * Enforcement -0.064 0.000 -0.027
(0.036) (0.036) (0.028)
Control Mean 0.210 0.489 0.813
N 16,277 23,312 21,894
Note: The table presents simplification treatment effect estimates and enforcement RDD estimates for the
TPR experiment (FY2014). Simplified is a dummy variable equal to one for taxpayers who received a simpli-
fied letter. Enforcement is a dummy variable equal to one for liability amounts above the cut-off value. Control
variables are listed in Table 3.1. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by date of letter receipt.
While the compliance benefits of nudges seem to disappear because of follow-
up interventions on non-compliant taxpayers, they do bring important benefits
28Note that these effects are driven by registered letters and garnishments (Appendix Ta-
ble C12).
91
by saving on enforcement costs as we discuss further below. Interestingly, we
can also use our results to estimate the counterfactual effect of simplification
after 180 days if the follow-up enforcement intervention had not taken place.
Of course, in practice, the reminder letters effectiveness depends on tax payers’
expectation of the follow-up enforcement by the administration. Still, to calculate
the effect of simplification net of the crowd-out by the follow-up interventions, we
impute the level of compliance based on the difference in compliance between high
and low intensity enforcement groups scaled up by the difference in enforcement
probability between them. Formally, let Y denote the payment probability, F the
enforcement probability, z tax liability, c the cutoff and S letter simplification.
Let the superscript F and Y denote the estimated coefficients when the dependent
variable is F and Y , respectively. We approximate the average treatment effect
in absence of enforcement, ATE0, by:
ATE0 ≈
[
E(Y |S=1,z<c)− E(F |S=1,z<c)
E(Y |S=1,z>c)− E(Y |S=1,z<c)




E(Y |S=0,z<c)− E(F |S=0,z<c)
E(Y |S=0,z>c)− E(Y |S=0,z<c)
E(F |S=0,z>c)− E(F |S=0,z<c)
]
=















This calculation relies on a homogeneity assumption: we need that the effect
of enforcement on the payment probability is the same for taxpayers who pay
only when enforcement intensity increases from below to above the threshold
and for taxpayers who pay even with low intensity enforcement. The counterfac-
tual analysis suggests that in absence of the follow-up enforcement actions, the
effect of simplification on the payment probability of late payers would have been
7.7pp after 180 days, which is approximately half of the effect estimated before
enforcement actions begun (15pp).
3.5.2 Cost-Effectiveness and Welfare
We now evaluate the cost-effectiveness of the simplification treatment. We con-
sider three closely related approaches. First, we compare the benefits of the
treatment in terms of additional revenue and savings on enforcement actions to
the costs of simplifying the tax correspondence. Second, we compare the cost of
raising one euro of extra revenue through reminder simplification and through
enforcement actions. Finally, we calculate the total cost of enforcement actions
that is needed to raise the same extra revenue as the simplification treatment
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could.
The first method is based on experimental results only. To compute extra rev-
enues, we estimate the effect of simplified letters on the probability of paying
taxes as late as possible in the tax cycle, which is 180 days after the payment
deadline, and assume that after this date the treatment effect will remain con-
stant.29 As Table 3.3 shows, the estimated treatment effect on the probability
of payment at 180 days is 1pp, which we multiply by the average amount paid,
conditional on a payment, at that date (e1,615) and the number of tax payers
in the treatment group (205,014) to obtain total extra revenues equal to e3.16
million. To compute savings on the cost of enforcement, we estimate the effect
of simplified letters on the probability of the three most common forms of en-
forcement actions – registered letters, garnishment and bailiffs. Multiplied by
the cost of the respective enforcement measures, we obtain a total cost saving of
e0.70 million.30 Adding the extra revenues and costs savings on enforcement, the
total benefit of the intervention equals e3.86 million. In comparison, the costs of
simplification were negligible: the administration paid e69,300 for the design of
the new letter, including ICT staff, data analysts, legal experts, communication
staff and management, and the printing of the new (colored) letter costs an extra
e0.05 per letter. The total cost of simplifying the reminder letters amounts to
e79, 550 and is about 50 times smaller than its benefits. Simplifying the reminder
letters was thus a high return investment for the tax administration.
The second method builds on the regression discontinuity results from the previ-
ous section. Since we are able to estimate the compliance effects of the simplifi-
cation treatment and the enforcement interventions separately, we can ask what
the most cost-effective way is to raise one euro of extra revenue. The concep-
tual framework in Section 3.2 made clear that from an efficiency prespective, an
optimal use of simplification and enforcement actions by the government should
equalize the marginal cost of raising an additional euro of revenue between them.
For the enforcement interventions, we first use regression discontinuity estimates
for the increase in the probability that registered letters (11.0pp) and garnish-
ment (7.1pp) were sent at the threshold (see Appendix Table C12) and their cost
(e5.7 and e17.1 respectively) to compute the cost of the increase in enforcement
29After 180 days, tax filing for the next fiscal year begins: the administrative data that we
use does not allow us to track outstanding debts separately from new tax liabilities.
30As Appendix Table C11 shows, the estimated treatment effects on follow-up enforcement
are −7.4pp for registered letters, −2.8pp for garnishment actions and −1.2pp for bailiffs. Mul-
tiplying these figures by the cost of each action and the number of treated taxpayers, we obtain
costs savings of e86, 436 for registered letters, e97, 357 for garnishment and e517, 318 for
bailiffs.
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intensity at the threshold, which is e1.85.31 We then use regression discontinuity
estimates of the effect of enforcement intensity on the probability of payment at
180 days (from Table 3.4) multiplied by average payments made at the threshold
to estimate additional revenues raised. The ratio of the two, i.e., the cost of rais-
ing one more euro of tax revenues through enforcement is equal to e0.31. This
estimate is arguably in the range of standard estimates of the marginal excess
burden of personal income taxes, suggesting that the enforcement intensity may
well be desirable (Keen and Slemrod, 2017). In comparison, the resource cost of
using nudge interventions is much smaller: e79, 550 in total, or e0.39 per letter
sent. We multiply our counterfactual estimate of the effect of simplification on
the probability of payment in the absence of follow-up enforcement by the av-
erage tax payment, and obtain e7.53 extra revenue per letter. Hence the cost
of raising one euro with simplified reminders is e0.05, which is six times smaller
than with enforcement actions.32 This second method confirms that simplifying
reminders is far more cost-effective than intensifying enforcement.
The third method extrapolates the regression discontinuity results to the whole
sample, using a back-of-the envelope calculation. At the enforcement threshold,
the treatment effect was 15.1pp after 14 days and the counterfactual effect absent
follow-up enforcement at 180 days was 7.7pp (Table 3.4). Hence for the whole
sample the estimated treatment effect of 10.3pp after 14 days suggests that the
counterfactual effect, in the absence of follow-up enforcement, would have been
10.3 ∗ 7.7/15.1 = 5.2pp at 180 days. Multiplying this figure by the amount paid
by the average taxpayer and by the number of letters sent gives e17.5million
of extra revenue. To obtain these extra revenues with traditional enforcement
methods at the cost of 31 cents per euro raised, the government would have had
to spend e5.4 million. This is again subtantially higher than the cost of the
simplification intervention (e79, 550).
Regardless of the method we use for the cost-benefit analysis, simplifying letters
seems highly cost effective, in itself and when compared to the alternative of
using standard enforcement actions. The above calculations, however, ignore
other welfare-relevant considerations that may be important when assessing the
use of nudges. First of all, the letter treatments - when successful - changed the
net transfers between taxpayers and the government, not only by affecting the
31As Appendix Table C12 shows, there is no significant increase in the use of bailiff at the
threshold. As an enforcement tool, the use of bailiffs is applied to debts of relatively large
amounts, while registered letters and garnishments are more often employed.
32We consider this a conservative estimate as the cost of nudging is largely driven by the
fixed costs of experimental design. If these are ignored the per letter cost goes down to 0.05
making it eight times cheaper and thus lowering significantly the cost to benefit ratio of the
nudging intervention.
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taxes paid, but also avoiding the late penalties and interests on outstanding tax
liability. Second, the nudges can affect individuals’ welfare above and beyond
their after-tax income. The simplified correspondence reduces compliance costs,
but may also reduce the disutility of paying taxes.33 While the same may be
true for highlighting the public value of taxes paid, the opposite effect seems as
plausible when using deterrence or invoking social norms.
3.5.3 Long-term Effects
We have shown that simplification is effective at different stages of the tax pro-
cess, and for different subpopulations of income taxpayers. We have also shown
that in the case of payment reminders, it is very cost effective, in itself and as
compared to traditional enforcement actions. We now ask whether the simplifi-
cation intervention only works once and its effects are short-lived, or to contrary,
(i) has long-term effects and (ii) can be used repeatedly on the same taxpayers.
To test this, we exploit the two payment reminder experiments carried out over
two consecutive years.
We first investigate whether simplification of communication in one fiscal year
can improve compliance in subsequent years. We use the randomization in the
FY2014 payment reminder experiment to estimate the effect of reminder letters
on timely payment in the next two fiscal years (FY2015 and FY2016). The
results are shown in column 1 of Panel A of Table 3.5. We find a positive and
significant effect of simplification on tax compliance in the next financial year.
The probability of paying taxes on time in FY2015 increased by 1.3pp. Note that
this long-term effect of simplification of the reminder letter is twice as large as
the short-run effect of the simplification of the tax bill itself (0.5pp increase in
the probability of meeting the deadline, see column 1 in Table 3.2). This may be
due to the fact that the simplification of the reminder letter was more substantial
than the simplification of the tax bill, as discussed in the previous section. Also,
the reminder letters were sent to a subsample of taxpayers who may be more
sensitive to simplification. Two fiscal years after the intervention, the effect of
simplification had declined to 0.5pp, and the coefficient is no longer significant
(column 2 Panel A of Table 3.5). In contrast with simplification, the deterrence
messages had no effect in the following fiscal years, but the negative effect of tax
morale messages was remarkably persistent. Overall, these results suggest that
small nudges can have long-term effects, and that the benefits of simplification
33For example, Di Tella et al. (2015) show that complexity can lead people to be “conveniently
upset” and use it as an excuse not to comply.
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may be even larger than our cost-benefit analysis based on the effects in one fiscal
year only would suggest.
Table 3.5: Long-term and Repeated Treatment Effects
Panel A: Long-term Effects Probability of being on time Probability of being on time
with payment FY+1 year with payment FY+2 years
(1) (2)
Simplified (S) 0.013 0.005
(0.003) (0.004)
+ Deterrence -0.002 -0.003
(0.003) (0.002)





S+Tax Morale=Simplified 0.016 0.253
Control mean 0.703 0.776
N 229,751 229,751
Panel B: Repeated Treatment Probability of some payment at 14 days (before enforcement) in FY2015
Sample of Taxpayers Sample of Taxpayers
late in FY2014 and FY2015 late in FY2014
(1) (2)
Simplified 2014 -0.000 -0.001
(0.010) (0.005)
Simplified 2015 0.099 0.024
(0.011) (0.007)
S 2014 * S 2015 -0.002 0.004
(0.009) (0.006)
P-values of tests:
Simplified 2014=Control 0.424 0.956
Simplified 2015=Control 0.001 0.001
S 2014*S 2015=S 2015 0.535 0.278
Control mean 0.410 0.825
N 66,705 229,751
Note: The table presents results from the replication, long-term and repeated treatment anal-
ysis. The sample in Panel A is the universe of late payers in FY2014. In Panel B column 1 it is
composed of taxpayers who were late with payment in both FY2014 and FY2015. In Panel B
column 2 it is composed of the universe of late payers in FY2014. Control variables are listed
in Table 3.1. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by date of letter receipt. p-values
are adjusted for multiple hypothesis testing (List et al., 2016).
We then ask whether repeated interventions remain effective. For this we use
the cross-randomization of the FY2014 and FY2015 payment reminders experi-
ments. First, we check that the FY2014 experimental results replicate in FY2015
(see Appendix Table C13). In FY2015 as in FY2014, simplifying tax reminders
had a large positive effect on the probability of paying before enforcement starts
(+10.7pp), and deterrence messages had an additional positive effect (+1.4pp),
while tax morale messages had a negative effect (−1.2pp). Interestingly, mix-
ing deterrence and tax morale messages had a significantly smaller impact than
deterrence messages alone. Given that the treatment effects replicate, we can
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now test whether simplified letters had a larger or smaller effect for taxpayers
who received them twice, i.e. whether repetition induced a reinforcement or a
fatigue effect. The results are presented in Panel B of Table 3.5. To simplify the
exposition, we estimate the effect of receiving any simplified letter in FY2014, in
FY2015 or in both years.34 Among taxpayers who were late twice, the estimated
effect of the simplified letter in FY2015 is again large (9.9pp) and comparable to
the estimated effect of a simplified letter on the late tax payers in FY2014 (Ta-
ble 3.2) and in FY2015 (Appendix Table C13). Interestingly, among taxpayers
who were late twice, but already received a simplified letter in FY2014, the effect
of the simplified letter in FY2015 is the same (i.e., the interaction coefficient is
zero). As simplification is not less effective when used repeatedly, this result
suggest that fatigue effects are unimportant. However, taxpayers who were late
twice are of course a selected sample of taxpayers and we know that the sim-
plification in FY2014 itself affected the selection as it decreases the probability
of being late again in FY2015. For completeness, we also report effects for the
whole sample of taxpayers who were late in FY2014 (column 2) rather than just
for the subsample (30%) of taxpayers who were late again in FY2015 (column 1).
Also in the whole sample, we find a significant positive effect of simplification in
FY2015 (2.4pp) and no evidence that simplification was less effective for those
who had received the simplified letter in FY2014 (precise zero on the interaction
term).
3.6 Conclusion
Based on a series of population-wide experiments in Belgium, we show that sim-
plifying communication by the tax administration consistently improves tax com-
pliance. Simplification makes taxpayers pay taxes on time and makes both late
filers and late payers comply more swiftly than they would otherwise. Our results
also demonstrate the added benefits from including deterrence messages in the
same context but suggest that invoking tax morale does not raise compliance and
often backfires. Finally, we estimate causally the costs and benefits of simplifi-
cation as compared to traditional enforcement actions, and find simplification to
be highly cost effective. The positive effects of simplification persist in the next
fiscal year and are sustained when simplification is repeated. Making it as easy as
possible to comply therefore deserves greater attention from tax administrations
around the world.
34The estimated effects of simplification are similar when we include dummy variables for the
different messages and their interactions (Appendix Table C14). Note that with the treatment
interactions, the estimation is based on relatively small subsamples and the estimates become
less precise.
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Appendix A (for Chapter 1)
Figure A1: Educational attainment and CBA coverage
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Up to lower-secondary Upper-secondary Tertiary
2000 2014
Note: Figure (a) presents the share of native and immigrant workers by highest level of educa-
tional attainment for the period 2000–2014. Lower-secondary level of education is compulsory
education as highest degree, upper-secondary is an apprenticeship or a matura, tertiary is a
degree from a university, university of applied sciences, university of teacher education or a
professional degree. Figure (b) presents the share of native workers employed in an industry
with a CBA by highest level of educational attainment. Source: SESS.
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Note: The figure present kernel estimates of the density of foreign workers along the native
wage distribution by language region. Data is pooled from 2000 to 2014. Source: SESS.
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Note: The figure presents estimates from an IV regression using municipality level data. The
outcome is the share of pro-immigrant votes. Share of migrants is the number of foreign
residents in municipality and year divided by native population in municipality in 2000. Share of
skilled natives is the share of native residents with upper-secondary or higher level of education
in 2000. Controls are listed in Table A2; all specifications include municipality and vote fixed
effects. Weights assigned to observations reflect the number of Swiss residents in 2000. Standard
errors are clustered at the municipality level, 95% confidence intervals plotted. In Figure (b)

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A2: Summary statistics of control variables
N Mean Sd Min Max
Swiss Earnings Structure Survey (SESS)
Share women 848 0.376 0.053 0.070 0.690
Mean age 848 40.623 1.059 31.394 46.135
Share above lower-secondary educated 848 0.875 0.043 0.429 0.985
Swiss Labor Force Survey (SLFS)
Share women 1590 0.509 0.041 0.169 0.839
Mean age 1590 42.113 1.318 33.185 51.463
Share above lower-secondary educated 1590 0.866 0.042 0.507 1.000
Federal Statistical Office
Share women 8860 0.504 0.016 0.331 0.606
Mean age (2000) 2215 39.099 2.393 29.487 58.655
Share above lower-secondary educated (2000) 2215 0.713 0.069 0.313 0.872
Note: Table presents summary statistics for control variables from the SESS and SLFS sur-
veys, and the 2000 census. In the wage analysis weights equal the number of native workers in
2000 (SESS data), in the employment analysis the number of native respondents 18-65 years of
age (SLFS), the number of Swiss residents in municipality in 2000 for census data. SESS and
SLFS variables are measured at the commuting zone level, census variables at the municipality
level. Source: FSO, SESS, SLFS, ZEMIS.
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Table A3: Voting behavior and stated preferences
Outcome: equal to one if respondent voted
pro-immigration, zero otherwise
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Prefers equal opportunities 0.349 0.325 0.342
(0.015) (0.016) (0.016)
Prefers open Switzerland 0.431 0.398 0.419
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Age 0.001 -0.002 0.000 -0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Age squared 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Female 0.060 0.036 0.066 0.040
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)






Hh inc. 7001-9000 CHF 0.001 -0.018
(0.022) (0.022)
Hh inc. 5001-7000 CHF -0.065 -0.087
(0.021) (0.021)
Hh inc. 3001-5000 CHF -0.056 -0.079
(0.023) (0.023)
Hh inc. <3000 CHF -0.138 -0.122
(0.032) (0.032)
N 3525 3525 3525 3549 3549 3549
Note: Table presents estimates from OLS voting analysis using individual-level data. All spec-
ifications include place of residence and vote fixed effects. We code an individual with a re-
sponse 1–3 as in favor of equal opportunities / open Switzerland, and 4–7 as not in favor. Base
category for education is tertiary, base category for household income is above 9000 CHF per
month. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Source: Vox Survey.
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Table A4: Voting analysis by native educational level: IV checks
Outcome: share of pro-immigration votes
Without controls With controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: 1970
Sh. migrants 0.256 -1.841 -0.140 0.004 -2.499 -0.406
(0.140) (0.850) (0.151) (0.134) (1.526) (0.215)
Sh. migrants x Sh. skilled 2.667 3.425
(1.177) (2.173)
Sh. migrants x Q2 sh. skilled 0.049 0.181
(0.105) (0.183)
Sh. migrants x Q3 sh. skilled 0.092 0.235
(0.097) (0.208)
Sh. migrants x Q4 sh. skilled 0.325 0.445
(0.112) (0.241)
Sh. migrants x Q5 sh. skilled 0.348 0.433
(0.147) (0.329)
First stage F-stat 18.725 9.500 14.531 7.610
N 13290 13290 13290 13290 13290 13290
Panel B: Interaction 4-digit industry
Sh. migrants -4.041 -0.454 -3.553 -0.416
(1.172) (0.143) (1.104) (0.127)
Sh. migr. x Sh. CBA cov. 9.817 1.267 8.345 1.036
(2.419) (0.397) (1.865) (0.418)
Sh. migr. x Sh. skilled 5.744 4.987
(1.725) (1.652)




Sh. migr. x Q2 sh. skilled 0.054 0.013
(0.137) (0.143)
Sh. migr. x Q3 sh. skilled 0.209 0.187
(0.157) (0.154)
Sh. migr. x Q4 sh. skilled 0.643 0.556
(0.147) (0.137)
Sh. migr. x Q5 sh. skilled 0.858 0.695
(0.277) (0.298)
















N . 13284 13284 . 13284 13284
Note: Table presents estimates from OLS and IV regressions using municipality-level data.
Share of migrants is the number of foreign residents in a municipality in a year divided by na-
tive population in a municipality in 2000. Share skilled is the share of native residents with
upper-secondary or higher level of education in 2000. Controls are listed in Table A2; all spec-
ifications include municipality and vote fixed effects. Weights assigned to observations equal
the number of Swiss residents in 2000. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the mu-




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A6: Voting analysis by native educational level and CBA coverage: IV
MS-region
Outcome: share of pro-immigration votes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sh. migrants -9.522 -2.365 -6.764 -2.006
(4.158) (0.908) (2.720) (0.835)
Sh. migr. x Sh. CBA cov. 29.000 7.646 22.798 6.759
(13.746) (2.890) (11.324) (2.768)
Sh. migr. x Sh. skilled 12.365 8.556
(5.725) (3.796)
Sh. migr. x Sh. CBA cov. x Sh. skilled -36.275 -28.496
(19.306) (16.426)
Sh. migr. x Q2 sh. skilled 1.125 1.372
(0.862) (0.812)
Sh. migr. x Q3 sh. skilled 1.245 1.025
(0.915) (0.851)
Sh. migr. x Q4 sh. skilled 1.916 1.528
(0.996) (0.924)
Sh. migr. x Q5 sh. skilled 2.189 1.744
(1.016) (0.937)
Sh. migr. x Sh. CBA cov. x Q2 sh. skilled -3.228 -4.499
(2.669) (2.609)
Sh. migr. x Sh. CBA cov. x Q3 sh. skilled -2.862 -2.802
(2.935) (2.821)
Sh. migr. x Sh. CBA cov. x Q4 sh. skilled -5.361 -5.113
(3.096) (3.021)
Sh. migr. x Sh. CBA cov. x Q5 sh. skilled -5.857 -5.709
(3.769) (3.740)
N 636 636 636 636
Note: Table presents estimates from IV regressions using commuting zone-level data. Share of
migrants is the number of foreign residents in a commuting zone in a year divided by native
population in a commuting zone in 2000. Share skilled is the share of native residents with
upper-secondary or higher level of education in 2000. Controls are listed in Table A2; all speci-
fications include commuting zone fixed effects. Weights assigned to observations equal the num-
ber of Swiss residents in 2000. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the commuting
zone level. Source: FSO, SECO, ZEMIS.
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Table A7: Wage analysis by percentiles of the wage distribution: IV robustness
checks










Sh. migrants -0.109 -0.620 -0.742 0.278
(0.162) (0.309) (0.327) (0.275)
Mean outcome 3.553 3.062 3.157 4.224
Sd outcome 0.103 0.070 0.068 0.195
First stage F-stat 6.243 6.243 6.243 6.243
N 848 848 848 848
Panel B: Interaction 4-digit industry
Sh. migrants -0.177 -1.493 -1.531 0.671
(0.482) (0.527) (0.591) (0.658)
Sh. migr. x Sh. CBA cov. 0.147 5.626 5.375 -1.415
(2.189) (2.228) (2.440) (2.775)
Mean outcome 3.553 3.062 3.157 4.224
Sd outcome 0.103 0.070 0.068 0.195
First stage F-stat 4.300 4.300 4.300 4.300
N 848 848 848 848
Note: The table presents estimates from IV regressions using biennial data at the commuting
zone level between 2000 and 2014. Share of migrants is the number of foreign residents in a com-
muting zone in a year divided by native population in a commuting zone in 2000. Controls are
listed in Table A2; all specifications include commuting zone and year fixed effects. Weights as-
signed to observations equal the number employed in commuting zone in 2000. Standard errors
in parentheses are clustered at the commuting zone level. Source: FSO, SECO, SESS, ZEMIS.
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Table A8: Wage analysis by native educational attainment and CBA coverage
Outcome: mean ln of native gross hourly wage





(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: IV with controls
Sh. migrants -0.107 -1.040 -0.347 0.082
(0.123) (0.452) (0.108) (0.109)
Mean outcome 3.594 3.345 3.526 3.879
Sd outcome 0.109 0.082 0.081 0.103
First stage F-stat 9.722 9.722 9.722 9.721
N 848 848 848 847
Panel B : IV interaction with controls
Sh. migrants -0.207 -1.944 -0.577 0.089
(0.384) (0.667) (0.318) (0.265)
Sh. migr. x Sh. CBA cov. 0.449 5.332 1.422 -0.064
(1.530) (2.298) (1.273) (1.165)
Mean outcome 3.594 3.345 3.526 3.879
Sd outcome 0.109 0.082 0.081 0.103
First stage F-stat 3.638 3.638 3.638 3.638
N 848 848 848 847
Note: The table presents estimates from IV regressions using biennial data at the commut-
ing zone level between 2000 and 2014. Share of migrants is the number of foreign residents
in a commuting zone in a year divided by native population in a commuting zone in 2000.
Controls are listed in Table A2; all specifications include commuting zone and year fixed ef-
fects. Lower-secondary level of education is compulsory education as highest degree, upper-
secondary is an apprenticeship or a matura, tertiary is a degree from a university, university
of applied sciences, university of teacher education or a professional degree. Weights assigned
to observations equal the number of natives employed in commuting zone in 2000. Standard
errors in parentheses are clustered at the commuting zone level. Source: FSO, SECO, SESS,
ZEMIS.
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Table A9: Employment analysis by educational level: IV robustness checks
Outcome: share of natives employed in population 18-65





(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: 1970
Sh. migrants -0.658 0.525 -1.021 -0.644
(0.401) (0.484) (0.443) (0.373)
Mean outcome 0.776 0.451 0.787 0.909
Sd outcome 0.047 0.117 0.059 0.053
First stage F-stat 5.562 5.548 5.562 5.557
N 1590 1576 1590 1585
Panel B: Interaction 4-digit industry
Sh. migrants -1.044 -0.865 -1.118 -0.739
(0.584) (0.933) (0.546) (0.608)
Sh. migr. x Sh. CBA cov. 3.902 3.639 3.715 2.251
(2.325) (4.209) (2.164) (2.598)
Mean outcome 0.776 0.451 0.787 0.909
Sd outcome 0.047 0.117 0.059 0.053
First stage F-stat 3.467 3.444 3.467 3.464
N 1590 1576 1590 1585
Note: The table presents estimates from IV regressions using annual data at the commut-
ing zone level between 2000 and 2014. Share of migrants is the number of foreign residents
in a commuting zone in a year divided by native population in a commuting zone in 2000.
Controls are listed in Table A2; all specifications include commuting zone and year fixed ef-
fects. Lower-secondary level of education is compulsory education as highest degree, upper-
secondary is an apprenticeship or a matura, tertiary is a degree from a university, university
of applied sciences, university of teacher education or a professional degree. Weights assigned
to observations equal the number of native respondents 18-65 years of age in commuting zone
in 2000. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the commuting zone level. Source:
FSO, SECO, SLFS, ZEMIS.
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Appendix B (for Chapter 2)
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Note: This figure shows difference-in-differences estimates using annual (biennial) data at the
commuting zone level for the period 1996–2017 (1996–2016) in Panel a (b). The vertical lines
indicate the beginning of the transition period (2002) and the beginning of the post-treatment
period (2008). Outcome is the number of cross-border commuters divided by total employment
in 1995 in Panel (a) and number of resident foreign workers (excluding cross-border commuters)
divided by total employment in 1996 in Panel (b). Weights assigned to observations equal total
employment in first year. Standard errors are clustered at the commuting zone level, 95%
confidence intervals shown. Sources: FSO in Panel (a) and SESS in Panel (b).
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Figure B2: Wages by educational level
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Note: This figure shows difference-in-differences estimates using biennial data at the commuting
zone level for the period 1996–2016. The vertical lines indicate the beginning of the transition
period (2002) and of the post-treatment period (2008). Outcome is the mean natural log of
gross hourly wage of natives. Observations are weighed by number of native employees in a
specific education category in first year. Standard errors are clustered at the commuting zone
level, 95% confidence intervals shown. Source: SESS.
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Table B1: Exposure to cross-border commuters by educational level (robustness
checks to treatment definition)
Outcome: share of cross-border commuters





(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Threshold value
25min * 2002-2007 0.015 -0.002 0.011 0.006
(0.007) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002)
25min * after 2008 0.067 0.007 0.038 0.023
(0.019) (0.004) (0.011) (0.007)
35min * 2002-2007 0.012 -0.002 0.010 0.004
(0.005) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
35min * after 2008 0.050 0.004 0.031 0.016
(0.015) (0.003) (0.008) (0.005)
Mean outcome 0.070 0.020 0.038 0.012
Sd outcome 0.115 0.053 0.056 0.021
Commuting zones 106 106 106 106
within 25 min 28 28 28 28
within 35 min 41 41 41 41
N 1166 1166 1166 1166
Panel B: Continuous treatment
Travel time * 2002-2007 0.017 -0.003 0.013 0.007
(0.008) (0.002) (0.006) (0.003)
Travel time * after 2008 0.079 0.007 0.045 0.027
(0.022) (0.005) (0.013) (0.008)
Mean outcome 0.070 0.020 0.038 0.012
Sd outcome 0.115 0.053 0.056 0.021
Commuting zones 106 106 106 106
N 1166 1166 1166 1166
Note: This table shows difference-in-differences estimates using biennial data at the commut-
ing zone level for the period 1996–2016. The continuous measure applies the function exp(−ax)
with a = 0.05 to travel time. Outcome is the share of cross-border commuters in total employed.
Denominator is fixed at first year. Observations are weighed by total workforce in first year.
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the commuting zone level. Sources: SESS.
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Table B2: Enrolment by institutional type (robustness checks to treatment defi-
nition)
Outcome: share of enrolled native first-year students






(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Threshold value
25min * 2002-2007 0.005 -0.001 0.006 0.001
(0.008) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004)
25min * after 2008 0.023 0.003 0.022 -0.002
(0.011) (0.009) (0.005) (0.004)
35min * 2002-2007 0.010 0.002 0.008 0.001
(0.006) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
35min * after 2008 0.038 0.015 0.022 0.000
(0.010) (0.008) (0.005) (0.004)
Mean outcome 0.372 0.207 0.136 0.035
Sd outcome 0.119 0.086 0.052 0.020
Commuting zones 106 106 106 106
within 25 min 28 28 28 28
within 35 min 41 41 41 41
N 2226 2226 2226 1802
Panel B: Continuous treatment
Travel time * 2002-2007 0.007 -0.000 0.009 -0.000
(0.010) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004)
Travel time * after 2008 0.028 0.007 0.025 -0.004
(0.013) (0.011) (0.006) (0.005)
Mean outcome 0.372 0.207 0.136 0.035
Sd outcome 0.119 0.086 0.052 0.020
Commuting zones 106 106 106 106
N 2226 2226 2226 1802
Panel C: Municipality level
30min * 2002-2007 0.013 0.006 0.007 0.002
(0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
30min * after 2008 0.035 0.014 0.021 0.001
(0.006) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002)
Mean outcome 0.372 0.206 0.136 0.035
Sd outcome 0.181 0.131 0.090 0.042
Municipalities 2222 2222 2222 2222
within 30 min 785 785 785 785
N 46662 46662 46662 37774
Note: This table shows difference-in-differences estimates using annual data at the commuting
zone level (municipality level in Panel C) for the period 1997–2017. The continuous measure
applies the function exp(−ax) with a = 0.05 to travel time. Outcome is the share of native first-
year students in birth cohort. Denominator is fixed at first year and specific to the education
category. Observations are weighed by cohort size in a specific education category in first year.
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the commuting zone level (municipality level in
Panel C). Source: SHIS-studex.
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Table B3: Enrolment at UAS (robustness checks)
Outcome: share of enrolled native first-year students
Baseline + Education
supply
+ Labor demand No weights
(1) (2) (3) (4)
30min * 2002-2007 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
30min * after 2008 0.018 0.018 0.017 0.015
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Bartik control 0.038
(0.047)
Mean outcome 0.136 0.136 0.136 0.130
Sd outcome 0.052 0.052 0.052 0.054
Commuting zones 106 106 106 106
within 30 min 35 35 35 35
N 2226 2226 2226 2226
Note: This table shows difference-in-differences estimates using annual data at the commuting
zone level for the period 1997–2017. Outcome is the share of native first-year students in birth
cohort. Denominator is fixed at first year and specific to the education category. Observations
are weighed by cohort size in a specific education category in first year. Column (1) is the base-
line specification from Table 2.3, columns (2) and (3) include additional control variables. We
use two education supply controls – a dummy variable for an institution and the number of
study fields at the ISCED level available within a 20km radius of the main city of the region.
The Bartik control is based on employment data. Column (4) is unweighed. Standard errors in
parentheses are clustered at the commuting zone level. Source: SHIS-studex.
Table B4: Employment rates by educational level




(1) (2) (3) (4)
30min * 2002-2007 0.008 0.033 0.006 -0.006
(0.008) (0.026) (0.010) (0.009)
30min * after 2008 -0.003 -0.017 0.004 -0.003
(0.008) (0.022) (0.010) (0.011)
Mean outcome 0.777 0.458 0.788 0.907
Sd outcome 0.046 0.106 0.056 0.048
Commuting zones 106 106 106 104
within 30 min 35 35 35 35
N 1166 1162 1166 1143
Note: This table shows difference-in-differences estimates using biennial data at the commuting
zone level for the period 1996–2016. Outcome is the number of native employed divided by the
total number of respondents. Denominator is fixed at first year and specific to the education
category. Observations are weighed by the number of respondents in a specific education cate-
gory in the first year. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the commuting zone level.
Source: SLFS.
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Table B5: Graduation rates of first-year students by institutional type
Outcome: graduation rate




(1) (2) (3) (4)
30min * 2002-2007 0.004 0.002 0.008 -0.106
(0.005) (0.008) (0.009) (0.051)
30min * after 2008 0.003 0.001 0.006 -0.092
(0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.061)
Mean outcome 0.693 0.633 0.676 0.687
Sd outcome 0.305 0.289 0.295 0.353
Commuting zones 106 106 106 106
within 30 min 35 35 35 35
N 2226 2226 2224 1749
Note: This table shows difference-in-differences estimates using annual data at the commuting
zone level for the period 1997–2017. Outcome is the share of native first-year students that grad-
uated within 1997–2017 relative to the number enrolled. Observations are weighed by cohort
size in a specific education category in first year. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered
at the commuting zone level. Source: SHIS-studex.
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Appendix C (for Chapter 3)




Note: The figure presents average compliance in the control group by days since letter receipt
for the TP (Panel (a)), TPR FY2014 (Panel (b)) and TFR FY2015 (Panel (c)) experiments.
Outcome is partial payment probability at 60 days / deadline in Figure (a) and at 14 days /
enforcement start in Figure (b); outcome is filing probability at 21 days / enforcement start in
Figure (c).
116




Note: The figure presents deterrence and tax morale treatment effect estimates by days since
letter receipt for the TP (Panel (a)), TPR FY2014 (Panel (b)) and TFR FY2015 (Panel (c))
experiments. The outcome is partial payment probability in Panels (a) and (b), and filing
probability in Panel (c). The vertical lines indicate the payment/filing deadline and/or the day
follow-up enforcement starts. Controls are listed in Table 3.1. 95% confidence intervals based
on robust standard errors are plotted. Standard errors are clustered by date of letter receipt
in Panels (a) and (b).
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Figure C3: Average Value of Control Variables by Quintile of Treatment Effects
Simplification Deterrence Tax Morale
(a) Average Age
Age























(b) Average of Gender categories
Couple Female Male

















(c) Average Number of Children
Number of Children

















(d) Average of Language Categories
Flemish French


















Simplification Deterrence Tax Morale
(e) Average of Region Categories
Brussels Vlaanderen Walloni

















(f) Average Solvency Score
Solvability score quintile























(g) Average Taxable Income
Taxable income quintile























(h) Average Tax Liability
Amount owed quintile























Note: The figure presents the mean and 95% confidence interval of control variables from TPR
FY2014 experiment by quintile of conditional average treatment effect (CATE). These were
estimated using the generalized random forest (GRF) algorithm (Wager and Athey, 2018).
Three panels in each figure differ in the definition of treatment and control groups. The
underlying sample of taxpayers are those in the control group and those sent a simplified letter
without additional messages in the left panel, simplified letter and a simplified letter with a
deterrence message in the middle panel, a simplified letter and a simplified letter with a tax
morale message in right panel.
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Figure C4: RDD – Identifying Assumptions
(a) Density around the threshold - Control
(b) Density around the threshold - Treat-
ment
(c) Probability of Paying before Enforce-
ment
Note: The figure is based on the TPR FY2014 experiment. It explores the plausibility of the
identification assumptions underlying the RDD. Panels (a) and (b) plot the average density by
bin in the control and treatment group, respectively. Panel (c) plots the probability of payment
before enforcement by initial amount owed (centred at the enforcement threshold). Bin size is
set to e5 and amounts within e100 of the enforcement threshold are considered. Fractional
polynomial predictions are plotted as well.
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Figure C5: Effects of Enforcement
(a) Probability of Enforcement at 180 days
(b) Probability of Partial Payment at 14
days / enforcement start
(c) Probability of Partial Payment at 180
days
Note: The figure is based on the the TPR FY2014 experiment. It shows probability of enforce-
ment after 180 days (Panel (a)), probability of paying after 14 days (Panel (b)) and probability
of paying after 180 days (Panel (c)) by initial amount owed (centred at the enforcement thresh-
old). Bin size is set to e5 and amounts within e100 of the enforcement threshold are considered.
Fractional polynomial predictions with 95% confidence intervals plotted.
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Table C1: Deterrence and Tax Morale Messages by Experiment
Experiment / Type Name Message
Panel A: Tax Payment
Deterrence Explicit Penalty These costs amount to 209 euros on average and can go up
depending on the circumstances.
Enforcement + Immediacy Warning: do not wait until the deadline to pay, you run the
risk of being late. If you do not pay on time, we will start
actions to recover this amount.
Tax Morale Social Norm In Belgium 95% of taxes are paid on time.
Public Goods Tax revenues allow basic public services such as health care,
education and law and order, to function.
Panel B: Payment Reminders
Deterrence Explicit Penalty (EP) These costs amount to 209.00 euro on average and may,
(FY2014, 2015) depending on the situation, rise further.
Active Choice Not paying your taxes will be seen as an active choice.
(FY2014)
EP + Immediacy These costs amount to 209.00 euro on average and may,
(FY2015) depending on the situation, rise further. By paying now
you may still avoid these costs.
EP + Enforcement These costs amount to 209.00 euro on average and may,
(FY2015) depending on the situation, rise further. We will undertake
actions to claim tax dues that may involve seizing
your income or your assets.
EP (Female Name First) Woman’s name, Man’s name (instead of reversed)
(FY2015)
Tax Morale Social Norm You belong to a minority of taxpayers who did not pay
(FY2014, 2015) their taxes within the legal period: 95% of taxes in
Belgium are paid on time. Why not follow this example?
Public Goods Paying taxes guarantees the provision of essential services
(FY2014) by the government, such as public health, education, and
public safety.
Public Goods Negative Not paying taxes puts at risk the provision of essential
(FY2014, 2015) services by the government, such as public health,
education, and public safety.
Panel C: Tax Filing
Tax Morale Public Goods The above pie chart illustrates how your taxes and social
security contributions are spent in terms of public services.
Public Goods Negative The above pie chart illustrates how your taxes and social
security contributions are spent in terms of public services.
Incorrect and timely completion of the declaration puts at
risk the essential services provided by the government.
Public Goods + Penalty The above pie chart illustrates how your taxes and social
security contributions are spent in terms of public services.
By completing your declaration correctly and in a timely
fashion, you avoid further measures such as fines and tax
increases.
Public Goods + Social Norms The above pie chart illustrates how your taxes and social
security contributions are spent in terms of public services.
The vast majority of people complete their declaration
correctly and in a timely manner. Please follow this
example.
Panel D: Filing Reminders
Deterrence Explicit Penalty You risk a penalty of 50 to 1,250 euro and a tax increase
of 10 to 200%.
Note: The table lists all letter messages by experiment and treatment type. In all experiments the











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table C3: Randomization Design for TP experiment (using Day of Birth)
Day TP Day TP Treatment Groups
01 C 17 S + PG
02 C 18 S + PG C Control
03 C 19 S + PG S Simplification
04 C 20 S + PG S (NP) Simplification (Not Pers.)
05 S (NP) 21 S + ENF+ IMM Deterrence Messages
06 S (NP) 22 S + ENF+ IMM S + EP Explicit Penalty
07 S (NP) 23 S + ENF+ IMM S + ENF+ IMM Enforcement+Immediacy
08 S (NP) 24 S + ENF+ IMM Tax Morale Messages
09 S + EP 25 S S + PG Public Goods
10 S + EP 26 S S + SN Social Norms
11 S + EP 27 S
12 S + EP 28 S
13 S + SN 29 S
14 S + SN 30 S
15 S + SN 31 S
16 S + SN
Note: The table presents the randomization design of the Tax Payment (TP) experiment. Day
stands for the day the taxpayer was born. Simplified letters that were not personalized started
with “Mr., Ms.” instead of “Mr X” or “Ms X” (where X is the name of the taxpayer). See
Appendix Table C1 for more details on treatment messages. All messages were added to per-
sonalized simplified letters.
Table C4: Overlap across experiments
Share of taxpayers in experiment
Payment Reminders Payment Reminders Filing Reminders
FY2014 FY2015 FY2015
Experiment (1) (2) (3)
Payment Reminders FY2014 1.000 0.283 0.062
Payment Reminders FY2015 0.307 1.000 0.066
Filing Reminders FY2015 0.106 0.104 1.000
Note: The table presents the overlap between populations of taxpayers in the payment re-
minders (TPR) and filing reminders experiments (TFR). Each cell gives the share of taxpayers
in the experiment listed horizontally that were also part of the population of the experiment
listed vertically.
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Table C5: Filing Reminders FY2015 controlling for TPR FY2014 treatment as-
signment
Probability of having filed











Note: The table presents treatment effect estimates from filing reminders experiment (TFR
FY2015). Control variables are listed in Table 3.1. Additional controls include dummies for
the treatment the taxpayer would have received if had been late with payment in the previous
fiscal year. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table C6: Payment Experiments: Individual Letter Effects
Probability of some payment at 14 days (before enforcement) at 60 days (deadline)
TPR FY2014 TPR FY2015 TP
(1) (2) (3)
Simplification Treatments
Simplified (S) 0.102 0.107 0.005
(0.010) (0.004) (0.002)
+ Not Personalized (NP) 0.001
(0.002)
Deterrence Treatments
+ Explicit Penalty (EP) 0.020 0.009 0.004
(0.002) (0.003) (0.001)
+ Active Choice (AC) 0.001
(0.004)
+ EP + AC 0.016
(0.005)
+ EP + Enforcement 0.024
(0.003)
+ EP + Immediacy 0.017
(0.004)
+ EP FM 0.008
(0.005)
+ Enforcement + Immediacy 0.007
(0.001)
Tax Morale Treatments
+ Public Goods Negative (PGN) -0.007 -0.014
(0.004) (0.003)
+ Public Goods Positive (PGP) -0.014 -0.002
(0.004) (0.001)
+ Social Norms (SN) -0.002 -0.011 0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.001)
+ SN + PGP -0.006
(0.004)
Deterrence & Tax Morale Treatments
+ EP + SN 0.006
(0.003)
+ EP + PGN 0.005
(0.005)
P-values of tests:
Simplified=Control 0.001 0.001 0.001
S + NP = S 0.498
S + EP = S 0.001 0.451 0.017
S + AC = S 0.859
S + EP + AC = S + EP 0.491
S + EP + Enforcement = S + EP 0.001
S + EP + Immediacy = S + EP 0.077
S + EP FM = S + EP 0.916
S + Enforcement + Immediacy = S 0.001
S + PGN = S 0.61 0.001
S + PGP = S 0.007 0.262
S + SN = S 0.92 0.375 0.651
S + SN + PGP = S 0.562
S + EP + SN = S + EP 0.956
S + EP + PGN = S + EP 0.991
Control mean 0.447 0.418 0.728
N 229,751 202,730 1,216,317
Note: The table presents treatment effect estimates of messages in the two payment reminder
experiments (TPR 2014 in column 1 and TPR 2015 in column 2) and in the tax payment (TP)
experiment (column 3). Control variables are listed in Table 3.1. Standard errors in paren-
theses are clustered by date of letter receipt. p-values adjusted for multiple hypothesis testing
(List et al., 2016).
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Table C7: Treatment Effects on Other Outcomes
Panel A: Tax Payment TPR 2014 TPR 2015 TP
% Liability Paid % Liability Paid % Liability Paid
before Enforcement before Enforcement before Deadline
(1) (2) (3)
Simplified (S) 0.003 0.011 0.002
(0.002) (0.004) (0.001)
+ Deterrence 0.002 0.002 -0.000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
+ Tax Morale 0.000 -0.001 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
+ Deterrence + Tax Morale 0.003
(0.002)
P-values of tests:
Simplified=Control 0.124 0.120 0.001
S+Deterrence=Simplified 0.318 0.987 0.827
S+Tax Morale=Simplified 0.416 0.472 0.708
S+Deterrence+Tax Morale=S+Deterrence 0.715
Control mean 0.915 0.900 0.941
N 124,032 105,934 892,310
Panel B: Tax Filing Log pre-check total Log self-employed Log self-employed
tax due profits expenses
(1) (2) (3)
Tax Morale -0.003 0.010 -0.014
(0.003) (0.016) (0.014)
P-values of test:
Tax Morale=Control 0.584 0.750 0.776
Control mean 13.446 12.767 12.940
N 850,778 64,606 44,919
Panel B (continued) Log salaried Log general
expenses expenses
(4) (5)
Tax Morale -0.004 -0.006
(0.006) (0.005)
P-values of test:
Tax Morale=Control 0.844 0.526
Control mean 13.155 11.082
N 39,176 290,551
Note: The table presents treatment effect estimates for other outcomes of interest in the tax
payment (TP FY2016 Panel A) and the tax filing (TF FY2016 Panel B) experiments. In Panel
A the sample consists of late payers who had made some payment before enforcement started.
Control variables are listed in Table 3.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table C9: Heterogeneous Effects – Payment Reminder Experiment FY2014
Probability of payment before enforcement
Simplified (S) 0.041
(0.040)
+ Deterrence 0.080 (continued)
(0.030)
+ Tax Morale 0.090 Solvency score Q3 * Simplified 0.056
(0.025) (0.014)
Age 31-40 * Simplified 0.012 * S + Deterrence -0.004
(0.013) (0.008)
* S + Deterrence -0.011 * S + Tax Morale -0.004
(0.012) (0.011)
* S + Tax Morale -0.006 Solvency score Q4 * Simplified 0.024
(0.010) (0.016)
Age 41-50 * Simplified 0.025 * S + Deterrence -0.016
(0.014) (0.013)
* S + Deterrence -0.026 * S + Tax Morale -0.001
(0.012) (0.015)
* S + Tax Morale -0.026 Solvency score Q5 * Simplified -0.030
(0.011) (0.021)
Age 51-60 * Simplified 0.011 * S + Deterrence -0.002
(0.013) (0.011)
* S + Deterrence -0.028 * S + Tax Morale 0.012
(0.010) (0.011)
* S + Tax Morale -0.028 Liability Q2 * Simplified -0.050
(0.010) (0.012)
Age 61+ * Simplified -0.017 * S + Deterrence -0.005
(0.013) (0.010)
* S + Deterrence -0.024 * S + Tax Morale 0.017
(0.013) (0.011)
* S + Tax Morale -0.016 Liability Q3 * Simplified -0.042
(0.008) (0.010)
One child * Simplified 0.019 * S + Deterrence -0.019
(0.013) (0.007)
* S + Deterrence 0.008 * S + Tax Morale 0.004
(0.010) (0.007)
* S + Tax Morale 0.013 Liability Q4 * Simplified -0.062
(0.012) (0.010)
Two or more children * Simplified 0.027 * S + Deterrence -0.016
(0.014) (0.010)
* S + Deterrence -0.011 * S + Tax Morale 0.016
(0.012) (0.010)
* S + Tax Morale -0.012 Liability Q5 * Simplified -0.046
(0.011) (0.011)
Solvency score Q2 * Simplified 0.059 * S + Deterrence -0.041
(0.011) (0.008)
* S + Deterrence -0.008 * S + Tax Morale 0.007
(0.007) (0.010)
* S + Tax Morale -0.013
(0.005) N 229,751
Note: The table presents the heterogeneous treatment effects of the TPR FY2015 experiment.
Control variables are listed in Table 3.1. The full set of interactions between individual control
and treatment variables are included in the estimation (coefficients not reported). Standard
errors in parentheses are clustered by date of letter receipt.
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Table C10: Heterogeneous Effects – Payment Reminders Experiment FY2015
Probability of payment before enforcement
Simplified (S) 0.079
(0.066)
+ Deterrence 0.042 (continued)
(0.047)
+ Tax Morale -0.002 Solvency score Q3 * Simplified -0.018
(0.058) (0.013)
Age 31-40 * Simplified -0.017 * S + Deterrence -0.021
(0.013) (0.013)
* S + Deterrence 0.031 * S + Tax Morale -0.027
(0.016) (0.013)
* S + Tax Morale 0.008 Solvency score Q4 * Simplified -0.002
(0.012) (0.021)
Age 41-50 * Simplified -0.002 * S + Deterrence 0.001
(0.013) (0.010)
* S + Deterrence -0.015 * S + Tax Morale 0.016
(0.009) (0.012)
* S + Tax Morale 0.008 Solvency score Q5 * Simplified 0.109
(0.013) (0.011)
Age 51-60 * Simplified -0.011 * S + Deterrence 0.055
(0.012) (0.024)
* S + Deterrence -0.012 * S + Tax Morale -0.001
(0.010) (0.017)
* S + Tax Morale 0.005 Liability Q2 * Simplified 0.037
(0.009) (0.015)
Age 61+ * Simplified -0.004 * S + Deterrence 0.001
(0.010) (0.017)
* S + Deterrence -0.007 * S + Tax Morale -0.015
(0.015) (0.012)
* S + Tax Morale -0.006 Liability Q3 * Simplified -0.021
(0.013) (0.008)
One child * Simplified -0.015 * S + Deterrence 0.047
(0.020) (0.013)
* S + Deterrence -0.007 * S + Tax Morale 0.009
(0.017) (0.015)
* S + Tax Morale -0.014 Liability Q4 * Simplified -0.009
(0.019) (0.009)
Two or more children * Simplified 0.070 * S + Deterrence -0.009
(0.010) (0.009)
* S + Deterrence -0.033 * S + Tax Morale 0.088
(0.013) (0.016)
* S + Tax Morale -0.008 Liability Q5 * Simplified 0.012
(0.015) (0.013)
Solvency score Q2 * Simplified 0.020 * S + Deterrence 0.005
(0.014) (0.012)
* S + Deterrence -0.001 * S + Tax Morale 0.009
(0.011) (0.012)
* S + Tax Morale -0.026
(0.010) N 0.089
Note: The table presents the heterogeneous treatment effects of the TPR FY2015 experiment.
Control variables are listed in Table 3.1. The full set of interactions between individual control
and treatment variables are included in the estimation (coefficients not reported). Estimates
for Deterrence and Tax Morale joint treatment omitted for brevity. Standard errors in paren-
theses are clustered by date of letter receipt.
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Table C11: Number of Follow-up Enforcements FY2014
Nr registered letters Nr garnishments Nr bailiffs
within 180 days within 180 days within 180 days
(1) (2) (3)
Simplified -0.074 -0.028 -0.012
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Control mean 0.350 0.134 0.078
N 229,751 229,751 229,751
Note: The table presents treatment effect estimates on the number of enforcement actions by
type from the payment reminders experiment (TPR FY2014). Control variables are listed in
Table 3.1. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by date of letter receipt.
Table C12: RDD: Number of Follow-up Enforcements FY2014
Nr registered letters Nr garnishments Nr bailiffs
within 180 days within 180 days within 180 days
(1) (2) (3)
Simplified -0.070 -0.019 0.002
(0.018) (0.015) (0.003)
Enforcement 0.110 0.071 0.000
(0.025) (0.021) (0.004)
Simplified*Enforcement -0.057 -0.032 -0.000
(0.027) (0.022) (0.005)
Control mean 0.159 0.061 0.002
N 25,855 20,338 30,348
Note: The table presents treatment effect estimates from the regression discontinuity design
analysis embedded in the payment reminder experiment (TPR FY2014). Simplified is a dummy
variable equal to one for taxpayers who received a simplified letter. Enforcement is a dummy
variable equal to one for liability amounts above the cut-off value. Control variables are listed
in Table 3.1. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by date of letter receipt.
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Table C13: Replication of TPR experiment in FY2015
Probability of some payment





+ Tax Morale -0.012
(0.003)




S + Deterrence=Simplified 0.001
S + Tax Morale=Simplified 0.007
S + Deterrence + Tax Morale= S + Deterrence 0.011
Control mean 0.418
N 202,730
Note: The table presents results from the FY2015 TPR experiment, which replicated the
FY2014 TPR experiment. The sample is the universe of late payers in FY2015. Control vari-
ables are listed in Table 3.1. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by date of letter
receipt. p-values adjusted for multiple hypothesis testing (List et al., 2016).
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Table C14: Repeated Treatment Effects
Probability of some payment
14 days / follow-up
Sample of Taxpayers Sample of Taxpayers
late in FY2014 late in FY2014 and FY2015
(2) (1)
Simplified 2014 (S 2014) 0.001 0.011
(0.008) (0.012)
+ Deterrence 2014 (D 2014) -0.002 -0.010
(0.007) (0.010)
+ Tax Morale 2014 (TM 2014) -0.003 -0.016
(0.008) (0.018)
Simplified 2015 (S 2015) 0.025 0.107
(0.009) (0.013)
+ Deterrence 2015 (D 2015) 0.001 0.005
(0.004) (0.012)
+ Tax Morale 2015 (TM 2015) -0.004 -0.024
(0.004) (0.007)
S 2014 * S 2015 0.005 -0.020
(0.010) (0.015)
S 2014 * S + D 2015 -0.002 -0.011
(0.005) (0.017)
S 2014 * S + TM 2015 0.004 0.025
(0.004) (0.015)
S + D 2014 * S 2015 0.000 0.016
(0.009) (0.014)
S + D 2014 * S + D 2015 0.002 0.010
(0.005) (0.011)
S + D 2014 * S + TM 2015 -0.002 -0.021
(0.003) (0.014)
S + TM 2014 * S 2015 -0.007 0.005
(0.009) (0.021)
S + TM 2014 * S + D 2015 0.007 0.027
(0.005) (0.011)
S + TM 2014 * S + TM 2015 -0.002 -0.010
(0.002) (0.007)
P-values of tests:
S 2014 = Control 0.824 0.971
S 2015 = Control 0.308 0.001
S 2014 * S 2015 = S 2015 0.823 0.992
S + D 2014 = S 2014 0.947 0.945
S + D 2015 = S 2015 0.907 0.996
S + D 2014 * S + D 2015 = S 2014 * S + D 2015 0.986 0.582
S + TM 2014 = S 2014 0.976 0.751
S + TM 2015 = S 2015 0.993 0.948
S + TM 2014 * S + TM 2015 = S 2014 * S + TM 2015 0.165 0.959
Control mean 0.825 0.410
N 229,751 66,705
Note: The table present treatment effect estimates for repeated treatment in the payment re-
minders experiment. Sample size is limited to individuals who were late with payment in both
FY2014 and FY2015. For FY2015 treatment assignment both dummies for Deterrence and Tax
Morale equal one for individuals who received a letter with both a deterrence and tax morale
message. Control variables are listed in Table 3.1. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered
by date of letter receipt.
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